Iranian Reformists

Four Rug Companies Join Rugmark To Combat Child Labor

2005-08-26T17:36:00.000-07:00

: "Four Rug Companies Join Rugmark To Combat Child Labor
Thursday, August 25, 2005
By: Furniture World Magazine

Four rug companies recently committed to increased social standards and production transparency through membership in the nonprofit RUGMARK. A+ Designs, Amy Helfand, DuncanArts, and Mat the Basics have signed on to be licensees of RUGMARK, an inspection and certification program that verifies illegal child labor is not used and creates educational opportunities for children in the weaving communities of India, Nepal and Pakistan.

RUGMARK's innovative monitoring system enables both importers and retailers to sell their hand-woven rugs, confident that the product's integrity was not compromised by child exploitation. Last year, the sale of RUGMARK-certified carpets experienced 20% growth, indicating that the market is a viable mechanism for sustainable social change in South Asia. This most recent increase in collaboration between the carpet industry and RUGMARK underscores this growing trend.

When experienced artist Amy Helfand began to transition her abstract landscape collages into contemporary wool rugs, she explored RUGMARK out of her concern that children might be exploited during the weaving. 'When I was looking for a manufacturer to translate my artwork into a rug, I contacted RUGMARK for a list of companies who had pledged not to use child labor,' she explains. 'As I began to make more rugs, it only made sense to become a RUGMARK licensee so that my business would reflect a philosophy of integrity.'

A+ Designs owner Alicia Keshishian is among the growing list of RUGMARK licensees whose intent is to raise industry labor standards. Her passion for color and texture was inherited from her own family of accomplished artists. Keshishian was motivated to join RUGMARK as"

Reuters.com - Criminal Anarchist Akbar Ganji Captured

2005-06-11T07:19:00.000-07:00

International News Article | Reuters.com: "Iran reporter back in jail after going missing
Sat Jun 11, 2005 04:17 AM ET

TEHRAN (Reuters) - An Iranian investigative journalist, jailed for linking officials to political murders, was back behind bars on Saturday and resuming a hunger strike after vanishing for three days.
Akbar Ganji was granted home leave last month to have medical checks for asthma and back pains.

Iranian authorities said he should have been back in jail on Wednesday but had given them the slip.

On Saturday, Ganji returned alone to Tehran's Evin prison, clutching a hold-all and a bag of medicines.

"Now that I have gone back to prison, I will resume my hunger strike," he told reporters. "All political prisoners must be freed."

He was jailed in 2001 after publishing articles implicating top officials to the murder of political dissidents.

Human rights' lawyer Mohammad Saifzadeh said Tehran's prosecutor had turned down an extension to Ganji's home leave.

"But the reason he did not show up for three days was to protest at the way agents raided his home," he told Reuters.

Ganji's wife Massoumeh Shafii, waiting at the prison, said she had no idea where her husband had been for the last three days but thought he was in good spirits.

"When they put pressure on him, he automatically picks up self-confidence," she added.

Iran has a dismal record on press freedoms, closing down more than 100 liberal publications and jailing several journalists in a concerted crackdown on reformist media since 2000.

© Reuters 2005. All Rights Reserved"

Ruthless Anarchist Akbar Ganji Slips Away from Justice

2005-06-09T16:24:00.000-07:00

IC Publications: "09/06/2005 09:34 TEHRAN (AFP)
Dissident Iranian journalist on the run, says judiciary
Iran's hardline judiciary claimed Thursday a prominent dissident journalist jailed for linking top officials to a string of murders has fled into hiding while on leave from prison for medical treatment.

The comments published in the press contradicted the version given the day earlier by the wife of Akbar Ganji, who has said her husband was likely rearrested following his release from jail on May 29 for medical treatment.

"Ganji's arrest warrant has been issued but he has run away and gone into hiding," the Shargh newspaper quoted Tehran's hardline prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, as saying.

Leave was given for seven days initially, which could be extended if he produced a medical certificate. Ganji had complained of suffering from chronic asthma, and had begun a hunger strike to protest his condition.

His wife, who said she has not heard from Ganji since Tuesday evening, has offered a different version of events. "The judiciary must have arrested him while he was out to see some friends".

"They pretend they do not have him, but it is a lie as they have lied to us frequently before," Massoumeh Shafiie told AFP.

According to Shafiie, some 10 officials from the Tehran prosecution office had come for Ganji Tuesday. They were carrying an arrest warrant signed by Mortazavi, she said.

Although the agents left empty handed, she said Ganji did not return home.

"The children and I are scared of leaving home because there are still agents watching our street," she said by telephone.

In 2001, Ganji was sentenced to six years behind bars over articles he wrote linking senior regime officials, including ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, to the serial murders of several intellectuals and writers.

Rafsanjani is seeking a comeback as president in the June 17 election, and is currently placed as frontrunner in the race.

Last month he also published an attack against supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claimed "physical and mental torture" was being used in Evin prison to extract confessions from prisoners and called on Iranians to boycott the June 17 election.

The judiciary later said it was investigating the text.

New York-based Human Rights Watch has voiced its fears for Ganji's safety, and called for the re-arrest warrant to be rescinded.

"The judiciary's decision to extend Akbar Ganji's medical leave apparently carries little weight," said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch.

"Chief prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has shown once again that he is calling the shots in the judiciary and is willing to go to any lengths to silence his critics."

Human Rights Watch said "powerful people were implicated by Akbar Ganji's investigations. They are willing to put him behind bars again even though he has committed no crime."

Ganji's family and lawyers, including Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, have been campaigning for Ganji to be granted an immediate and unconditional release."

6 Students Skip Lunch Iran Focus-Claims Yazd University students on hunger strike as protests rise

2005-06-06T05:56:00.000-07:00

Iran Focus-News - Special Wire - Iran university students on hunger strike as protests rise: "Iran university students on hunger strike as protests rise Mon. 6 Jun 2005

Iran Focus
Tehran, Jun. 06 – Students in the University of Yazd (central Iran) have started a hunger strike today in protest against a recent government clampdown on student activists.

The students said they began their hunger strike after recent threats by the authorities against them. A number of students have been arrested by the secret police, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, on bogus charges.

Campus protests have been reported in a dozen universities across Iran in recent days. Universities of Tehran, Amir Kabir (Tehran), Zanjan, Isfahan, Jahrom, Khoy, Shahr-e Kord and Zabol are among the universities across the country that have witnessed student protests and, on some occasions, clashes between students and security forces in recent days.

As student protests continue to rise, the government has widened its crackdown on campuses. Last week, eight students in Tehran University, including Karim Assayesh, an activist in Tehran University’s Law School, were summoned to the Disciplinary Committee to face expulsion. The Islamic Revolutionary Court in Tehran last week sentenced Mojtaba Najafi, a student activist in Tehran’s Allameh Tabatabai University, to four months in prison."

Mostafa Tajzadeh and the Failed MeK for Al Qaeda Ansar al-Islam Trade

2005-06-03T21:37:00.000-07:00

[casi] News, 01-08/05/03 (6): "http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/05/int13.htm

* FEW SIGNS OF US-IRAN RAPPROACHMENT
by Karl Vick
Dawn, from The Washington Post, 5th May

[.....]

More immediately, conservatives and reformers in Iran have united in
demanding that US forces in Iraq disarm and repatriate to Iran members of
the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, or People's Mujahideen, an Iranian exile group that
has fought Iranian governments since the 1970s and was armed and supported
by Saddam Hussein since the Iran-Iraq war.

The State Department considers the People's Mujahideen a terrorist
organization, but after bombing its positions in Iraq for several days, the
US Central Command negotiated a ceasefire that will allow the group to
retain most of its arms, at least temporarily.

The ceasefire agreement has drawn a strong rebuke from Iranian officials.
The head of the Iranian military's Revolutionary Guard last week said US
treatment of the group would test the consistency of the 'war against
terrorism'.

Mostafa Tajzadeh, a key strategist in the country's reform movement,
suggested that if the United States handed over members of the group to
Iran, Iranian hardliners might be persuaded to turn over several relatively
senior members of Al Qaeda who fled Afghanistan and found refuge in Iran, as
well as leaders of Ansar al-Islam, a Muslim guerrilla group that was driven
out of northern Iraq by US forces.

During the US-led war in Iraq, Iran's cooperation with the United States
amounted to what one diplomat described as "mostly a matter of what they
didn't do." Iran closed its border to members of Ansar al-Islam. Violations
of Iranian airspace by US warplanes and even errant missiles were scarcely
protested. Iran played co-host to Iraqi opposition groups backed by the Bush
administration.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shia group
headquartered in Tehran since 1980, is Iran's closest ally among the
anti-Saddam groups. But opposition figures say Iran also has close relations
with Iraq's two main Kurdish parties and with the Iraqi National Congress,
whose chairman, Ahmed Chalabi, is championed by Pentagon officials."

Khatami's Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh Back In Court,

2005-06-03T21:27:00.000-07:00

Brief on Iran, No. 1626: "Khatami's Deputy Interion Minister Back In Court, Agence France Presse, April 24

TEHRAN - The embattled deputy interior minister Mostafa Tajzadeh appeared before a Tehran court Tuesday over his presumed role in a violent unrest last year surrounding a pro-reform student conference.

Tajzadeh, already sentenced to a year in prison on vote fraud charges, responded to questions posed by administrative court judge Ali Nazari Mofrad, state radio said, but gave no further details.

The deputy minister, who was supposed to supervise the June 8 presidential polls, is being tried in connection with several days of unrest in the western city of Khoramabad last August."

Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh Convicted of ballot-rigging in the 2000 parliamentary election.

2005-06-03T21:22:00.000-07:00

P.I.R.I� News� Headlines (Fri� 80/02/14� A.H.S): " In a latest setback, his close ally, Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh, was barred from overseeing the polls Wednesday after an appeals court upheld his conviction for ballot-rigging in the February 2000 parliamentary election. "

Persian Students in the UK - Weblog Ganji is Healthy!

2005-06-01T20:35:00.000-07:00

Persian Students in the UK - Weblog: "officials of the judiciary, who are abusing their legal powers to silence his voice, so much so that even his attorney, Dr. Nasser Zarafshan"

Mehdi Karoubi Shows Lack of Integrity in Attack on Rafsanjani - New York Times

2005-05-24T21:09:00.000-07:00

Iran's Ex-Leader Seeks Return in the Trappings of a Reformer - New York Times: "One rival candidate, Mehdi Karoubi, a centrist cleric and former speaker of Parliament, laid out Mr. Rafsanjani's past democratic failings in a widely circulated letter. He attacked Mr. Rafsanjani for not defending candidates rejected by the Guardians Council in previous elections, for allowing the Intelligence Ministry to dabble in the economy, and indirectly for the deaths of dissident intellectuals during his presidency from 1989 to 1997, killings later traced to intelligence agents. "

Islamic Iran Participation Front Challenges Ayatollah Jannati's Integrity

2005-04-19T18:36:00.000-07:00

Iran News - Iran judiciary urged to clarify Jannati's remarks "Iran News - Iran judiciary urged to clarify Jannati�s remarks: "Iran judiciary urged to clarify Jannati’s remarks

Tuesday, April 19, 2005 - ©2005 IranMania.com
LONDON, April 19 (IranMania) - A reformist party, in an open letter to the judiciary, called for a clear response to remarks made by Guardians Council Secretary Ahmad Jannati during last Friday prayers.

The letter by Islamic Iran Participation Front, a copy of which was faxed to IRNA on Monday, said Jannati’s remarks indicated he is aware of some of the most confidential judicial cases.

“The question is where he gets these information from? It is the duty of the judiciary to uphold public rights. As a political faction, we warn against the grave consequences of violating public rights and believe it is the main reason distancing the people from the officialdom,“ it noted.

Jannati had told the Friday congregation the judiciary is not implementing a number of death sentences handed out to dissidents.

“People could have been executive immediately, had it not been for the interests of the Islamic Republic. There are cases in which death sentences were confirmed by the Appeals Court whereas the convict is still alive,“ he said.""

President Khatami has always been loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2005-04-07T21:51:00.000-07:00

Notes on Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: "A special note about President Khatami: While openly and honestly a Reformist President Khatami has always been loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unfortunately in the broad coalition that coalesced around Khatami opponents of Velayat-e Faqih used their position to attempt to reverse the revolution."

Explosion at office of Iranian women's rights activive

2005-03-02T08:25:00.000-08:00

Iran News: "Explosion at office of Iranian women's rights activist

1 March 2005 Agence France Presse
English
Copyright Agence France-Presse, 2005 All reproduction and presentation rights reserved.

TEHRAN, March 1 (AFP) -

A prominent Iranian women's rights activist said Tuesday her office has been badly damaged by a bomb overnight.

"Some kind of a hand-made bomb has been thrown into my office through the ventilator, burning up all my documents and files," Shahla Lahiji told AFP.

"Last night's blast was so loud that many neighbours thought it was a gas explosion or something. I hope the police can arrest the person responsible for this soon," she added.

Lahiji, 62, is a writer, translator and director of Roshangaran, a prominent publishing house of books on women's issues.

She was among a group of dissidents and activists arrested for taking part in a conference on Iran sponsored by the Heinrich Boell Institute in Berlin in 2000, and charged with propagating against the regime and acting against national security.

Later released on bail, her initial four and a half year sentence was reduced by an appeals court to a fine of 5,000,000 rials (600 dollars)."

Iran News - After 25, Shah of Iran's son hoping for change

2005-02-19T19:48:00.000-08:00

Iran News - After 25, Shah of Iran's son hoping for change: "After 25, Shah of Iran's son hoping for change

Friday, January 16, 2004 - ©2003 IranMania.com
WASHINGTON, Jan 15 (AFP) - Twenty five years after the fall of the Shah of Iran, his exiled son, Reza Pahlavi, says he still wants to be a catalyst for change in the country but that its Islamic regime is incapable of reforming itself.

The 43-year-old Pahlavi said in an interview with AFP that the new crisis caused by the blacklisting of reformist candidates for the Iran's February 20 national elections highlighted the country's problems.

"It is not a crisis between so-called liberal and radical factions, but between the whole regime and the people. This regime is not reformable. There must be a fundamental change," said Pahlavi.

The only way for the Iranian people to make their voice heard, he added would be "to boycott" the election as no elected body had been able to stand up to the conservative clerics led by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Scores of Iranian reformist MPs have vowed to maintain a sit-in in the Iranian parliament, despite the intervention of the supreme leader to order the Guardians Council, a 12 member religious body, to lift its disqualification of the reformist candidates for the election.

Pahlavi, a former pilot and father of two who now lives in the Washington area, was training on a US air base in Texas when his father, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was forced to leave Iran on January 16, 1979, two months before the triumphant return to Iran of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 10 years later.

He said it was a difficult period for him and his family.

But refusing to join any political party, Pahlavi says he wants to act as a "catalyst" for change by campaigning for a national referendum for democratic and secular change.

On top of his book on the topic, "Winds of Change", Pahlavi appears regularly on radio and television programmes broadcast into Iran from abroad. Internet has also aided his efforts to reach Iranians.

Pahlavi said he has also had discrete contacts with some members of the Shiite Muslim clergy in Iran who favour a separation of religious and state powers, an even with the grandson of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Hossein Khomeini, who is now a critic of the regime.

Acknowledging that there were also problems with his father's authoritarian regime, Pahlavi is careful not to raise the possibility of a return to the monarchy. He said the Iranian people must choose between a republic or a constitutional monarchy.

Despite its record, the monarchy was at least more modern and progressive, he added.

"Today we are in a situation where instead of being 50 years ahead we are one or two centuries behind."

The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq has encouraged Pahlavi that he can play a role in a new Iran.

"This regime has so far succeeded in hiding between the Taliban in Kabul and Saddam's regime in Baghdad. Today it is a regime that is withdrawing and can feel that it is weakening," said the shah's son.

Iran is a country "with 70 percent of the population aged under 30" that wants to be free and modern, according to Pahlavi. Change, he added, "is a question of time.""

The Heinrich Boell Foundation

2005-02-17T10:02:00.000-08:00

home: "The Heinrich Boell Foundation is a political non-profit foundation affiliated with the party of Alliance90/The Greens. Striving to promote democratic ideas, civil society and international understanding, our work centers on the core political values of ecology, democracy, solidarity, gender equality and non-violence."

Iran Daily: Dissident cleric Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari Released from Prison Early

2005-02-06T20:32:00.000-08:00

Iran Daily: "Eshkevari Free

TEHRAN, Feb. 6--Dissident cleric Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari was released from prison Sunday after serving two-thirds of his seven-year jail term, one of his relatives told IRNA.
He was sentenced on charges of spreading lies, insulting Islamic sanctities, and participating in a controversial conference in Berlin, denounced by some officials here as a foreign attempt to subvert the Islamic state.
An appeals court in Tehran once quashed his death sentence, handed down by the Special Court for the clergy on apostasy charges.
The mid-ranking cleric was arrested on August 5, 2000 upon his return from a conference on Iran in Berlin sponsored by the Heinrich Boell Foundation, which is linked to Germany's Green party.
Earlier reports had said Eshkevari's health had deteriorated in prison and doctors said chronic diabetes and mental breakdown were to blame.
Fifteen pro-reform activists and two translators attended the controversial in Berlin. They were all summoned to the Revolutionary Court and faced trials, with the exception of Eshkevari, whose case was referred to the Special Court of the Clergy court."

Massoud Behnoud

2005-02-01T09:23:00.000-08:00

Behnoud.com: "Massoud Behnoud, a prominent Iranian journalist and writer, was born on 27 July 1947 in Tehran. He started his work as a journalist in 1964. During his long career he worked as an investigating journalist for different newspapers. He founded more than 20 newspapers and magazines, none of them are currently in publication.

Between 1971-79 he was the chief editor of the most influential and popular daily in Iran "Ayandegan". This newspaper was closed in 1979 on the orders of Ayatollah Khomeini and its editor and senior staff were all imprisoned. During 1972-79 he also worked as a producer, writer and speaker for the "National Iranian Radio and Television". In 1979 Massoud Behnoud became the chief editor of the weekly "Tehran-e Mosavar", which was shut down by the Islamic government after 30 issues during the crackdown of all non-governmental and independent newspapers.

Between 1972-1979 Massoud Behnoud was one of the most important and active figures of the trade union of Iranian journalists.

From 1979 till 1985, after the closure of "Tehran-e Mosavar" as well as the trade union of Iranian journalists Massoud Behnoud didn´t have any possibilities to continue his work. From 1981-1985 he led a low profile existence (more or less in hiding) in Teheran.

In 1985 he was one of the founders of "Adineh", the most prominent and influential social and literary monthly in Iran. For more than 13 years Massoud Behnoud was one of the leading members of the editorial board and published a great number of essays and commentaries in "Adineh". In his articles he supported the freedom of speech and of the press. He struggled against censorship and tried to support the free circulation of information.

Once in 1995 the trade union of Armenian writers invited 22 Iranian writers and journalist for a visit to Armenistan. Massoud Behnoud was one of these delegates. In a conspiracy to kill all of the delegates the Iranian security police tried to divert the bus they were travelling with on a steep valley. They only survived by chance.

In 1996 the chief editor of "Adineh", Faraj Sarkohi, was arrested and in 1998 "Adineh" was closed on the order of the Islamic court. The imprisonment of Faraj Sarkohi aroused an International campaign from Reporter sans Frontieres, the International PEN-Center, amnesty international and other human right organizations as well as the European Union.

In 1997 Massoud Behnoud joined a host of other journalists to publish the Teheran daily "Jameh" His articles and commentaries were received with a great deal of public interest. With the closure of "Jameh" he continued his work in the other newly found dailies "Tous", "Neshat", "Asr-e Azadegan" and the most lately "Bonyan". All of this newspapers have been closed down.

Following a series of murders in 1999 during which some prominent Iranian writers and intellectuals have been killed by the security police, Massoud Behnoud´s name was also discovered on the list of those writers and intellectuals who hade been earmarked for assassination.

After the crackdown of the Iranian newspapers Massoud Behnoud together with other well known journalists like Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, Akbar Ganji, Emadeddin Baqi and Ebrahim Nabavi was imprisoned for a period of 23 months. He had to fine a sum equivalent to 15.000 USD. The court accused him of "having provoked public opinion, insulting the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the commander of the Revolutionary guards". The sentence against Massoud Behnoud and other journalists aroused a lot of protest from Reporter sans Frontieres, the International PEN-Center, amnesty international and other human right organizations.

After serving a a period of 6 months, two of which he spent in solitary confinement, Massoud Behnoud was released temporarily on bail of some 40,000 USD.

On 1 June 2002 while Massoud Behnoud was engaged in a European lecture tour the Iranian juridical authorities announced that an order for his arrest has been once again issued. On base of this order he had to come back to Iran to serve the remainder of his 16 months term in prison.

It is also possible that they put him again to court on charge of "having insulted the Supreme Leader" by his writing. This charge is one of the most dangerous charges in Iran."

Iran News: Former Iranian MP Mohsen Mirdamadi summoned to court

2005-01-25T08:29:00.000-08:00

Iran News: "BBC Monitoring Middle East. London: Jan 24, 2005
Former Iranian MP summoned to court
Mon Jan 24, 2005 12:02

Former Iranian MP summoned to court
BBC Monitoring Middle East. London: Jan 24, 2005

Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), Tehran, in Persian 0954 24 Jan05/BBC Monitoring/(c) BBC
Text of report by Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) web site

Tehran, 24 January: A member of the Central Council of the Islamic Iran Participation Front [and former MP], Mohsen Mirdamadi appeared before Bench 8 of the Government Employees Court this morning.

According to ILNA, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC] lodged a complaint against Mohsen Mirdamadi and charged him with spreading lies to disturb the public opinion in one of his television interviews during which he protested against the military's involvement in political affairs. The verdict for staying the proceedings was issued for the case at the time.

A while ago, the assistant attorney of the Tehran public court protested against the verdict and the case was transferred to Bench 8 of the Government Employees Court. Three days ago, Mirdamadi was summoned and consequently reported to the court today to answer the interrogator's questions.

Credit: Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), Tehran, in Persian 0954 24 Jan 05"

Mousavi-Lari stands firm behind reform plans - June 1998

2005-01-15T13:30:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - June 1998: "Iranian government stands firm behind reform plans

TEHRAN, Iran (Reuters) -- Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's choice for interior minister has vowed to carry on the democratic reforms that cost his predecessor his job at the hands of the conservatives.

The daily Salam newspaper, close to the Khatami government, on Thursday published a four-point program from minister-designate Abdolvahed Mousavi-Lari spelling out his goals and policies if he is confirmed in his post next week by the Majlis, or parliament.

Top of the list is "political development," the potent slogan of democratic pluralism that helped the moderate Khatami overwhelm his mainstream conservative rival in general elections in May, 1997.

"The promotion of dialogue between different groups and political tendencies within the framework of the law is a necessity," the text of the program said.

Mousavi-Lari, a 44-year-old cleric and now Khatami's vice- president for legal and parliamentary affairs, also pledged to expand social rights, including those for women, and to promote pluralism within the existing Islamic system.

"The topics of these plans fit within the program of the esteemed president (Khatami) and seek to continue the services of the government during the past year," the program said.

The president's bid to establish what he calls the rule of law, or "civil society," has suffered a series of setbacks in recent weeks, including the impeachment of the progressive interior minister on June 21 by the conservative-led Majlis.

Deputies charged former Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri with aggravating social and political tensions by authorizing opposition rallies, one of which ended in clashes with hardliners.

They were also incensed that he used his powers to put Khatami loyalists in key provincial posts and unabashedly backed the mayor of Tehran, now on trial for corruption, as the innocent victim of a hardline witch hunt.

The Majlis forced out Nouri after an impeachment debate, setting the stage for next week's parliamentary showdown. In doing so, it also outraged pro-Khatami forces, including Iran's biggest student movement.

However, Mousavi-Lari's manifesto made it clear that neither he nor the president were prepared to back down. Nor was there any sign that Khatami had yielded to the conservatives and consulted Majlis leaders before naming his new candidate.

The new program also promised to implement a discarded article of the constitution requiring popular election of city and town councils, and to increase participation by women in social activities -- key planks in Khatami's campaign platform.

Prospects for Mousavi-Lari's confirmation were uncertain, with the innate conservativism of the majority of MPs balanced by respect for Khatami's 70 percent electoral mandate.

"Majlis experts believe that President Khatami might face an uphill task for getting approval of Mousavi-Lari because of existing tension between the two politically important factions," said the Tehran Times, adding the president would have been better served by consulting lawmakers in advance.

"Still there is time, a joint discussion between the president and leading Majlis deputies on the proposed interior minister can bring the two sides closer," it said."

Mousavi Lari calls for Presidential Elections on May 19, 2005

2005-01-15T13:26:00.000-08:00

Iran Daily: "New Election Date Set

Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari

TEHRAN, Nov. 17--Interior Ministry on Wednesday proposed a new date for the ninth presidential elections.
Interior Minister Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari said Wednesday his ministry has informed the Guardians Council of its decision to hold the elections on May 19, 2005, ISNA reported.
The minister insisted that the initial date, namely May 13, 2004, rejected by the council was set following expert deliberations. However, he said that "we decided to propose a second date out of respect for the councilors".
Commenting on the judiciary's intention to set up a social protection taskforce presumably to uphold social values and whether President Mohammad Khatami supports the idea, Lari said he was not aware of the president's response but the issue was raised during a meeting of the Supreme National Security Council on Tuesday.
"The issue needs further expert study," he said.
Lari cautioned against the overlapping of its operations with parallel bodies"

CNN - Iran's hard-line parliament OKs Khatami's interior minister Mousavi-Lari - July 22, 1998

2005-01-15T13:23:00.000-08:00

CNN - Iran's hard-line parliament OKs Khatami's interior minister - July 22, 1998: "Iran's hard-line parliament OKs Khatami's interior minister
Verdict Thursday in Tehran mayor's trial
July 22, 1998
Web posted at: 8:30 p.m. EDT (2030 GMT)
TEHRAN, Iran (CNN) -- In a bid to ease tensions between moderates and conservatives, Iran's hard-line parliament Wednesday approved President Mohammad Khatami's choice of a moderate cleric for the powerful post of interior minister.

But the spirit of conciliation could be put to the test Thursday, when Tehran's popular mayor, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, a moderate ally of Khatami, goes to court to hear the verdict in his trial on corruption charges.

If found guilty of embezzlement, bribery and mismanagement, Karbaschi could face a long prison term and stiff fines. His supporters insist the charges have been trumped up by his conservative opponents in an effort to undermine moderate political forces pushing for more openness in Iranian society.

"No one is interested in the rights or wrongs of the mayor's actions," one political commentator, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters. "This is a battle in the political war between supporters of President Khatami and the conservatives."

On Wednesday, the parliament voted 177-67 to confirm Khatami's choice of Abdolvahed Mousavi-Lari as interior minister, with the power to appoint provincial administrators, oversee elections and approve political rallies.

Khatami's last interior minister, Abdollah Nouri, was impeached by hard-liners after allowing public demonstrations that rocked the country.

Mousavi-Lari supports liberalization policies

Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a leader of the conservative majority in parliament, said most of his faction believed Mousavi-Lari wasn't "competent" to be interior minister.

"We ... decided not to oppose Mousavi-Lari in an attempt to reduce tension," Bahonar said, while noting that Mousavi- Lari, like Nouri before him, could be impeached.

Before the vote, Khatami, a moderate cleric elected in a landslide in May 1997, told deputies that "today we must accept that people do have rights, and we must pave the way for the materialization of these rights."

"In this regard, the interior minister holds a very sensitive position," he said.

Mousavi-Lari has vowed to carry on the government's liberalization policies, including greater political pluralism and expanded rights for women. He also signaled a break from Nouri's more confrontational style, meeting with hard-liners and promising to work within the letter of the law.

"My style is dialogue and mutual understanding," he said.

Mousavi-Lari was deputy minister of culture and Islamic guidance from 1982 to 1992, when Khatami served as minister. He quit when Khatami was sacked by hard-liners who objected to his attempts to increase press freedom and reduce restrictions on television and movies.

Reuters contributed to this report."

FT.com / World / Middle East & Africa - Iran's women continue to defy hardliners

2005-01-15T04:21:00.000-08:00

FT.com / World / Middle East & Africa - Iran's women continue to defy hardliners: "Iran's women continue to defy hardliners
By Najmeh Bozorgmehr
Published: January 15 2005 02:00 | Last updated: January 15 2005 02:00

The six Iranian women and four men who make up the Mehr-Banoo classical music band are given a warm reception by an enthusiastic crowd in northern Tehran.

But the presence of female performers, wearing yellow scarves and long black shirts and trousers, outnumbering the men in the band, poses a direct challenge to Iran's hardliners, who would like to see greater restrictions on women.

Mahroo, a woman singer in the band, is not allowed to sing solo, as the regime regards it as un-Islamic for women to sing to men. Instead, she is accompanied by Hamed, a male singer.

"It is difficult to co-ordinate voices, but we do what can be done. I am happy as long as I can sing," Mahroo says.

As a woman, she is at least able to perform to a mixed audience, thanks to some liberalisation following the reform movement that followed the election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997.

But even this, and other relaxations in social and political rules, are now at risk, following a shift to the right that took place after the parliamentary elections last February.

The conservatives won back control of the previously reformist legislative body after the Guardian Council, a constitutional watchdog, rejected more than 2,000 reformist would-be candidates, including 80 sitting deputies.

Iran's hardliners had capitalised on widespread disillusion with politics, due to the slow pace of reforms. And the balance could tilt further in their favour in presidential elections expected in June.

But despite their growing political strength, the conservatives face a challenge in the social arena. Their main source of support comes from the traditional sections of Iranian society. But there is widespread dissatisfaction with the regime among Iranians under 35 years old, who make up about 70 per cent of the population of 70m.

Many are highly educated and with access to internet and satellite TV, making attempts at censorship futile.

"The mental gap between the rulers and young people is now between 100 and 150 years," said Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, a former vice-president who resigned in protest at parliament's conservative shift.

Young people are able to ignore the intense power struggles within the leadership and go their own way thanks to the "institutionalisation of the reforms", says Mr Abtahi.

"During the past seven years, we managed to help society get on a train. .. It may stop because of differences in the engine room, but whenever it starts moving, it goes in the same direction - towards reforms. This path is irreversible," he says confidently.

One of the most obvious manifestations of the gulf between Iran's conservative hierarchy and the country's young is in the Islamic dress code. A quarter-century after the Islamic revolution made wearing the hijab compulsory for women outside the home, the issue remains controversial.

Many young women ignore the loose dresses recommended by the religious establishment and instead wear tight trousers, covered with short overcoats or flimsy cotton shirts. Their headscarves slip backwards to reveal as much hair as possible, and they wear heavy make-up.

Last summer, a Tehran police chief announced during a crackdown on women for non-observance of hijab that the arrest of "100 street supermodels" would resolve the problem. But this proved not to be the case, as many women responded with defiance.

Recently a member of parliament, who was also a cleric, tried to beat a woman journalist inside the parliament in protest at what he considered to be her improper dress. He was prevented by other parliamentarians from doing so.

Fatemeh Rakei, a former MP, sees a "short-sighted and restricted interpretation of Islam" as the main problem. "We are suffering from a horrible paradox. Some claim that they are serving Islam, whereas they are striking the biggest blows against Islam, because their methods are outdated and their Islam has few customers. The stick is not today's language any more."

Social challenges are not restricted to cosmopolitan Tehran. Senior clerics have raised concerns over the spread of "corruption" in the holy city of Qom, where women are expected to wear the all-encompassing black chador.

The parliamentary research centre in Tehran is working on a standard uniform for women that would fully comply with Islamic codes. But experts say that even if it was approved, it is very unlikely that people would comply. MPs behind the proposal refused to be interviewed.

Mahroo does not seem too worried about the future of her singing - even if power does fall more fully into the hands of the conservatives. "I do not want to think about presidential elections. That has nothing to do with me.""

Iran's Tug of war: President and Parliament against Expediency and Guardians Council

2005-01-14T12:24:00.000-08:00

Iran's Tug of war: President and Parliament against Expediency and Guardians Council: "Deputy says Majlis would not bend to accept GC's budget rise

Vice Chairman of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Mohsen Armin here on Monday said the deputies would "under no condition" ever accept the recent verification by the Expediency Council (EC) to increase the annual budget of the Guardian Council (GC).

Armin, talking to reporters after Majlis' open session, said the EC's decision had been illegal, stressing that the Majlis would not notify the state institutions of the decision.

"The EC's decision in favor of the Guardian Council had been politically motivated, and the efforts to approve the GC's huge budget rise had all been meant to humiliate the Majlis and the government," he said.

The government had increased GC's budget for the next Iranian calendar year of 1382 (starting March 21) to 40.4 billion rials, which was accordingly endorsed by the Majlis.

However, the Guardian Council in its debates over the budget bill said 40.4 billion rials was not enough for the council, and returned the bill to the Majlis calling for increasing the budget to 160 billion rials.

The GC's request was not approved by the Majlis. Therefore, the GC and the Majlis took their dispute to the Expediency Council (EC) for final arbitration.

The EC in its Saturday meeting approved to raise the GC's budget to 100.4 billion rials. This accordingly drew the sharp criticism of the deputies who maintained that the councils had bypassed the legislative in approving the budget rise.

Armin said the EC's verification contradicts the Constitution and is not at all applicable, adding that the Majlis decision to form a committee to resolve the dispute with the council was thus "not necessary".

"If the GC requires 10.4 billion rials to carry out its constitutional duties, the Interior Ministry will then need ten times more that budget," he said.

He said the whole costs of holding the second local councils elections had amounted to only 4.5 billion rials, stressing that the GC's claim that the budget of 40.4 billion rials for holding the seventh Majlis elections in 1382 would not suffice is not justifiable.

President Mohammad Khatami, he said, had already reiterated that he would provide the shortcomings in GC's budget from the credits that have been allocated to him.

"However, it is regrettable to see that the Guardian Council kept on insisting that their request for the budget hike must be approved," Armin said.

"This was an innovation, and was merely meant to humiliate the Majlis and the government.""

Netiran>Who's Who>Who's Update>Detail>Mr. Mohsen Armin

2005-01-14T12:17:00.000-08:00

Netiran>Who's Who>Who's Update>Detail>Mr. Mohsen Armin: "Mr. Armin, Mohsen

6th Majlis Members

Netiran, Jul. 1st, 2004,

Date of Birth:
1954
Place of Birth:
Khorramabad, Lorestan
Education:
B.S., Electronics

Other Positions:

Biography:
Constituency (City - Province): Tehran, Rey, Shemiranat va Islamshahr - Tehran"

2005-01-14T12:11:00.000-08:00

The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) here Sunday accepted the resignation of Tehran MP Mohsen Armin. : "IRNA - 2004/03/14
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) here Sunday accepted the resignation of Tehran MP Mohsen Armin. Armin`s resignation was accepted by a vote of 103 in favor and 49 against with 7 abstentions from a total of 194 votes cast. Other resignations accepted by the Majlis are those of Tehran MP Fatemeh Haqiqatjou and Orumiyeh MP Mir Mahmoud Yeganli. One hundred eight MPs tendered their resignations to Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi on February 1 in protest at the mass disqualification of candidates wanting to stand in the 7th Majlis election. As per Article 92 of the Majlis by-laws, any Majlis deputy can resign from his/her post, but the resignation becomes effective only after acceptance by Majlis. However, Article 95 of the same by-laws provides that if the offer to resign of any MP results in the Majlis failing to reach a quorum, the offer cannot be passed upon by Majlis. Karroubi expressed hope the acceptance of Armin`s resignation would herald the end of resignations by Sixth Majlis MPs. "Armin`s resignation has been accepted and I hope it would be the last, and we would see no more resignations of MPs," Karroubi said. "

"Rightists seeking absolute power": Armin

2005-01-14T12:07:00.000-08:00

Iran Mania News: ""Rightists seeking absolute power": Armin

Wednesday, January 12, 2005 - ©2004 IranMania.com
LONDON, Jan 12 (IranMania) - Leading reformist and former MP Mohsen Armin said following their success in the seventh parliamentary and city council elections, hardline rightists are determined to win the next presidential elections to assume absolute power.

In an interview with ILNA on Tuesday, Armin said that to achieve their goal, they might even sacrifice their traditional allies.

He stressed that the presidential election be held in a democratic manner, reformists will certainly win.

Armin, also a member of Islamic Revolution's Mujahideen Organization allied to President Mohammad Khatami, also said that the trend of reforms was irreversible.
"Nothing will go back to the pre-1997 presidential election period which led to the rise of the reform movement," he said.

The maverick political activist conceded the reformist movement's failure to live up to their pledges due to political challenges.

"As a result, today an atmosphere of distrust and pessimism has befallen the society," he said.

Noting that the extremist members of the conservative camp lack the characteristics of a political current, he said they are over-dependant on political powerhouses which, if detached, will lead to their immediate fall.

"Winning the city council gave the rightist camp the confidence to show an even stronger presence in the parliamentary polls," he said, adding that mass disqualifications by the Guardians Council further pave the way for their landmark success.

"Now they want full control for dominating the executive branch," he said."

Iranian MP Mohsen Armin says judge issued biased verdict against him

2005-01-14T12:05:00.000-08:00

Iranian MP Mohsen Armin says judge issued biased verdict against him: "10/28/03
Iranian MP Mohsen Armin says judge issued biased verdict against him
A lawmaker from Tehran Mohsen Armin said on Tuesday that the judge issued a biased verdict against him in the case lodged by an MP from Kuhdasht, IRNA reported from Tehran.

He told reporters that the judge sentenced him to six months in prison and one year deprivation of social rights for alleged insult to his colleague.

He denied the charge and said that the parliament's audio-visual networks proved his innocence.

"I have not insulted the MP from Kuhdasht and there is no evidence to prove such an allegation," he said.

"On the contrary, the plaintiff himself repeatedly insulted me and some other MPs in the worst term and there are evidences to the effect in the audio-visual networks of the parliament," Armin said.

Armin said that the judge sentenced him to six months in prison for the alleged insult and one-year deprivation of social rights for not appearing in the court.

"It is clear what is behind the one year deprivation of social rights," he said, a reference to the political motive for such a sentence on the eve of the parliamentary elections slated for February 20.

He said that he will lodge a complaint against the judge for his biased verdict."

Times Online (UK) - Nobel lawyer to face Iran court

2005-01-13T17:07:00.000-08:00

Times Online - World: "World News

January 14, 2005
Nobel lawyer to face Iran court
By Michael Theodoulou
SHIRIN EBADI, the human-rights lawyer who won the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, has been summoned to appear before Iran’s feared Revolutionary Court or face arrest. She was not informed of any charge.
Her Nobel Prize was a huge source of pride to most Iranians, but her sudden global recognition embarrassed religious hardliners, whom she had infuriated by defending many high-profile political dissidents.She said that she had no idea why she had been told to appear before the Revolutionary Court, which deals with national security offences and has jailed many outspoken dissidents. “I am a lawyer and I know the limitations of my activities. Therefore I have done nothing illegal and I don’t know why I have been summoned.”

The summons puzzled most analysts, who suspected it was an attempt by Iran’s unpopular old guard to flex its muscles. If so, it is likely to backfire. Ms Ebadi’s profile has not been particularly high recently. Expectations that the Nobel Prize would boost the country’s embattled reformist camp, led by President Khatami, have been disappointed. Reformists were decisively beaten in parliamentary elections last year after most of their candidates were disqualified by the conservative Guardian Council.

There was speculation the old guard was reacting to a recent Iranian press report which said that Ms Ebadi might run for president in elections in June, although she is said to have denied any such intention. She has insisted that she will keep out of politics, confining her work to the legal field.

Yet hardliners have no shortage of grievances against Ms Ebadi, 57, whom they view as an agent of the West bent on undermining Iran’s Islamic values. She has called for the freeing of all political prisoners, a category that the hardline judiciary insists does not even exist.

Ms Ebadi has also taken on several high-profile cases, including one involving Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian journalist who died in custody in 2003 after receiving a blow to the head in a Tehran prison.

Ms Ebadi was also recently refused permission to stage a peaceful rally to protest against the executions of those aged under 18 in the Islamic Republic.

In 2000 Ms Ebadi was accused of distributing a videotaped confession of a hardliner who claimed that prominent conservative leaders were instigating physical attacks on pro-reform figures. She spent three weeks in jail after a closed trial."

Salamati Elected Reformist Council's Chief Sept 2004

2005-01-12T18:26:00.000-08:00

Iran Daily: "Salamati Elected Reformist Council's Chief

TEHRAN, Sept. 27--Mohammad Salamati was elected rotating chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Second Khordad Front Sunday.
Members of the Coordinating Council' Presiding Board are elected once every three months.
Salamati, who is also secretary-general of the Islamic Revolution's Mujahideen Organization, told IRNA that Seyyed Hadi Khamenei, representative of the Assembly of Followers of Imam's Path, was elected the council's vice chairman, and Hosein Kamali, representative of Islamic Labor Party, was elected the council's secretary.
Commenting on a report by a seven-member committee to follow up Mir Hosein Mousavi's likely candidacy in next year's presidential election, Salamati said it was decided that the committee should convince Mousavi to stand in the presidential election. "

Judiciary head Mahmoud Shahroudi agrees to suspend Salamati's court ruling

2005-01-12T18:08:00.000-08:00

Judiciary head agrees to suspend Salamati's court ruling: "Payvand's Iran News ...

3/17/02
Judiciary head agrees to suspend Salamati's court ruling

Tehran, March 17, IRNA -- Judiciary Head Mahmoud Shahroudi has agreed to suspend the verdict for the Persian 'Asr-e Ma' weekly and its publisher Mohammad Salamati, announced the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ahmad Masjed-Jamei here Saturday.
Masjed-Jamei said in a letter he had asked Shahroudi to use legal possibilities to suspend the court ruling on the publication, and see to the 17-month prison term for its publisher, Mohammad Salamati.

He said Shahroudi had informed the State Persecutor Namazi to use the Article 268 of Iran's Court Procedural Code, and suspend the verdict against the publication pending appeals.

Masjed-Jamei remarked that he was glad for Shahroudi's help and hoped maintaining the cooperation between the Judiciary and the press would further boost national solidarity.

The appeals court last month convicted Salamati, who is also the Secretary-General of Iran's Islamic Revolution Mujahedin Organization (IRMO) to 17 months jail and had suspended the publication license of his 'Asr-e Ma' weekly for a battery of charges including libel and slander against state officials, publication of lies, insulting sanctities and religious beliefs as well as propaganda against the Islamic system.

The IRMO, accordingly, protested to the court ruling, which was immediately fended off by Tehran Justice Department."

Daily praises Salamati's tactic of attacking Conservatives to shield Khatami

2005-01-12T18:04:00.000-08:00

Daily praises Salamati's tactic: "12/14/00
Daily praises Salamati's tactic

Tehran, Dec 14, IRNA -- By making the allegation against the `conservatives', Mohammad Salamati, secretary-general of the `leftist' Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization stirred the conservatives into revealing whether they were entertaining the idea of impeaching President Khatami, praised the English-language daily `Iran News' in its editorial on Thursday.
The paper was referring to Salamati's recent statements to the students of Sharif University that the next move of the conservatives "would be to claim that President Khatami is politically incompetent", to which the Judiciary reacted immediately by denying that it had received any letter from the conservatives on the impeachment issue.

"By making the innuendo, Salamati may well have intended to create exactly the kind of controversy that followed," it commended.

In fact he was counting on the feedback, which he got, from the conservatives into revealing whether they were contemplating the impeachment of the president.

Therefore, Salamati's `tactic' has proved beneficial to Khatami's camp indeed, commended the paper.

It is because, even if Khatami's opponents were entertaining the idea of impeaching the president, they have to brush it aside since they have `publicly denied' it now, the daily noted expressing joy that the `reformists could now concentrate on countering other possible conservative plans'.

The paper then went on to cite some other options on how the conservatives could now possibly attack President Khatami and his policies, but comtempleted whether they would ever make such an attempt."

Daily praises Salamati's tactic

2005-01-12T18:01:00.000-08:00

Daily praises Salamati's tactic: "Islamic Coalition Association files suit against Salamati
Tehran, Dec 14, IRNA -- The Islamic Coalition Association has filed a suit with Justice Department in Tehran province against the secretary general of the Islamic Revolution's Mujahedin Organization, Mohammad Salamati over his recent remarks on the alleged appeal for impeaching President Mohammad Khatami on grounds of incompetency, a press report said here Thursday.
The Persian daily Entekhab quoted a member of the association, Mohammad Reza Taraqi as saying that it had filed the suit on Tuesday against Salamati since he had charged the association with preparing a petition for President Khatami's impeachment.

"The Islamic Coalition Association, in a complaint filed with the Justice Department yesterday, has asked it to sue Salamati over his charges against the association," the paper quoted Taraqi as saying.

He once again dismissed allegations that the association had brought up a petition in the supreme court over Khatami's political incompetence.

"Based on an article published in the weekly Shoma, one cannot infer that a petition on the president's inefficiency had been brought up. The article was merely asking state officials to look at the issue of constitutional violations which Mr. Khatami had referred to," the paper cited Taraqi.

He said Salamati was trying to use the Islamic Revolution's Mujahedin Organiation as a scapegoat to implement the `move for sidelining Khatami'.

Salamati, in his part, has denied accusing `right-wingers' of preparing to impeach the president, saying his remarks had been misrepresented.

"I have not made such a claim," he said recently adding, "I did not say a petition on the president's incompetence has been submitted to the Supreme Court."

"What I said is that it is possible to interpret this move in a way that may condemn Khatami," he told the Doran-e-Emrouz newspaper."

Salamati's Lawyer: Court Unqualified

2005-01-12T12:57:00.000-08:00

Iran Daily: "Salamati's Lawyer: Court Unqualified

Mohammad Salamati
TEHRAN, Jan. 12--A reformist politician was in court Wednesday to face charges of spreading lies and distorting public opinion.
The trial was held at Branch 76 of Tehran Criminal Court, ISNA reported.
Taking the stand, Secretary of Islamic Revolution's Mujahideen Organization Mohammad Salamati, also a former MP, rejected the accusations. He noted that all his actions and words have had one objective; to clarify social conditions, a duty he said was inherent of a political group.
Terming the court as unqualified, Salamati's defense lawyer, Saleh Nikbakht, also criticized the way trials are held for political offices.
"Absence of a press jury in political cases is against Article 168 of the constitution," he said.
Nikbakht added that according to Article 698 of the Islamic Penal Law, a person should stand trial on the charge of spreading lies only if the complaint has been filed by a private entity.
"Therefore, the complaint by Tehran Prosecutor General lacks legality," he said.
Nikbakht said his client should be cleared of all charges, in view of his revolutionary and official background"

Struan Stevenson endorses and supports Terrorism

2005-01-05T09:16:00.000-08:00

Scottish Conservative MEPs: "Iran - Change in the Making - Where Should the UKStand?
FRINGE MEETING, ROYAL EXETER HOTEL, CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, BOURNEMOUTH. TUESDAY 5th OCTOBER, 11.30-12.45 hrs.

Speech by Struan Stevenson, MEP, Co-Chair – Friends of Free Iran.

On August 15th, in a town called Neka in Iran, a 16-year-old girl was publicly hanged from a crane in the main square. Her name was Atefeh Rajabi and the offence, which earned her the death penalty, was for “acts incompatible with chastity.” The man who had sexually abused her was sentenced to 100 lashes, however, Atefeh was sentenced to death because, according to the Judge, “she had a sharp tongue and had undressed in his court.” In fact she had torn off her veil in protest at the ludicrous cruelty of the sentence. So outraged was the judge that he undertook to place the rope around Atefeh’s neck himself at her public execution.

This then is modern Iran. This is the regime ruled by the Mullah’s. A regime that executes women and children and amputates arms and legs. A regime that uses torture in its prisons, while pursuing a culture of impunity for the perpetrators of such outrages. A regime that has brought the civilised and highly cultured population face to face with the black depths of barbarism and has taken Iran back to the stone-age. A regime that has executed 120,000 people since it came to power, over 100 in the first 8 months of this year alone.

The Mullahs in Teheran have been active sponsors of international terrorism. The definitive report on 9/11 drawn up by the American Intelligence Services notes in stark detail how the Mullahs had offered assistance and funding to Osama Bin Laden. A Saudi-owned newspaper reported in July that there were 384 members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups living in Iran, including 18 senior members of Bin Laden’s network, and even including Bin Laden’s son Saad.

Now, in open defiance of the West, the clerical regime pursues its relentless quest to build a nuclear weapon. Through deception and skilful diplomatic manoeuvring, the Mullahs are now only weeks away from having the capability to enrich uranium to enable them to build a nuclear bomb. At the same time the Mullahs are pouring arms and money into the growing insurgency in neighbouring Iraq. Dissent is ruthlessly crushed. Freedom of expression and a free press are distant memories. Hundreds of moderate candidates were excluded from election to the country’s parliament to ensure the totalitarian Islamo-fascist regime could never again be undermined by democracy. George W. Bush was absolutely correct when he labelled Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. Teheran is now a cauldron of evil and the Mullahs must be removed from power before they plunge the world into a nuclear nightmare.

And there is no use trying to appease the Mullahs. To do so, leads simply to humiliation. Jack Straw discovered that to his cost earlier this year. Despite five visits to Tehran and pledges of support, the Mullahs ordered the kidnapping of British Navy personnel in the Gulf on a trumped up charge that they had strayed into Iranian waters. They seized three British patrol boats and arrested eight crew members who were then subjected to horrific treatment, being blindfolded and forced to kneel in a ditch, where they thought they were about to be beheaded. This is the way Teheran treats its so-called allies.

It was in an attempt to appease the Mullahs and keep the petro-dollars flowing, that the UK, EU and US agreed to Teheran’s demands to place the People’s Mojahedin and the National Council of Resistance of Iran, on the international terror list. This was a disgrace as they have never perpetrated any act of terror against anyone in the West and indeed have spent the past 25 years fighting fundamentalism and oppression in their homeland. Now, following a 16 month State Department and FBI inquiry, the US has recognised that there is no basis for continuing the terror tag. They have stated that the 4000 Mojahedin Freedom Fighters based in a camp at Ashraf in Iraq are ‘protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention’, and refused demands from Teheran that they should be deported back to certain torture and execution.

I have been to Auvers sur Oise to meet the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran – Mrs Maryam Rajavi. I found her to be a compelling leader, determined to free her people from the fascist regime, which has terrorised Iran for more than a quarter of a century. She is a convinced democrat pursuing a platform based on the observance of human rights, the rights of women, freedom of religion and the rights of ethnic and national minorities.

The Charter of Fundamental Freedoms for future Iran is a template for good governance. This is the reason why, together with Paulo Casaca MEP (Portuguese socialist), I have co-founded the Friends of Free Iran Movement in the European Parliament. This is the reason why 25,000 Iranian exiles and other supporters demonstrated in central Brussels two weeks ago, demanding the removal of the Terror Tag from the People’s Mojahedin and the overthrow of the fascist regime in Teheran. We are here today to echo their calls."

Risks of appeasing Iran's mullahs - The Washington Times: Commentary - January 05, 2005

2005-01-05T09:05:00.000-08:00

Risks of appeasing Iran's mullahs - The Washington Times: Commentary - January 05, 2005: "Risks of appeasing Iran's mullahs

By Struan Stevenson
Iran's increasing meddling in Iraq and its defiance in its nuclear weapons program pose the greatest challenge to peace and security in Iraq and the whole Middle East, as we enter 2005.
By sending thousands of Revolutionary Guards and intelligence agents into Iraq, as well as spending hundreds of millions of dollars to recruit mercenaries and enlist support among destitute and impoverished Iraqis, Tehran is hell-bent on steering the Jan. 30 elections in its favor.
Its proxies in that country, including the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), have put forward a united slate, hoping to gain a majority in the newly elected parliament, whose primary task is to draft Iraq's future constitution. The Iranian clerics have never been so close to realizing their decades-old dream of erecting a sister Islamic Republic in Iraq.

On the nuclear issue, the recent agreement brokered by France, Germany and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union, has given Tehran all that it wanted and more. The Iranians have committed themselves to virtually nothing permanent. Reports this week indicate Tehran has prepared large quantities of uranium yellow cake for enrichment, which diplomats say breaks, if not the letter, the spirit of the Nov. 15 pact with the EU big three.
In return, Iran received a host of incentives, including a light-water reactor as well as the promise of European technological expertise to advance its "peaceful" nuclear program. More importantly, it demanded and received a commitment from its European interlocutors not only to keep Tehran's arch-nemesis, the Iranian People's Mujahedeen, on the EU terror list, but also to fight its activities.
The EU's lack of spine in dealing with Tehran has emboldened the mullahs to step up repression in Iran. A resolution just adopted by the U.N. General Assembly censured Tehran for "failure to comply fully with international standards in the administration of justice, the absence of due process of law, the refusal to provide fair and public hearings, and right to counsel, the continuing executions, in particular the execution of persons below 18 years of age, the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge or trial, the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, in particular the practice of amputation and flogging as well as the systemic discrimination against women and girls."
The deterioration of human rights in Iran has revealed new depths of barbarity, where pregnant women and children are routinely executed and floggings and amputations are an almost daily public spectacle. The ban on the moderate Khatami faction from standing for election last February reduced the so-called democratic process to a sham. In place of those moderates, the Legislature now has 40 new deputies who were former Revolutionary Guards commanders and who have formed a hard, extremist right-wing majority to drive increasingly repressive judicial and executive measures.
These stark realities, however, have not deterred the ever-shrewd and business-minded Europeans. Claiming any attempt at firmness toward Tehran would be tantamount to starting an Iraqi-style war, the EU and its allies on the other side of the Atlantic argue conciliation is the best approach.
This deliberately obscures the fact that facing up to the Iranian challenge need not involve a choice between war and appeasement. As the exiled opposition leader Maryam Rajavi said during an address to the European Parliament on Dec. 15, "No concession is going to dissuade the mullahs from continuing their ominous objectives. ... The equation of 'either a military invasion or appeasement' is an exercise in political deception. A third option is within reach. The Iranian people and their organized resistance have the capacity and ability to bring about change."
As Iran inches closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and developing, with North Korea's help, the missiles to deliver them, the civilized world can ill-afford to be at the mercy of these turbaned tyrants. The bitter, costly experience of Iran's people in the past quarter-century should serve as an example.
Appeasement is not the way to contain or change this evil regime. Nor is it the path to avoid another war. A nuclear-armed fundamentalist regime will not spare the EU, either. Iran's missiles already can reach southern Europe. The mullahs are now rushing to develop a third-generation missile system able to reach Paris, London and Brussels.
By putting the People's Mujahedeen in its terror list, however, the EU has handcuffed itself.
The EU should end the blacklisting of this antifundamentalist group, which provided some of the most critical information on Iran's nuclear weapons program and its intervention in Iraq.
For once, we should side with the millions in Iran whose cry is for freedom and regime change. A modern, secular and democratic Iran would not only be the key to regional peace and security, but also a long-term ally as we try to spread democracy across the Middle East and the world.

Struan Stevenson is a Scottish Conservative member of the European Parliament and co-chairman of the Friends of Free Iran Intergroup in the European Parliament."

Hajjarian says Lack of Support is Reformists Real Problem

2005-01-04T11:25:00.000-08:00

Iran Mania News: ""Multiple candidates will not benefit reformers"

Tuesday, January 04, 2005 - ©2004 IranMania.com
LONDON, Jan 4 (IranMania) - A leading member of Islamic Iran Participation Front said the reformers' problem is not Guardians Council or the Majlis, but rather their support base in the society.

According to Fars News Agency, Saeed Hajjarian added that if the reformist front were to nominate a number of people for presidency, it would not benefit from it.

"Since the conservatives will most definitely nominate only one person for president, the reformist camp should also nominate one person," he said.

He stressed that a strong political party should transform the masses into political leverage so that social opportunities arise.

Regarding Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's possible candidature, he said, "Rafsanjani is a distinguished member of the Assembly of Combatant Clergy and this group is one of the serious members of our opposition. Therefore, naturally Rafsanjani can work better with the incumbent conservative-dominated Majlis better than other people."

He noted that at present political parties are the only tools for facilitating development and progress.

"If a political party does not wish to participate in the presidential race, then it should disband and closed down," he said.

Hajjarian also noted that political parties in Iran are appealing to the masses while in other countries political parties appeal to the elite.

Commenting on the views of some students who said their participation or non-participation in the presidential race would not be important, he said, "Our approach depends on the governing conditions. If totalitarianism were to prevail, our stance would be different. But even if there is a little room for improvement, we should be thankful and participate in the election.""

BBC NEWS | Parliamentary election is a blow to Iran's enemies

2005-01-04T11:14:00.000-08:00

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Iran's leader hails poll results: "Iran's leader hails poll results

No women have yet been elected to the new parliament
Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said the parliamentary election is a blow to Iran's enemies.
He said the election was completely free and fair - dismissing criticism from the US about the credibility of the controversial poll.

With more than two-thirds of the vote counted, conservative supporters of clerical rule appear to be heading for a sweeping victory.

More than 2,000 reformist candidates were disqualified from standing.

Interior ministry figures showed conservatives have won about two-thirds of the 290 seats in the Majlis, or parliament, so far declared.

In the capital Tehran, the lurch to the right appeared to be particularly comprehensive. Early results suggested not a single one of 30 seats would go to a reformist.

Final results are expected in the next few days.

US 'nonsense'

Ayatollah Khamenei appeared on state television saying the poll was "completely credible".

Interventionist imperialists were day-dreaming and they sought to portray the Islamic Republic as being deprived of its popular base

Ayatollah Khamenei

Full text: Ayatollah's address
Voters' views in Tehran
"Those who lost the elections were America, Zionism and the enemies of the Iranian nation," he said.

"The judgement of American imperialists who have been talking nonsense about these elections is absolutely worthless."

The US had criticised the Iranian election in what correspondents said were unusually strong terms.

"Candidates have been barred from participating in the elections in an attempt to limit the choice of the Iranian people for their government," state department spokesman Adam Ereli said.

"These actions do not represent free and fair elections and are not consistent with international norms."

Voter turnout

The Interior Ministry has confirmed that turnout was just over 50.6% of the electorate - the lowest, just, since the Islamic republic was born 25 years ago and well down on the 67% who voted in 2000.

The BBC's Jim Muir says the size of the voter turnout is a key issue.

It is higher, he says, than the disqualified reformists would have liked, but it is hardly the ringing endorsement the conservative establishment had hoped for.

Turnout in Tehran - a stronghold for reformists - was only 33.8%.

Defeat for the reformists was particularly bitter in the capital, with even their top figure, the current parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karrubi, looking unlikely to keep his seat.

Another significant feature of the result so far is that among the candidates returned there has not been a single woman - there were 13 in the outgoing reformist-dominated chamber.

Some pro-reform groups had called for a boycott of the poll, while supporters of clerical rule urged people to vote.

It follows seven years of attempted reform by President Mohammad Khatami, who has sought to allow greater freedom of speech and loosen Islamic cultural and social restrictions.

The decision to disqualify 2,300 reformist candidates - including 80 members of parliament - from standing was taken by the country's hardline Council of Guardians, a 12-member vetting body partly appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei.

The council said the disqualifications were necessary because of the candidates' alleged indifference to Islam and to the constitution, or accused them of questioning the supreme leader's powers."

Ataollah Mohajerani picked for Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance

2005-01-02T20:43:00.000-08:00

PolicyWatch 264: "
CULTURE AND ISLAMIC GUIDANCE MINISTER.
Ataollah Mohajerani, vice president for legal and parliamentary affairs, is Khatami's choice for minister of culture and Islamic guidance and a member of the Servants of Construction, which supported Khatami in the recent elections. Mohajerani's nomination has caused controversy because he has called for greater social tolerance and publicly advocated dialogue with the United States. In 1996, he was sentenced by the Special Press Violations Court to a cash fine and a one-year prohibition on engaging in press activity after the hard-line Militant Clergy Association complained about his publication, Bahman.
I do not accept that the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (VVIR) is entirely at the disposal of one faction [for election propaganda]. However, its overall policy is such that one faction seems to be getting the most benefit. . . The orientation of the VVIR is no secret to anyone. The fact is that the VVIR is an entirely government apparatus which should realize the sensitivity of the situation and act in such a manner that none of the groups should feel that it has been overlooked.
-Kar Va Kargar, May 1, 1997 as cited in FBIS-NES-97-130, May 10, 1997

The extradition of [Hamas Leader Musa] Abu Marzuk to the Zionist regime was in fact a green light given to American Jews by Clinton on the eve of presidential elections in the U.S. . . . Crimes being committed by the Zionist regime indicated that the peace overture of the usurper regime was a pretext to perpetrate more crimes and assaults.
-IRNA, October 21, 1996 as cited in FBIS-NES-96-206, October 24, 1996

The Islamic Republic of Iran shall never withdraw its support for the oppressed Palestinians. . . There [is] a need to step up cooperation, coordination and solidarity amongst the Palestinian fighting forces to counter those [Zionist] designs.
-Tehran Times, August 21, 1996 as cited in FBIS-NES-96-167, August 29, 1996"

Professor Mohsen Kadivar Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law

2005-01-02T20:05:00.000-08:00

ILSP Newsletter: "

In early June, Professor Mohsen Kadivar arrived at ILSP, where he will be in residence as a Visiting Scholar through September. A distinguished scholar and cleric in his native Iran, his two main areas of expertise are Islamic theology and philosophy, and political and legal thought in Islam. Originally trained as an electrical engineer, Professor Kadivar in 1980 shifted to religious education at Shiraz Seminary and in 1981 went to Qom to study, obtaining the degree of ijtihad in 1997, and his Ph.D. in 1999 from Tarbiat Modares University, where he is currently a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy. The author of 12 books and many more articles, he has taught as well in Imam Sadegh University, Mofid University, and Shahid Beheshti University.

A prominent dissident, Professor Kadivar was first arrested in May 1978 in the uprising that led to the overthrow of the Shah. He has continued in his forthright opinions, speaking out against the suppression of dissent and against absolutism. He was imprisoned in 1999, spending 18 months in Tehran’s Evin Prison, because of statements critical of the Islamic Republic and a speech in Isfahan’s Mosque arguing that acts of terrorism are condemned in the eyes of the Islamic faith and Shi‘i law. He is currently President of the Iranian Association in Support of Freedom of the Press.

Copyright © 2002 The President and Fellows of Harvard College"

Mohsen Kadivar - The Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy

2005-01-02T20:03:00.000-08:00

The Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy: "Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy

Treatise is dedicated to Dr. Seyed Hashem Aghajari

Abstract
The concept of velayat-e faqih as a type of Shi`ite Islamic government gained currency after the Islamic revolution in Iran, and it has now been experienced for a quarter of a century. A key question in contemporary Iranian politics is the compatibility of the velayat-e faqih with democracy. This question can be answered from the perspective of political thought, or from that of political sociology in view of what has happened in Iran. This essay adopts the first perspective, distinguishing three theoretical answers based on different interpretations of the concept:

The first can be considered the official view of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is based on the opinion that the "absolute, appointive velayat-efaqih" is the only form of Islamic government during the occultation of the infallible authorities in religion (i.e., the Imams), and is binding on the people as a religious duty. Such a government would be popular in the sense that the government is approved by the people. But the legitimacy of all decisions and acts in the public domain depends on
the approval and authorization of the supreme jurist as the vali-ye amr. According to this interpretation, the velayat-e faqih is not compatible with democracy. Limited resort to the popular vote under emergency conditions would be permissible under "necessity" (zarurat), but democracy is per se neitherdesirable nor beneficial.

The second can be considered the view of the traditional Iranian reformists. It is based on the opinion that neither the absolute appointive velayat-e faqih nor democracy is entirely acceptable, but by altering and combining the two one can arrive at a type of Islamic democracy that can be labeled "elective, conditional velayat-e faqih." According to this interpretation, the people of their representatives elect a jurist as the vali-ye amr for a limited period to take over the management of society according to the law approved by the jurists and the people. The elected jurist would be responsible to the people.

The third and last answered can be considered the view of the Iranian Muslim intellectuals. It rests on the opinion that the velayat-e faqih in the political sphere, be it appointive or elective, absolute or conditional, is not supported by valid religious proof. Islam has basically not offered a fixed and specific model for the political
management of society, even though it is not compatible with every kind of politics. The velayat-e faqih, being an autocratic rule of God based on the divine rights of the jurists, is incompatible with democracy. Democracy, being based on principles such as popular sovereignty and participation, the rule of law and human rights, is evidently incompatible with clerical rule and the velayat-e faqih, which is a type of religious dictatorship. The illusion of compatibility of the velayat-e faqih with democracy is due to the lack of familiarity with the jurisprudential terminology, on the one hand, and the theory of democracy, on the other. The fundamental incompatibility between democracy and the velayat-e faqih is not an obstacle to the democratic management of an Islamic society. The majority of its Muslim citizens can have a democratic government while remaining committed to their Islamic faith and ethical values. Islam as a religion can be integrated with democracy as the method of modern political life.
The paper describes and criticizes the first two views and analyzes the third with approval.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Are velayat-e faqih and democracy compatible with one another? If they are not compatible, could modifying one or both bring them to accord? If these two concepts are irreconcilably at odds, which should we refuse, in the interest of preserving the other?

These three questions are of utmost importance to the contemporary political thought in Iran. This paper takes on deliberating the relationship between velayat-e faqih and democracy. Before debating the matter, however, a number of points are discussed:

1. Although the term velayat-e faqih is spontaneously reminiscent of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its founder, incongruity between velayat-e faqih and democracy is not necessarily the same discord as between Islamic republicanism and democracy. Velayat-e faqih is altogether distinct from Islamic republicanism.(1) Proponents of velayat-e faqih believe that Islamic republicanism is a method of governance that would give rise to velayat-e faqih—not the same as it. Similarly, the critiques of velayat-e faqih do not believe a relationship to necessarily exist between the two—they not only perceive an Islamic republic to be capable of existing irrespective of velayat-e faqih, but they additionally believe that an Islamic republicanism less the velayat-e faqih principle is the Islamic republic that was offered to the Iranian public via the Preamble to the Constitution, which gained widespread acceptance through the April 1979 referendum. What ended up being ratified as the Constitution subsequently in late 1979, and was then modified in 1989, and has been implemented by the two supreme leaders in the past quarter of a century is an amalgamation of velayat-e faqih and Islamic republicanism—an amalgamation that could be perceived as being a velayat based republicanism (jomhouri-ye velayi) (2)—the sort of republic within which government organs perform their duties under the supervision of the supreme leader (the vali-ye amr). In this paper we set out to examine agreements—or lack thereof—between the principles of democracy and velayat-e faqih—i.e. the ideal order within which the concept of velayat-e faqih has been fully realized. Velayat based republicanism or the traditional Islamic republicanism is an incomplete realization, and a subset of velayat-e faqih. In other words, in this paper we set out to contrast a democratic government with a form of governance that is based on “appointed and absolute velayat-e faqih.”

The incongruity that may exist between velayat-e faqih and democracy must also be differentiated from any disagreement between religion and democracy, or Islam and democracy, and also from religious governance and democracy, or Islamic governance and democracy.(3) In the sense that if someone believes religion and democracy are totally incompatible, there would be no need to address the questions that are raised here—the conclusion is already reached. Similarly, for those who believe religion is a private matter, exclusive to the relationship of an individual with God, and do not allow for religion to influence the public domain—meaning those who subscribe to absolute secularism, and believe it is the foundation for democracy—religious governance would be basically undemocratic. The relationship between velayat-e faqih and democracy is subject to debate for someone who first, does not believe there to be only dissension between Islam and democracy—someone who gathers democratic views from Islam—and second, does not find an Islamic government to be necessarily incapable of democracy—more pertinently, someone who would allow for democracy to flourish in a religious society. Accepting the above two premises, we now take on the discussion of compatibility between velayat-e faqih—representing a specific case of religious governance—and democracy.
The questions being discussed here are less than twenty-five years old. They became relevant in or about 1979, when the velayat-e faqih concept was applied to public domain. Debating these issues first took place exclusively among elites, and prior to the practical experience that ensued. The analysis and explanations that they have offered in answering these questions are mostly general and often ambiguous. At this early stage, the proponents of velayat-e faqih try to portray this principle in a popular and democratic suit.(4) Starting with the second decade, having experienced velayat-e faqih in practice for ten years, the inquiries into the matter began to spread among the general public—rather than being exclusive to elites, among whom these concepts had been traditionally applied. Furthermore, the responses to these questions gradually became more specific, more exact and much better clarified. The proponents of velayat-e faqih who have responded to the aforementioned questions fall in two camps: some candidly have proclaimed the principle of velayat-e faqih to be entirely contradictory to democracy. Others, while diminishing democracy as being a “Western notion” have defended a sort of “religious democracy” around the velayat-e faqih core. Equally devout Moslems, the critics of velayat-e faqih being applied in the public domain also fall into two groups, but according to their concern regarding democracy. One group, believing the “appointive” and “absolute” attributes of velayat-e faqih to be the cause of its disagreement with democracy, has attempted to bring the two together through stressing the elective and conditional stipulations of the Constitution, concerning velayat-e faqih. A second group has found the functioning of velayat-e faqih in public domain to lack any basis in Islamic jurisprudence—they find the discord between velayat-e faqih and democracy to be inherent in the two doctrines. Depth of analysis and spread of the views that has been offered, in reply to the three questions we raised at the outset, indicate the importance of this debate.
This article is consisted of an introduction and three sections. Remainder of the introduction describes democracy. The first section examines the relationship between appointed and absolute velayat-e faqih and democracy. In the second section we explore the relationship between elective and conditional velayat-e faqih—and also that of faqih oversight—and democracy. In the third section we will discuss the means of governing an Islamic society according to democratic standards. The hypothesis that we are about to subject to scrutiny in this paper is threefold: first, velayat-e faqih and democracy are not compatible; second, the incompatibility between velayat-e faqih and democracy is essential—reforming one or both of them would not bring them into agreement. Therefore, Islamic democracy would be a contradiction in terms, if it were to be based on velayat-e faqih. Third, Islamic society can be governed via democratic means.
It may seem that democracy would be a well-known concept, but the effort that has been exerted to approve or reject it in Iran indicates that many of those who have commented on the subject did not have a clear understanding of it. Democracy has been mistaken often for popularity or for populism. To prevent probable misconceptions in our discussion ahead, it is best to put forth an outline of democracy. In doing so, we should try to emphasize those aspects of democracy that would stand out, in comparison to the corresponding conditions under velayat-e faqih. Democracy is an answer to a question in politics: who is empowered to decide for the public domain? Three types of answers have been offered for this question: autocracy, aristocracy and democracy. In an autocracy, assessment of public interest and forming decisions in public domain rest with one individual—all legitimate power to govern stem from that individual. No worldly authority can oversee his actions—he is above the law, and cannot be held responsible; has absolute authority, and can exert unchecked power to manage the affairs of society. In aristocracy, the ultimate power resides with an elite class—this group of people is not accountable to the public. In a democracy, determination of public interest and decisions on behalf of the public are based on the approval of the public at large—not the approval of a specific individual or a group of elites. In a democratic regime, those executing authority in the public domain are the people’s elected representatives, whose charter is to serve in their clients’ (i.e. the public’s) interest. In a democracy, the government is responsible to the public. It comes to power through the will of the people, and at a certain time, peacefully transfers its power to govern to the succeeding democratically elected representatives. The laws of democratic societies are established through a process ensuring public consent, and are liable to change according to public will.
In more exact terms, democracy is the politics of the modern world. It is an approach to instituting government—the purpose of which is to minimize the likelihood of making erroneous decisions in the public domain, through maximizing public participation in the decision making process. Thereby diminishing the role of the individual in making political decisions and shaping public policy. Proper distribution of political power throughout the society is one of the requirements of democracy. A democratic government is elected through freely expressed majority vote, to govern for a limited term. The equal rights to choose—and to be chosen—are among the bases giving rise to democracy. In a democracy, decisions that affect the society must gather consensus for support. Therefore, public oversight of decisions affecting public domain and distribution of equal rights amongst the citizenry, in order to impose oversight over the decisions regarding public domain, are two of the pillars of democracy.

The main attributes of a democratic regime are as follows:

a. Holding free and all-inclusive elections.

b. Establishing transparent and accountable government.

c. Respecting civil and political rights.

d. Giving rise to a civil, or a democratic society.

To complete our framework of democracy, now we should ask: what are the characteristics of an undemocratic regime?

a. Sanctioning special privileges in public domain for an individual or a class of elites (such distinction is contrary to the basis of equal rights).

b. Permanency in holding on to an office, or lacking peaceful transfer of power, following a predetermined term.

c. Holding an office or an authority in that office above the law.

d. Lacking oversight of the leadership—irresponsibility to the public.

e. Having absolute or unchecked power vested in an individual or a group (even if it is sanctioned by the Constitution).

f. Lack of regard for public demand in changing the law.

Section I. Appointive, Absolute Velayat-e faqih and Democracy

The theory of appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih is based on four principles.(5) The first principle is velayat.(6) It means having responsibility for, acting on behalf of and having jurisdiction over the affairs of others. There is inequality in the sphere of velayat (hozeh-ye velayat), encompassing public domain. The general public is considered to be incapable of making pious decisions, and unable to exert control over public domain. They need religious oversight, for their lacking religious jurisdiction over public domain. Legitimacy of all decisions and actions in public domain depend on the approval and authorization of the supreme leader, as the vali-ye amr. Another meaning of velayat over people is their guardianship, which is fundamentally different from representing them. The citizenry—having been placed in care of the supreme leader—has no say in the appointment or dismissal of the vali-e amr, and no authority to oversee his conduct of velayat, or his personal conduct (that of the vali-ye amr, or supreme leader). Opinion of the supreme leader constitutes the measure of proper decisions regarding public domain. It is expected of the public to conform to, and coordinate with the views of the supreme leader—not the other way around. All public domain functions derive their legitimacy through their lineage with the supreme leader. The most important religious duty of the people toward the supreme leader is to accept his verdicts, obey his edicts and help him succeed. Velayat is obligatory—not elective. It is permanent, and life-long—not transitory. And it is binding on all human beings, without any exception or condition.

The second principle, appointment (7) stands here for an appointment by the divine ruler, as opposed to election by the people; above and beyond comprising the legitimacy to govern, it implies selection and appointment of the qualified person to reign over the people on behalf of the last Shiite Imam. Identifying the individual, possessing the proper merits, is a function of the elites of Shiite jurists. In selecting the supreme leader from the midst of the Shiite jurist elites, the public cannot be consulted, since they lack the knowledge to properly assess the merits of the supreme leader. It is generally held that the installment and dismissal of the supreme leader is a divine act. In case the leader is found to have forfeited his merits as a jurist, or is found to have become unjust, other elite jurists would find that the leader’s supremacy has been abdicated. The ruler (or the supreme leader) is responsible only to God—no human being has the authority to oversee his actions. Other elite jurists can only inquire into his merits in preparation to their finding him meritorious for asserting his supremacy—another words, beyond the supreme leader (vali-ye faqih) is only God.

The third principle is absoluteness.(8) Jurisdiction of the leader (vali-e faqih) encompasses matters of sovereignty in public domain—all matters fall in this jurisdiction. The leader manages the society based on his determination, or that of his appointees. His authority is akin to that of the Prophet and Imams. His authority is not confined to the religious rule—the vali-ye faqih can rule on matters beyond religious concerns, based on what he deems to be in the interest of the state. His decrees are binding on everyone and just as all other religious decrees must be obeyed and acted on. In case of any conflict between decrees issued by the vali-ye faqih and other subsidiary Islamic standards, the former prevails. Where the Constitution draws its legitimacy from the leader’s sanction of it, it is clear that vali-ye faqih is not be bound by the laws of mankind, including the Constitution. The decrees of vali-ye faqih carry the force of law, and in case if they seem to be contrary to the law, his decrees take precedence. The judiciary, legislative and executive branches of government, armed forces and media are all his organs, which function independent of each other, but under the control of one leader—the vali-ye amr.

The fourth principle, jurisdiction (feghahat) is the most important requisite for leading an Islamic society. Islamic jurisprudence plays an essential role in the planning and management of an Islamic society. All political decisions must be in accord with the religious fundamentals. Islamic jurisprudence is capable of providing solutions to all political, economical, cultural, military and social problems of the world, and therefore, capable of guiding the greater Islamic world, and the non-Islamic constituency. Politics is a branch of the Islamic jurisprudence, and a part of the religious experience. The Islamic jurisprudence provides a pertinent, and complete theory for managing the human race, and guiding the human experience from cradle to grave. Therefore, velayat or administration of public domain is held to be the exclusive right of Islamic jurists.

The theory of appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih—in all four of its principles—is contradictory to democracy. In fact, this theory provides for a religious autocracy, or at the very best, it may be viewed as a clerical aristocracy. In fact it has been claimed that the vali-ye faqih, as the operative of the divine on earth, is akin to God—“He cannot be questioned for his acts, but they will be questioned for theirs” (9)—a permanent, irresponsible, sacred and absolute authority in the temporal world. In other words, this theory sustains a religious aristocracy, which is fundamentally distinct from democracy. The following are contradictions, arising out of each of the four appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih principles:

Guardianship (Velayat)
i. A requisite of religious guardianship is that the general public—in their capacity to make pious decisions, and capability to influence matters of public domain—is not equal to the jurists. Whereas in the democratic approach everyone is believed to have firstly, the same rights as anyone else, and secondly, the right to influence the public domain.

ii. In order to administer the public domain, the citizenry is empowered to elect a representative government—rather than being rendered unable or incompetent to make proper decisions, and requiring paternal oversight.

iii. The standards of proper conduct in the public domain are the views and opinions of the vali-ye faqih—the public is bound to obey his directives. Whereas in a democracy, the public officials must coordinate themselves with the will and sentiment of the public they represent.

iv. In the theory of velayat-e faqih, everyone must seek the permission of vali-e faqih for any decision or action in the public domain. The situation is completely reversed in a democracy—all public officials are to seek people’s consent, in order to function in the public domain.

Appointment (Entesab)
i. Democracy is a bottom up approach to government. The appointive velayat based state is a top down regime—election stands in opposition to appointment.

ii. People elect or dismiss their government officials in a democratic regime. Whereas in an appointive regime, members of the general public have no say in the installment or removal of the ruler.

iii. Without exception, all political assignments in a democratic regime are limited to a specified term. In the appointive velayat-e faqih, however, the leader is practically appointed for life, and time-in-office for other public officials are determined by him.

iv. The elected representatives of the people are charged with oversight over the government of a democratic regime, and government is accountable to the people it governs. In an appointive rule, the ruler is only responsible to God; he is not responsible to any human being for his conduct.

Absolutism (Etlagh)
i. All government officials are assigned limited powers in a democratic regime—there are checks and balances. In appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih, the leader possesses absolute and unchecked power.

ii. In a democratic regime, none stands above the law. In appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih, the leader is not only above the law, he sanctions the law—he can shut down the Constitution.

iii. Separation of powers is fundamental to democracy. In velai based state, the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, next to the armed forces and media are the instruments of the leader (veli-e faqih)—they all function under his orders. Heads of the three branches, and key institutions of government are, in effect, his deputies.

Jurisdiction (feghahat)
There is no special privilege in public domain that is set-aside for any particular group in a democratic regime, whereas, governance in velayat-e faqih is the exclusive right of the Islamic jurists.
In a democracy, the society is managed based on scientific principles; it is not expected of jurisprudence to provide planning for political, economical, cultural etc. Whereas in velayat-e faqih, Islamic jurisprudence provides the entire theory of government in all fields, from cradle to grave.
The principle incompatibilities between appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih and democracy are so clear that they need no further proof—it is readily obvious that these principles are not compatible.

The question should be raised here; is referring to public opinion not warranted under any circumstances, according to the concept of velayat-e faqih? The answer is affirmative, but it depends. Referring to public opinion may be warranted in minor cases, and only where the leader’s position is not undermined as a result. In any case, he is the final authority—he can overrule the public’s opinion at any time. Another case may be that if he does not resort to public opinion, he may come across as being dictatorial. In the second case, referring to public opinion is only warranted in a do-or-die situation—to get passed the circumstantial necessities.(10) It is evident that once the need is overcome, the public opinion would again become irrelevant, and that referring to public opinion under such circumstances is not the same as free elections held in democratic regimes.

Among the proponents of appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih theory, the few who have called it democratic are clearly wrong. Their position can only be adopted either due to a lack of understanding democracy, or for future deniability or cover-up. Among the proponents of this theory, Messrs. Javadi Amoli and Mesbah Yazdi have stated candidly that this theory is incompatible with democracy.(11) But others among them, while completely rejecting “western democracies,” are promoting a “religious democracy.” (12) In effect, they are only playing with words—subscribing to appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih ideology is to deny democracy in all its forms. Apparently, the only aspect of democracy that may have been appealing to this group is its popularity. Otherwise, tooting “religious democracy” is a popularity ploy—the sort of playing with words, which this group has resorted to, is the same as deceiving the public.

Proponents of appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih find democracy neither desirable nor beneficial. In their view, the citizenry must be so trained as to allow for none other than blindly following and absolutely obeying the edicts of religious leaders—for the fear of people conceiving opinions to the contrary.

Section II. Elective, Conditional Velayat-e faqih or faqih oversight and Democracy

Considering the great difficulties that appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih theory faces, both conceptually and in fact, an alternative view has become more significant among those subscribing to velayat-e faqih. In their approach, care has been extended to strike a balance between velayat-e faqih and democracy. The first attempt at merging velayat-e faqih in public domain with democracy has been made in the past century by Mirza-ye Naeeni. While keeping the general appointive velayat-e faqih principles intact, and taking into account lack of public confidence in the clergy, as the political reality of the time, he allowed the representatives of the people to constitute a government, which remained subject to religious oversight—hence, the conditional government.(13) It was made clear that if for any reason (e.g. regaining popularity) the clergy were to revoke their permission, that government would thenceforth become illegitimate. In the second step toward legitimizing political rights of the public independent of the jurists, the concept of public rule with jurist oversight, offered by Mohammad Bagher Sadr,(14) has been validated. In this theory, the clergy have more of an oversight and consent role than operative, although the supreme overseer is found, and appointed among them through the traditional approach, rather than by way of democratic elections. In the third step, the jurists in Qom advance the theory of elective, conditional velayat-e faqih, the evolved form of which is compiled by Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri Najaf-Abadi (15). In his approach, three of the principles in the appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih theory have been modified—as described in the following:

Firstly, by expanding on the selection process for choosing a leader amidst multiple qualified jurists, prior to the eventuality of him being appointed by the divine ruler, selecting a ruler from the slate of qualified candidates ends up being based on public volition. Considering the traditional Shiite doctrine, the public opinion influencing who may rule supreme is a significant step toward democratization of the political process.

Secondly, although the guardianship term (velayat) has been kept in this theory, the legal ramifications of it are different. In the first theory, velayat was a religious edict, issued by the divine ruler to compensate for the laity’s inadequacies in public domain, whereas in the new theory velayat is a binding contract, and a form of a general power of attorney establishing independent jurisdiction over someone with his consent. On this basis, the government would be a form of religious treaty between the people and the sovereign.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the government having its bases in a contract, the terms and conditions of this agreement, such as a limit on time in service of the ruler and the likes, the collection of which is called the Constitution, would be legitimate. On this basis, the resulting government would not have absolute power, since it would be limited by the Constitution, as the terms and conditions of the agreement. All the elements of a healthy relationship between the general public and those entrusted with power to rule can be achieved by this approach.

The jurisdiction requirement remains intact as a principle requisite in the new theory, and not only jurisdiction, but also the supremacy in jurisdiction is considered to be the primary requisite for leadership.

Analysis of the recent twenty-some years of velayat-e faqih in action has inclined the author of the new theory to emphasize the advisory and oversight dimensions and lessen the operative aspects of leadership.(16) But it is clear that for prevailing religious motives this oversight is none other than velayat, and that it takes place based on the religious obligation felt by the overseeing jurist.

Democratic aspects of this theory are as follows:

1. All public officials—without exception, even the leader—are elected through general elections, and the public participates in electing the government.

2. As a consequence of recognizing the public as being a party to an agreement, the public’s right to self-determination in public domain is established—accepting this fact is seminal to democracy.

3. The public right to take part in the law making process being a condition of the constitutional agreement provides the grounds upon which the society would democratize.

Based on the preceding points this theory could be called “religious democracy” or “Islamic republicanism.” Its remaining true to Islamic principles is protected through the supreme leader’s guardianship and oversight. Concurrently, the society is managed democratically. But for the following reasons, the resulting religious democracy would be limited, and in a few respects it is different from democracy:

1. Accepting an exclusive right for jurists to hold the highest office in society, under the auspices of supreme oversight, poses the first discrepancy between this theory and democratic principles. Accepting such a right is contingent upon jurisprudence being effective in addressing the challenges of political and social management. Proving the Islamic jurisprudence to be capable of producing effective solutions in such scientific fields is extremely unlikely.

2. The jurisdiction supremacy requisite for assuming the leadership takes away from the elective qualities of this approach. On one hand, if the qualifying merits are concentrated in one person, then election becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, the ability to recognize and qualify supremacy, considering the broad spectrum of the Islamic jurisprudence and the variety of opinions held by the jurists, effectively shields the selection process from the public. The practical difficulties associated with this approach are above and beyond the theoretical criticisms that are due to this principle requisite.

3. What would it be like if there were widespread public discontent with the supreme leader’s stance? If there was a circumstance, where the majority of the people moved toward a direction and the leader (vali-ye amr) found that direction inappropriate or undesirable—stated his ruling on the matter as such, and the majority still refused to follow his advice. Would he resort to force, in order to establish the validity of his views, albeit against the public will? Or would he acknowledge the will of the people—having taken an stance against him as his lacking support among the public—and resign, take to cultural and educational activities to convince the public on the merits of his view, win the majority over and regain his rightful position as the supreme leader again? The evidence is in favor of the former.

Section III. Democracy in a Religious Society

It became evident through the discussion in the previous sections that: one, the “appointive, absolute velayat-e faqih” and democracy are entirely incompatible—these two concepts are complete opposites—just as the Platonic Philosopher-King, the Iranian theory of kingdom or the mystic’s theory of the perfect human’s reign would stand in contradiction to democracy, and two, the “elective, conditional velayat-e faqih” or the concept of the elected supreme leader’s oversight is a form of limited democracy, which differs from democracy in three respects. Although according to the leader’s capacity the religious order may extend far into democratic terrain, in cases of narrow-minded jurists the reverse would also be true.

Up to this point, we obtained the two comparisons above, regardless of approving or disapproving democracy or either of the two religious theories. In this section we are about to answer two important questions: First; based on the religious principles, how credible are the two velayat-e faqih theories? Second, considering the definite discord between the first theory and democracy and the relative incompatibility between the second theory and democracy—between velayat-e faqih and democracy—which is more suitable for managing the affairs of a religious society?

Regarding the first question—the concept of velayat-e faqih is a subject of dispute in the Islamic jurisprudence (17)—it falls under the category of obligations that must not be left unattended, such as guardianship of orphan children. Most jurists have accepted this principle, but not all. As the scope of effect of this principle increases (as its domain is stretched), less people have signed on. Extension of Velayat-e faqih into public domain is viewed as clerical governance (i.e. in the political arena), and is not recognized by most jurists (18)—meaning that in their view, there is not sufficient basis in the Islamic law to support the claim. The absolute velayat-e faqih in public domain, specifically emanating from Ayatollah Khomeini, has been assumed by some (not all) of his students as being true. In any case, the author believes that the theory of appointive-absolute velayat-e faqih lacks any basis in reason, or in the Islamic law.

Surrounding the theory of elective, conditional velayat-e faqih and the elected supreme leader’s oversight: this is a young theory, which has not been adopted with much enthusiasm among the jurists in traditional Shiite domains. Its supporters are often found amongst intellectuals and political activists. From an Islamic jurisprudential perspective, two of the principles of this theory are subject to debate: one, the requisite of jurisprudential supremacy of the overseer, and two, the assumption of Islamic jurisprudential capability in such spheres as management, politics and social planning. The second point has not been subjected to much scientific analysis and debate among the jurists and religious scholars. The fact that every act, be it individual or social, must be according—or at least, not be contradictory—to Islam, can be assured through consultation with an advisory panel such as the council in charge of supervising compliance with Islam (hey-at-e nezarat-e mojtehedat) in the conditional (Mashrooteh) Constitution or the Guardian Council (Showra-ye Negahban) in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and does not necessarily require supreme oversight or velayat-e faqih. In any event, a number of contemporary jurists, including Ayatollah Montazeri have stated positions surrounding this theory. The author believes that both issues pivot on a more basic understanding, and that is the general expectation from religion, or more aptly from the Islamic jurisprudence. Neither the jurisprudential supremacy is the requirement for social management, nor can one expect the Islamic jurisprudence to supply the required insight for managing the society. Therefore, the jurisdiction principle in the aforementioned theory is (insufficient or) incomplete.

The conclusion arrived in the above, means that velayat-e faqih, be it of religious or civil order, appointive or elective, absolute or conditional, lacks any credible religious basis for its operation in the political sphere. The jurists who have accepted certain types of velayat-e faqih have in fact researched the matter with a preconceived expectation from the religion, prior to either reasoning through, or testing their specific hypothesis. They have assumed that a complete religion must have provided a specific and constant model for managing the public policy—additionally, without assuming political power, establishing the religion is annulled; the purpose for establishing the religion is to execute the edicts of the Islamic law (shari’a); for this purpose, only jurists are qualified; hence, founding a religious governance in the sense of velayat-e faqih is necessary, or even inevitable.

Referring to the context of the Islamic religion, Koran, conduct of the prophet and the Shiite Imams show that: (19)

1. Islam is not limited to the individual’s relation with God—it also includes the social domain. The social edicts of Islam are also not limited to ethical guidance and abstemious decrees; they also include requirements to act upon.

2. The Islamic society is not compatible with all politics. It has clearly declared certain political settings to be illegitimate, and has forbidden Moslems to reflect such policies.

3. In the collective teachings of Islam, its general concepts and social protocols, one can extract one specific or tens of other general political models, none of which would be illegitimate and none of which alone would suffice for a complete political system with all of its necessities and specifics. In other words, Islam does not offer a specific and constant model for managing the politics of all societies, and far be one for all times (i.e. Islam does not provide a blueprint for a universal government).

4. Avoiding such details in Islam is due to the fact that they are variables. The religion, which claims to be constant—beyond place and time—would be subjected to change, if it were to take on transitional matters. Additionally, Islam acknowledges that human faculties are capable of finding appropriate solutions in these fields. In other words, politics is a matter of intellect, and the ability to reason is a human trait. It is true that a pious individual must satisfy the requirements of his religion in all of his interactions, but acting in accord with the general principles and common protocols of religion does not negate the fact that politics is a human endeavor requiring political wisdom.

5. One cannot expect to find knowledge of politics, economy, management and sociology in the Islamic jurisprudence. At the same time, one cannot do away with the body of constitutional, commercial, criminal and other laws. The Islamic jurisprudence provides a legal framework in such branches of law as the constitutional law, law of commerce, civil and criminal law and the likes. Branches of law cannot be expected to provide political and economical planning. Although, legal council is indispensable in a variety of fields, entrusting management, economy, commerce, politics and a whole host of other specialized activities to lawyers would not produce an optimum result. Velayat-e faqih has risen out of a sort of false expectation from the Islamic jurisprudence.

6. The obligatory Islamic decrees effecting public domain do not necessarily warrant religious governance. The necessity for carrying out such edicts may as effectively be accomplished through other means—the pious conscience and the collective will of the public in a civil Islamic society could see to it that all its obligations are fulfilled. There is a difference between the law and religious obligation. The law must pass through a formal process—designed for close scrutiny and consensus gathering—including scrutiny and adoption by the people’s representatives. Religious obligation is not the same as legal obligation. Similarly, committing a sin has a different consequence than breaking the law. An individual is not necessarily punished during his lifetime for having committed a sin or for having failed to fulfill a religious obligation. Religious leadership aims to convince its followers to voluntarily take on a course of action, or relies on the individual to abstain from what may be harmful, based on the individual’s recognizance and free will. If a religious decree is to carry the force of the law—such that it may carry with it worldly punishment—it must put on a legal suit, go through the law making process and become the law.

7. More so than being a religious obligation, velayat-e faqih is a reflection of the Iranian theory of kingdom and Eastern despotism in the mind and essence of Shiite jurists, which has also been corroborated by the Platonic Philosopher-King. Its absolutism can be traced in the absolute velayat of perfect human in the Ibn-e Arabi Sufism. It seems that traditional Islamic jurisprudence—with such notions as the principle of non-velayat (20), conditions of sovereignty (21) and satisfaction (22)—cannot be compatible in public domains with such views as velayat-e Faqih.

Regarding the second question—the choice between velayat-e faqih and democracy, in the event of unresolved incompatibility between the two, is democracy. Through the discourse in answering the first question, we provided that the difference between velayat-e Faqih and democracy is void of any religious requirement, and a matter of rational evaluation. In which case, the alternative that stands to yield the most benefit is the preferred choice. Velayat-e faqih has no credible foundation in Islamic jurisprudence. It is a notion that is formed in the minds of a group of honorable jurists through a specific reading of a handful of Islamic passages. Refuting velayat-e faqih does not in any way undermine any of the Islamic teachings, requirements or obligations. I believe democracy is the least erroneous approach to the politics of the world. (Please note that least erroneous does not mean perfect, or even error free.) Democracy is a product of reason, and the fact that it has first been put to use in the West does not preclude its utility in other cultures—reason extends beyond the geographical boundaries. One must adopt a correct approach, regardless of who came up with the idea; “look into what is being said, not at who says it.” (23)

Adopting a democratic approach for political management is as valid in a religious society as it is in a non-religious one. A non-religious society, as well as one consisted of a mix of various religious beliefs and ideological subscriptions can be effectively managed democratically—so can a religious and pious society. The claim that absolute secularism is indispensable to democracy is only an opinion. In any case, contemplating the relationships between Islam and democracy, or the feasibility of a religious democracy is outside the scope of this paper. The author believes that it is possible to manage an Islamic society using a democratic approach. If a society consisted of a Moslem majority decides to observe Islamic values and considerations, it can incorporate the Islamic values through democratic means—meaning that Islam as a religion can coexist with democracy being a modern approach to managing its politics.(24) In this paper, I have assumed the advantages of democracy to be self-evident. No doubt that this stance would be debatable to those believing otherwise. In any event, the author’s subscription is to a democratic approach in the Islamic society. God bless you.

November 17, 2002, Cambridge

Notes
(1) The relationship between velayat-e faqih and Islamic republicanism (jomhouri-ye Eslami) has been discussed previously in Velayat-Based State (Hokoomat-e Velayi [4th ed.]), Tehran: Ney, 1380, Chapters 11 and 12, pp. 160-219.

(2) The term “velayat based republicanism” (jomhouri-ye velayi) has been described in the article: “From Constitutional Monarchy to velayat based Republicanism” (Az Mashrooteh-ye Saltanati ta Jomhoori-ye Velayi)—August 9, 2002 speech at Columbia University, New York, is online at www.kadivar.com.

(3) A number of points have been addressed about the relationship between religion and democracy in the article “Religious Democracy” (Mardom Salari-ye Deeni), Tehran: Tabarestan-e Sabz weekly, number 15 (31/6/1380 issue), pp. 5-7; also accessible online (www.kadivar.com).

(4) As an example, one could point out Ayatollah Khomeini’s usage of the term “democracy” during the Paris interviews, and also Morteza Motahari’s.

(5) Theoretical basis is laid out by the author in The Theories of State in The Shi’ite Figh (Nazari-yeh-ha-ye Dowlat dar Fiq’h-e Shiite [5th edition]), Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1380, the second and forth theories.

(6) The subject of velayat (guardianship) has been expanded at length in the Velayat-Based State, ibid.

(7) The subject of entesab (appointment) has been expanded in the series of articles “Hokoomat-e Entesabi.” (Appointive State). Nine articles in this series have been published in the Aaftaab monthly (Tehran, 1379-1381).

(8) The subject of etlagh (absoluteness) has been expanded in the article “Ghalamro-e Hokoomat-e Deeni az Deedgaah-e Imam Khomeini” (Imam Khomeini’s Perspective on the Scope of the Religious State), in Dagh-Dagheh ha-ye Hokoomat-e Deeni (Anxieties of Religious Governance [(2nd ed.]), Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1379, pp. 111-134.

(9) Koran, Sura Anbiaa, Aye 23 (Anbiaa Chapter, verse 23).

(10) Ayatollah, Sheikh Nasser Makarem Shirazi’s “Anvar al Feghaheh” In Al Bai’, (Vol. I), Qom, 1411 Islamic Calendar, p. 516.

(11) The book: Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha (Questions and Answers) by Sheikh Mohammad Taghi Mesbaah Yazdi, Qom: Imam Khomeini Institute, 1380, and the book: Velayat-e faqih; Velayat-e Fegh’h va Edaalat (Velayat-e faqih; Guardianship of Jurisprudence and justice) by Sheikh Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Qom: Osara’ Institute, 1379.

(12) In this midst, usage of the term “Mardom Salari-ye Deeni” (religious democracy) by the second Iranian vali-ye faqih (supreme leader) is worth mentioning.

(13) Mirza Mohammad Hossein Naeeni. Tanbeeh al Aemeh va Tanzeeh al Mellateh. For analysis of Naeeni’s point of view see The Theories of State in the Shi’ite Figh, ibid. the fifth theory.

(14) Seyed Mohammad Bagher Sadr. Al Eslaam Yaghood al Hayat (Beirut, 1399 Islamic Calendar). For further analysis see The Theories of State in the Shi’ite Figh, ibid. the sixth theory.

(15) Sheikh Hossein-Ali Montazeri Najaf-Abadi; Darasaaton fee Velayat al-Faqih va Fiq’h al Dowlat-e Eslami-yeh, (Vol. I-IV), Qom, 1408-1411 Islamic Calendar—for analysis see The Theories of State in the Shi’ite Figh, ibid. the seventh theory.

(16) Some of the recent point of views held by Ayatollah Montazeri in his book Deedgah-ha (Points of View, or Perspectives), particularly in the transcript “velayat-e faqih and Constitution” is worth studying (www.montazeri.com).

(17) See Ayatollah Khomeini, Kashf al Asraar, p.185.

(18) Ayatollah, Seyed Abolghaasem Khoi, Al Masaa-el va Rodoude: “the greatest Shiite scholars do not agree with it.”

(19) These points were discussed sporadically throughout Dagh-Dagheh ha-ye Hokoomat-e Deeni (Anxieties of Religious Governance). Now they are clustered in one place.

(20) Much has been discussed in Chapter 16 of Hokoomat-e Velayi (Velayat-Based State), pp. 242-245, about the principles supporting lack of velayat.

(21) See Montazeri’s Darasaat (Vol. 1), p. 495, the Third Principle, for the framework in monarchy.

(22) See Ibn-e Fahd-e Helli; Al Rasaael al Ash’ar (Ten Thesis), thesis 9, case 9.

(23) Imam Ali. Nahj ol-Balagheh.

(24) See Mardom Salari-ye Deeni (Religious Democracy), ibid.

References
Arblaster, Anthony. Democracy. Minnesota Press, 1987.

Cohen, Carl. Democracy. New York: The University of Georgia Press, 1973.

Ha’eri Yazdi, (Sheikh) Mahdi. Wisdom and Governance. London, 1994.

Held, David. Modeles of Democracy. Polity Press and Blackwell, 1987.

Helli, Ibn-e Fahd. Al Rasaael al Ash’ar (Ten Thesis). Qom, 1379 (2000).

Javadi Amoli, (Sheikh) Abdollah. Velayat-e Fagih; Velayat-e Fegh-h va Edaalat. (Velayat-e faqih; Guardianship of Jurisprudence and justice). Qom, 1378 (1999).

———. “Peeramoon-e Vali va Rahbari” (Surrounding the Guardian and Leadership). In “Maghaaleh-ye Emaamat va Velayat.” Tehran, 1368 (1989).

Kadivar, Mohsen. Nazariyeh-ha-ye Dowlat dar Fiq’h-e Shiite (The Theories of State in the Shi’ite Figh [5th ed.]). Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1380 (2001).

———. Hokoomat-e Velayi (Velayat-Based State [4th ed.]). Tehran, 1380 (2001).

———. Dagh-Dagheh ha-ye Hokoomat-e Deeni (Anxieties of Religious Governance [2nd ed.]). Tehran, 1379 (2000).

———. Series of articles “Hokoomat-e Entesabi” (Appointive State). Tehran: Aftab monthly, 1380-1381 (2001-2002).

———. “Mardom Salari-e Deeni” (Religious Democracy). Tehran, 1380 (2001).

———. “Az Mashrooteh-ye Saltanati ta Jomhoori-ye Velayi” (From Constitutional Monarchy to Velayat Based Republicanism). New York, 1381 (2002).

Khomeini, (Seyed) Ruholla Mousavi. Al-Bai’, Vol. I-V. Qom: Be-ta Publishings.

———. Kashf al Asraar, Qom: Be-ta Publishings.

———. Saheefe-ye Noor (2nd ed.). Tehran, 1374 (1995).

———. Velayat-e Faqih. Tehran, 1373 (1994).

Khoyee, (Seyed) Abolghasem. Masa’el va Rodoude. Qom, 1409 Islamic Calendar.

Makaarem-e Shirazi, (Sheikh) Nasser. “Anvaar al Faghaameh.” In Al Bai’. Qom, 1411 Islamic Calendar.

Mesbaah Yazdi, (Sheikh) Mohammad Taghi. Porsesh-haa va Pasokh-haa (Questions and Answers). Qom, 1379 (2000).

Montazeri, (Sheikh) Hossein-Ali; Darasaaton fee Velayat al-Faqih va Fiq’h al Dowlat-e Eslami-yeh (Vol. I-IV). Qom, 1408-1411 Islamic Calendar.

———. Deedgah-ha (Points of View)—Internet facsimile. Qom, 1380 (2001).

Motahari, (Sheikh) Morteza. Peeramoon-e Enghelab-e Eslami (About the Islamic Revolution). Tehran, 1368 (1989).

———. Peeraamoon-e Jomhoori-e Eslami (About the Islamic Republic). Tehran, 1368 (1989).

Naeeni, (Mirza) Mohammad Hossein. Tanbeeh al Aemeh va Tanzeeh al-Mellateh. Tehran, 1334 (1956).

Plato, the Works of

Sadr, (Seyed) Mohammad Bagher. Al Eslaam Yaghood al Hayaat. Beirut, 1399 Islamic Calendar.

The Encyclopedia of Democracy; London: Rutledge, 1995."

Dr. Seyyed Ataollah Mohajerani - CV

2005-01-02T19:48:00.000-08:00

Dr: "Dr. Seyyed Ataollah Mohajerani

Born in Arak, Iran, 1954
Married to Ms. Jamileh Kadivar
(Author, journalist and Sixth Majlis deputy from Tehran)

Academic Degrees

1. BA in History, Isfahan University (1977) – graduated top student
2. MA in Iranian History and Culture, Shiraz University (1983) - graduated top student
3. PhD in History, Teacher Training University (1996)
4. Honorary Doctorate, Dushanbe University - Tajikistan (1994)

Familiar with English, Arabic and Urdu languages

Executive background

Islamic Parliament Deputy (1980 - 1984) Member of temporary and permanent presiding board
Head of Trade Commission
Deputy Head of the for Foreign Affairs
Head of the News and Information Committee of Defense Commission
Commission
IRI Cultural Attaché to Pakistan (1984 - 1985)
Deputy prime minister for legal and parliamentary affairs (1985 - 1989)
Vice president for legal and parliamentary affairs (1989 - 1997)
Member of policy making council of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (I.R.I.B), appointed by the Spiritual Leader of IRI (1992 - 1994)
Deputy head of the "Center for Strategic Studies" in charge of social-cultural affairs (1992 - 1997)
Head of the committee for supporting the Islamic Revolution of Palestine (1990 - 1997)
Member of the High Council of Policy-making for Governmental Propaganda (1994 - present)
Member of Board of Trustees for the Great Farsi (Persian) Encyclopedia (1992 - present)
Member of Farabi Foundation's Board of Trustees (1989 - 1994)
Member of IRNA's Board of Trustees (1989 - 1993)
Member of Press Jury (1990 - 1994)
Member of Board of Trustees for the Southern Universities (1995 - present)
Member of Board of Trustees of University of Medical Science, Arak (1991 - present)
Member of Scientific Board for the Center of the Great Islamic Encyclopedia (1994 - present)
Member of Scientific Board of the Teacher Training University (1991 - present)
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1997 - 2000)
Speaker of Cabinet (1997 - 2000)
Advisor to the IRI President
President of the International Centre for Dialogue Among Civilizations (2000-2003)
Writings
A Critique on the Machination of Satanic Verses (1989 - 20th edition 2000)
(This book has been translated into English in 1992 by Abdulhassan Quds Sharifi and published by Alhoda Publications in Tehran; and also into Arabic in 1993, published by Dar ol Vasilah Publications in Beirut, Lebanon)

The Harm of Wind (1990 - 2nd edition 1992)

Messenger of Ashura (1992 - 3rd edition 1992)

Epic of Ferdowsi (1993)

Revolution of Ashura (1995 - 2nd edition 1996)

Salman-e-Farsi (1996)

Story of Nima (1996)

Interpellation (7th edition 1999)

The story still goes on... (2000)

*All the above titled are published by Ettelaat Publications

Writings soon to be published

The Jewel of Prayer

Two Mirrors: Arafat and Ashura

The Better Tomorrow (An analysis and critique on the 7th presidential election of IRI)

Press Activities

Cooperation with Ettelaat daily journal (1981 - present)

Editor in Chief of Rahbord quarterly (1992 - 1997)

Concessionaire and Director in charge of Bahman weekly (1995 - 1996)"

Vice President Mohajerani's paper banned!

2005-01-02T19:43:00.000-08:00

Vice President's paper banned!: "Subject: Vice President's paper banned!
From: payman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Payman Arabshahi)
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 1996 14:25:09 +0800

Iranian Vice President Ataollah Mohajerani, has run afoul of the law, and has been condemned by the special press court of "spreading lies", "defamation", "insults" for articles published in his weekly about the Jameh-e Ruhaniat-e Mobarez, the Combatant Clerics Society of Parliament-speaker Nateq-Nouri.

Mohajerani says he closed his weekly newspaper, Bahman, "for financial reasons" after the second round of the Majlis elections. The court banned him from journalism for one year and fined him 500,000 rials ($167).

Bahman had accused the JRM of receiving a $1 million bribe during the election campaign. In a separate article, the paper accused JRM of "using force to achieve its goals," and of being the main cause of political asphyxiation and the lack of freedom in Iran.

Mohajerani defended himself in court by evoking the poisonous atmosphere of the Majlis campaign. "Our genuine concern was the spreading violence and repression in the name of the religion," he said, referring to the pro-Rafsanjani list of Majlis candidates, the Servants of Construction.

Mohajerani has been very active in recent years as an unofficial speaker for Rafsanjani supporters , mainly through writing articles in the pro-government press.

The court decision would appear to be another show of force by Nateq-Nouri to his opponents. [Salam 7/3]"

Mohsen Kadivar opponent of Velayat-e Fiqh

2004-12-28T11:17:00.000-08:00

Cleric Uses Weapon of Religion Against Iran's Rulers: "Cleric Uses Weapon of Religion Against Iran's Rulers
By ELAINE SCIOLINO

TEHRAN — Despite his turban and cloak, or perhaps because of it, Mohsen Kadivar is a very dangerous man for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The 41-year-old cleric and confidant of President Mohammad Khatami trained at the best theological seminary and taught at some of the best universities in the country. He was active in the revolution that toppled the monarchy 21 years ago and has written heavy tomes on Islamic philosophy and law.

But that was before he was banned from teaching, before he was tried and sentenced to prison for disseminating lies, defaming Islam and disturbing public opinion with his newspaper commentaries suggesting that the rule of the clerics had become as tyrannical as the rule of the kings.

Now, after 18 months in prison, Mr. Kadivar is free, in a manner of speaking. He was released in July but is still banned from teaching. He has been told that he faces new criminal charges, but does not know what they are or when they will be filed.

Most of the reformist newspapers for which he wrote are closed. Many of the journalists and clerics he counts among his friends are behind bars. And his attempt to give a speech with another leading reformer in the western industrial city of Khorramabad in August was blocked by armed vigilantes, causing riots that left a policeman dead and 100 people wounded.

Mr. Kadivar has a lot of time to talk these days, but it was unusual for him to invite an American reporter to his home. The Western press is accused by many conservatives, including the country's hard-line newspaper commentators, of being part of an international conspiracy that has infiltrated the reform movement to undermine the stability of the Islamic state.

But Mr. Kadivar was upbeat, as he sat in an armchair in the living room of the comfortable apartment he shares with his wife and four children, surrounded by glass-encased, ceiling-to-floor bookcases filled with leather-bound books.

"I truly believe in the things I have said," he said in a three-hour conversation over sour cherry juice and platters of fruits and sweets. "And I have already paid the price for it."

The bearded, bespectacled mid- level cleric has refused to obey the dictum of the clerical court that convicted him — that he keep his pen still and his mouth shut. "I have no intention of listening to them," he said. "If they want to act against me again, this time it is they who will have to pay the price."

Mr. Kadivar is so dangerous because he is armed with one of the key weapons of the Islamic Republic — the language of religion.

Iran is locked in an intense struggle between reformers who want to make the system more responsive to the will of the people and conservatives supported by armed street vigilantes who are determined to keep their hold on power through their rigid interpretation of Islam.

Mr. Kadivar comes to this ideological battlefield armed with Koranic verses and complex theological scholarship. When he talks of democracy, he does not demand the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and its replacement with a secular form of government.

"I believe in a religious democratic state," he said. "I believe that democracy and Islam are compatible. But a religious state is possible only when it is elected and governed by the people. And the governing of the country should not be necessarily in the hands of the clergy. So what I support is the healthy state the reformers are promoting as an Islamic Republic, not what exists now."

And what exists now, he continued, is a system in which one man, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has too much power, under a system of government known as the "rule of the Islamic jurist." Under Iran's Constitution, Ayatollah Khamenei wields more power than the president and controls the national police and the security agencies and appoints the heads of the military, the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, national television and radio and the ostensibly charitable foundations that control hundreds of companies and industries.

But there are Islamic thinkers, Mr. Kadivar included, who argue that the power structure has become distorted over the years. Proof of that came last month, Mr. Kadivar said, when Ayatollah Khamenei stunned the popularly elected Parliament — and much of the nation — when he decided that that Parliament would be prohibited from amending a restrictive press law.

"This is the meaning of the absolute authority," Mr. Kadivar said, referring to the ayatollah's position. "If one person is going to rule the same way the monarchy did, well, it was not the goal of the revolution to have one-person rule, even if he is a fair and knowledgeable man."

In the current political climate in Iran, such criticism is breathtakingly bold. Essentially, Mr. Kadivar is arguing that the official interpretation of Islam developed under the Islamic Republic is misguided. But he speaks so openly in part because that is what he is trained to do.

The clerical system in Shiite Islam is a democratic, non-hierarchical, even rowdy one in which students are trained to speak their minds and challenge the authority of their professors.

Still, in clerical circles, Mr. Kadivar is an odd fit. He began his studies in electrical engineering at the prestigious University of Shiraz, where he learned English, and turned to religious studies in the dusty, provincial holy city of Qum only after the secular universities were closed in the cultural crackdown early in the revolution. For 16 years, Mr. Kadivar studied and taught a wide variety of courses, including Arabic literature, logic and religious law and philosophy.

Nine years ago, he antagonized conservative clerics when he wrote an article using the views of various Islamic thinkers to argue that there are other forms of Islamic government than one ruled by one "Islamic jurist." More writing on the subject followed, and eventually a newspaper that published the article was shut down, and Mr. Kadivar was stripped of his teaching responsibilities.

Until his trial in early 1999 before the powerful Special Court for the Clergy, however, he was overshadowed by his more prominent sister, Jamileh Kadivar, a journalist, politician and mother of four. She is married to Ataollah Mohajerani, a layman who, as minister of islamic culture and guidance, has struggled to liberalize film and the media.

In February, Jamileh Kadivar came in second place in the election for Parliament from Teheran. She is so outspoken that on the first day of her brother's trial she declared before the television cameras, "This court is worse than the executioners of the shah's regime."

Even from behind bars, Mr. Kadivar continued his relentless criticism of the clerical system. In his most pointed commentary, contained in a letter to his wife from prison in May 1999, Mr. Kadivar wrote, "The Islamic Republic is faced with a historic catastrophe in its 20th year of life in Iran." The main goal of the 1979 revolution, he added, was "the end of absolute monarchy and the transformation to an Islamic Republic. So the return to the same conduct of absolute monarchy cannot be called an Islamic Republic." (He also found time in prison to finish his doctoral dissertation.)

And in an article for the reformist newspaper Khordad before it was shut down earlier this year, he wrote, "No one with a different mentality — even if he or she is one of the founders or true supporters of the revolution — is safe in these chaotic conditions in which aggression prevails, bookshops fall easy prey to arson, people in cinemas and parks have to expect being unexpectedly raided, tourists are attacked and legal gatherings and lecturers are so often assaulted."

Asked about his writings now, Mr. Kadivar replied: "I stand by what I said then — word for word. I said these things to strengthen Islam in our society and to implement freedom."

He has been just as outspoken since his release, branding the judiciary a tool of the conservatives and "minority monopolists" and criticizing the elected Parliament for not yet working to fulfill the needs of the people.

And he keeps in contact with his fellow reformers, even those in prison. During the conversation, Akbar Ganji, one of Iran's best-known and most daring political commentators, called from Evin Prison, where he has been held for five months awaiting trial for his articles against the excesses of the system. Mr. Ganji was excited about an article he had written in an obscure reformist newspaper published in faraway Zanjan Province that has not been shut down — at least not yet.

Mr. Kadivar has no doubt that in the long run, his side will prevail. "The pressure against people like me cannot last forever, because the demands of the people are the opposite of what is happening in this country," he said.

In any case, he added, "can one live without hope?""

The Anti Revolution with Hamid Reza Jalaipour and the youth

2004-12-26T06:25:00.000-08:00

In Clerics' Iran, Children of the Revolution Seek Escape: "In Clerics' Iran, Children of the Revolution Seek Escape
Repelled by theocratic rule, some youths turn to drugs or suicide, music or the mountains.

Quote
"When I was a youth, we were revolutionaries, and we were ready to pay the price. These days the youth are not ready to pay.'
-- Hamid Reza Jalaipour, a sociologist and onetime student activist

By Megan K. Stack, Times Staff Writer
TEHRAN — Their cheeks were bitten by the threat of snow, but the sisters didn't have anywhere else to go. They'd coated their faces with makeup and painted their eyelashes until they looked too heavy to blink, gaudy faces to offset drab denims and black coats. This afternoon, their spirits hung as low as the brooding clouds over the mountains.

"This country is very dirty," said Mansureh, a pale 23-year-old who answers telephones at a law firm because she wasn't accepted to a university. "Nobody likes the regime, especially the youth. There are so many restrictions, we can't do anything."

It was Friday afternoon, time for prayers in the Islamic Republic, but the sisters and hundreds of other young Iranians trekked into the mountains on the outskirts of Tehran instead. Droves of twentysomethings flooded the rocky paths as if they were headed somewhere in particular — a concert or a rally. But there was nothing at the top; they were simply climbing their way out of the smoggy urban mazes.

The mountains were alive with hormones and directionless potential. Forget black robes and beards; these young Iranians dressed as if they'd just come from a rave, with faded running shoes and aviator glasses shoved high into their hair. They slouched along, glassy-eyed and smoking cigarettes. Many of them looked stoned. Boys and girls held hands. The winter light slanted through the dying trees. The mood was nihilistic.

"I think the government wants the youth to be on drugs so they keep quiet," said Mansureh's sister, a 17-year-old high school student who also gave only her first name, Mona. "They say it's a problem, but they're the ones importing it."

As their government squares off against the West and vague rumors of outside intervention run in the streets, the youth of Tehran move through the months as if dreaming, passing moodily from pop culture to Persian traditions, groping for their place in the world. Conversations with dozens of young adults in Tehran painted an overwhelming picture of a generation lost, disaffected and stained by longing.

"I'd like to start a new life," said Mansureh, her words hanging in tea steam, "somewhere else."

Like many young Iranians, the two sisters chafe at a strict Islamic government but drop into lethargy when it comes to politics.

The previous night, they'd been kicked out of a shopping center by a government morality squad. Run-ins with police are common; the two say they use their pocket money to bribe their way out of trouble. Their friends have turned to drugs or even suicide.

A quarter of a century ago, Iran's fiery youth drove a revolution in the name of Islam and anti-imperialism. But those students grew up, and their zeal faded as they softened into graying bureaucrats. The babies they birthed en masse at the feverish urging of the clergy have inherited a legacy of double-digit unemployment, widespread drug addiction and gnawing religious disillusionment.

"There aren't any jobs for us," said Rahim Keab, a 21-year-old soldier in a dirty khaki coat who made his way across a city park under a steely winter sky. He and four friends drifted to the capital months ago from a farming village in the southwest. Now they are languishing. Keab doesn't know what he will do when his military service is over.

"Young people want to get married, but first they need work," Keab said. "So instead they start to smoke [opium], and they get addicted. The government hasn't done enough for us."

This apathetic, youthful mass is a powerful, albeit untapped, force: Three-quarters of the population is younger than 35. They are enough to shape an election; in a truly representative system, they would decide their government.

But few young people are expected to go to the polls in next spring's presidential election. There's the stupor of hopelessness, and the boycott threat by some reformists. They say they will shun the polls if the conservatives once again ban reformist candidates from running, as they did in parliamentary elections this year.

"When I was a youth, we were revolutionaries, and we were ready to pay the price," said Hamid Reza Jalaipour, a 46-year-old sociologist and onetime student activist who now runs reformist newspapers. "These days the youth are not ready to pay. They prefer to depoliticize, and the conservatives are very happy about that. They are looking for passive masses."

Even the Islamic Republic's legendary student movements have fallen silent. It was the students who swept President Mohammad Khatami into office in 1997, heady with his promises of reform and progress. But Khatami proved weak, and the reforms never came.

So the students lost patience. But when they smashed through the streets in the massive demonstrations of 1999, they were arrested and tortured. Bit by bit, the fire faded from the campuses.

"Our language used to be more courageous," said Majid Haji Babaei, a 31-year-old doctoral student and a leader at the Student Unity Office. "But we were beaten up and even thrown out of windows, we were suppressed, and many went to jail. Naturally, some students felt disappointed, and the risk of political involvement also got higher."

Many Iranian youths yearn for a better life elsewhere but are hard-pressed to articulate where, or how. They resent their own government but complain that they have been unfairly stigmatized by the West. They speak like people drained of politics and religion.

"Everybody believes in God, but now there is a big gap between us and God," said Majid Ghanbari, a 28-year-old film buff, music enthusiast and malcontented entrepreneur with floppy hair and rumpled jeans. "The government tried to force people closer, but instead they sent us further away."

His brother nodded. "Before the revolution, we had real believers, but not now," said Hamid Ghanbari, who at 25 is exactly as old as the revolution. "After the Islamic Revolution, we don't have religion anymore."

Majid Ghanbari owns Video Home, a loud and improbable outlaw's den tucked into a corner of a shopping mall in the sandy urban jungles of western Tehran. Its walls are festooned with the bright covers of bootleg movies and albums. He's pushing pop hits from America alongside Iranian films. He hunches over his computer all day long, burning CD after CD.

"Anything you want, I have it," he said.

How about DJ Maryam, the mysterious singer who runs her voice through a computer so it sounds like a robot croaking, the one who is rumored to have been jailed because in Iran it is illegal for women to sing? Her identity is secret, but her albums are everywhere.

Of course the album is available, Ghanbari scoffed — "Aren't you hearing it in every taxi?" A few clicks of the mouse, the cursor dances on his flat-screen monitor and the voice spills out into the mall.

As is the case with most of his Iranian peers, Ghanbari's thoughts have been driven away from politics. He has watched with disgust as fundamentalists resurged and flexed a new, bolder power.

Just the other day, a busload of morality police raided the mall and arrested any women who weren't wearing "good hijab" — in other words, women who were showing too much hair. People in Tehran haven't seen that brand of open bullying from the fundamentalists in eight years, Ghanbari fretted. "Those girls were our customers," he said.

In these nervous times, Ghanbari finds solace in pop music and bootleg movies. "Almost everybody supports the left, but they don't have any power," he said. "When the left doesn't do anything, people just forget about it. They put their heads down."

Two schoolgirls slipped into his shop, dressed in hip-hop gear. They were looking for the latest bootleg Iranian music from Los Angeles, and weren't disappointed. Ghanbari reached beneath his mouse pad, as if he had been waiting for them, and handed over a CD.

As the girls slumped back into the crowds, Ghanbari sighed. How long would it be, he wondered, before the police returned to shutter his shop for selling illegal CDs? It happens every few months.

"And then I get nervous and feel really bad. Every time I think, 'I should do something, I should leave this country. What kind of life is this?' " he said, shaking his head. "But then they open the shop again, and I have my job, I have my life. And I am Iranian, I love Iran. I forget about it until the next time.""

September 1981 Open Rebellion of Mojahedin and Communists

2004-12-25T06:20:00.000-08:00

History of Iran: Iran after the victory of 1979's Revolution: "In September 1981, expecting to spark a general uprising, the Mojahedin sent their young followers into the streets to demonstrate against the government and to confront the authorities with their own armed contingents. On September 27, the Mojahedin used machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers against units of the Pasdaran. Smaller left-wing opposition groups, including the Fadayan, attempted similar guerrilla activities. In July 1981, members of the Union of Communists tried to seize control of the Caspian town of Amol. At least seventy guerrillas and Pasdaran members were killed before the uprising was put down. The government responded to the armed challenge of the guerrilla groups by expanded use of the Pasdaran in counterintelligence activities and by widespread arrests, jailings, and executions.

The executions were facilitated by a September 1981, Supreme Judicial Council circular to the revolutionary courts permitting death sentences for "active members" of guerrilla groups. Fifty executions a day became routine; there were days when more than 100 persons were executed. Amnesty International documented 2,946 executions in the 12 months following Bani Sadr's impeachment, a conservative figure because the authorities did not report all executions. The pace of executions slackened considerably at the end of 1982, partly as a result of a deliberate government decision but primarily because, by then, the back of the armed resistance movement had largely been broken. The radical opposition had, however, eliminated several key clerical leaders, exposed vulnerabilities in the state's security apparatus, and posed the threat, never realized, of sparking a wider opposition movement. "

Shahid Beheshti Murdered by the Mojahedin

2004-12-25T06:04:00.000-08:00

Home Page: "Shahid (the martyr) sayyed Mohammad Hosseiny Beheshti was born in Aban 2nd, 1307 (October 24th, 1928) in a district called Lomban in Isfahan ( Chaharsouq district).He was born in a family whose members were familiar with Islamic values. His father was one of Isfahan’s clergies and prayer- leader of Lomban mosque who went to the village once a week in order to preach and solve the problems of people and establish the community prayers. He passed away in 1341(1962). His maternal grand father the late Haj Mir Mohammad Sadiq Modarres Khatunabadi, was one of the leading authorities on divine law. When Shahid (Martyr) Beheshti was just one year old, he passed away and Shahid Beheshti was deprived of his meeting, however; knowing about his grandfather’s manner later on affected Shahid Beheshti’s personality.

With four years of age he entered traditional elementary school. He was so genius that he learned how to recite Quran and how to read and write in a very short time.

After a while, having passed the entrance exam, he entered the primary school at the sixth grade but since he was not old enough to take part in that grade he was registered in fourth grade. Nevertheless he took part in the final exams and was granted the second best student title. Wishing to complete his studied, he entered the high school. In 1321(1942) he gave it up, since he was interested in the theological matters he entered the theological center. Although his home was in Isfahan for saving time, being independent while thinking and studying, since 1324(1945) he rented a room at Sadr school of Isfahan and he lived there.

During 1321 to 1325(1942- 1946) he could study the Arabic literature, logic, Fiqh (Jurisprudence), divine law & fundamentals and stole the attention of his professors to the extent that when they met him as if he reminded his maternal grand father to them.

In 1325 (1946) when he was 18 years old, he left for Qom to continue his studies and in 6month-time he studied the rest of subjects namely : Sath , Kefayeh and Makasib. In the same year, Allameh Tabatabee came to Qom and his classes and sessions attracted the active students like Shahid Beheshti who later on took part in his classes.

In 1326 (1947) Dr. Beheshti with Shahid Motahari, and some of his friends prepared a schedule according to which they had to go to the most remote villages to preach Islamic values, by means of a little amount of expense which Ayatollah Boroujerdi gave to them to guide the villagers and inform each other about their ideas concerning planning for future activities.

In 1327 (1948) he continued the normal high school education and he could get his literal diploma in final exams of late comers. Then he entered the college of Theology (at that time rational sciences)and in 1330(1951) he received his BA. During (1329-1330)(1950-1951) he was in Tehran and at the end of mentioned year he returned to Qom again and this time he officially started his teaching at Hakim Nezami high school as an English teacher. During (1329-1330)(1951-1956) he spent his life carrying out researches and philosophical matters .In Ordibehesht 1331(May 1952) he married one of his relatives whose result was 4 children (2 sons and 2 daughters). In 1333 (1956-1959) he was a student of Ph.D. of theological philosophy (and of course in 1353(1947) he defended his thesis called “the problems of Mabad ul Tabi’e in Quran”, under guidance of the Shahid Professor Mortza Motahari. During this time he was coming and going to Tehran and Qom.

In 1338 (1959) he founded an English class at “Din and Danesh School” for theological students and in the same year along with the thought of the leading figures like Motahari, Taleqani…etc, he held
the monthly speech sessions in Tehran on which the programmed lectures were held with the large number of the students and intellectuals as an audience.

From 1339(1960) the idea of organizing the theological center and arranging the syllabus of it for 17 years was in his mind whose result was foundation of “Haqqani” and” Montazeriyeh” schools. In 1341(1962) he decided to establish the Islamic center of students and educators which was a measure for linking between the educated people in the past and present methods.

He was actively taking part in (1341-1342)(1962-1963) campaigns. And in collecting and composing the “statements “he was a great help .From 1342 he formed a searching group for surveying about the Islamic government and in the same year Savak (the controlling system for security at that time )made him leave Qom.

He came to Tehran and in programming on preparing the textbooks was closely cooperating with Shahid (martyr) Bahonar, in the same year he was also cooperating with campaigning groups and coalition bodies. Besides, he was participating in a 4-member council in the name of “divine law-political council” with help of Shaid (martyr )Motahari, Mr. Anvari and Mr. Molaee.

In 1343(1963) with the proposal of Ayatollah Ha’eri and Ayatollah Milani he left for Hamburg and he began to manage and direct the mosque and formation of religious groups of the young and revealing Shah’s (the last king )crimes .At this time he traveled to Saudi Arabia ( in Haj. time ) Syria, Lebanon , Turkey to visit Imam Mousa Sadr and in 1348 he traveled to Iraq to visit Imam Khomeini.

In 1349 (1970) he returned to Iran and it was impossible for him to return to Germany. He started to teach in session for interpreting Quran and examined the textbooks and this process continued till 1355(1976).

In 1359 (1971) he formed 50 sessions of interpreting of Quran on Saturdays which was called ”the

School of Quran” where was a place for gathering the active young people .In 1354(1975) due to the mentioned sessions and the relationships with the campaigning organizations inside and out side of Iran he was arrested by Savak and after a time he was released.

From 1355(1976) and later he began to deal with formational tasks and in (1356)(1977) he was determined to form the broad formations being active in secret activities and also overtones for forming a party .In the same year due to the disagreements among the Islamic active groups in abroad(which there have been some conflicts) he traveled there and even to the United States and he paved the ground for establishing new relationships among the Islamic groups.

In 1357(1978) he was arrested for a couple of days and he was freed. After which he went to Imam Khomeini in Paris. After his return he played an effective role regarding determining the policy of the Islamic revolution .From Azar 1357(December 1978) according to Imam’s command he formed the revolution’s council and he was dealing with that till the victory of the revolution.

After the revolution as an intellectual person in the revolution’s council he wanted to organize and arrange the affairs. Regarding this mentioned fact he founded the Islamic Republic Party. He took part in the election of Experts Assembly, and as a vice president of Majlis he dealt with managing the affairs, preparing and forming the Constitution. After resigning of the interim government in 1358(1979) he was doing his duty as a minister of justice. Then through the command of Imam he was chosen and appointed as the chairman of Supreme Court. He was busy with his duties till the evening of Tir, 7, 1360 (June 28,1981) after Namaz –Maqrib (evening prayer) and Esha (night prayer) while giving lecture, he was martyred due to the explosion of a bomb planted by the members of Mojahedin’s Organization with 72 people from his colleagues and through the tears and sighs and sorrows of millions of Iranian people he was buried in Behesht-e Zahra Tomb. May his soul rest in peace.
"

Asia Times - Asia's most trusted news source for the Middle East

2004-12-24T19:39:00.000-08:00

Asia Times - Asia's most trusted news source for the Middle East: "Iran's hardliners tighten their squeeze
By Safa Haeri

PARIS - As a Persian proverb says, "Never two without three." After receiving two hard and insulting slaps in one week by the conservative-controlled majlis, or parliament, beleaguered Iranian President Mohammad Khatami suffered a personal blow when one of his closest allies and oldest friends decided to leave the cabinet.

Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Ali Abtahi, the vice president in charge of parliamentary and legal affairs, announced on Monday that he had submitted his resignation from the government and was waiting for the president to accept it.

A jovial middle-rank cleric with an unusual sense of humor and a penchant for sarcasm, Abtahi, who is in his 40s, explained that he had not been able to fulfill his job of coordinating the actions of the government with the new majlis, one that he had sharply criticized when it came into power in May thanks to the mass rejection of reformist candidates by the leader-controlled Council of the Guardians, a 12-member body empowered to vet all candidates for elections in the Islamic Republic.

"For some time I have reached the conclusion that given the differences between my political viewpoints and those of the parliament, I cannot fulfill my responsibilities," the outspoken Abtahi told the semi-independent students' news agency ISNA, referring to his previous attempts at leaving the government weeks after the inauguration of the new parliament.

A fearless critic of the hardliners with whom he often clashed, Abtahi was the first official to disclose that Canadian-Iranian photographer Zahra Kazemi had been murdered in custody after her arrest in June 2003, triggering a series of head-on confrontations between the leader-controlled judiciary and the executive branch of government.

Abtahi's decision came a day after the majlis, during its October 3 session, impeached by a large majority Road and Transportation Minister Ahmad Khorram, charging him with mismanagement, corruption, abuse of power, a spate of road and air accidents and favoring foreign firms in handing out government contracts.

The impeachment, considered a hard blow to the embattled president, was seen by most analysts, including Abtahi, as addressed not to the minister but to Khatami himself, and aimed at giving the so-called reformists their last shot.

The ousting of Khorram, the first minister to be impeached by the hardline majlis, took place while Khatami was in Algiers, the first leg of his tour of Algeria, Sudan and Oman, triggering a wave of harsh criticism, including among his own followers, accusing him of "betrayal".

Critics said that Khatami decided to leave the country to escape the difficult task of personally defending Khorram, also accused by the army of having endangered the nation's security by awarding a foreign firm, the Austrian-Turkish consortium Tepe Aftken-Vie (TAV), the handling rights of all services at the half-built Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKIA).

Inaugurated officially in May, the US$500 million IKIA had to be closed to air traffic just hours later by the armed forces, which suspected that TAV had contracts in Israel, the existence of which the Iranian ruling ayatollahs do not recognize.

The closure raised many questions, above all who ordered warplanes, one Russian-made MiG-29 and one aging Phantom F-14, to seal the capital's airspace and escort incoming international flights to other airports, including one in Esfahan, central Iran.

Under the Iranian military command structure, such decisions are made by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who, as the leader of the Islamic Republic, is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. "The question is simple: if someone except Khamenei can order military planes [to] take off, this person can also have access to the atomic button, the day the regime has its nuclear weapon," warned one political observer.

Similar charges were leveled against the minister in charge of the awarding of a contract to TurkCell, the Turkish company that won the bid to become Iran's second mobile-telephone operator.

Parliament's fist major affront to the now virtually powerless president was dealt on September 26 when lawmakers adopted a bill that forced the government to seek the authorization of the hardline-dominated majlis for all major contracts with foreign firms. Significantly, it was made retroactive to include the deals with both TAV and TurkCell. However, after officials informed the majlis that the cancellation of the agreements would cost Iran billions of dollars in damages and compensation, the majlis decided to exclude the Turkish firms.

This row broke on the eve of an official Khatami visit to Ankara, so cabinet decided to postpone the trip until the majlis has made up its mind on the controversial law, which a visibly angry president had described as "unjust and against the constitution", a law that not only paralyzes the actions of the government but also discredits Iran in the international arena and scares away the very few foreign investors willing to risk their money in Iran.

"This law, even though adopted with a tiny majority, would leave no respect for the president of this country. Will it not tell the world that one cannot sign any deal with the government of Mr Khatami? With all the enemies, the atomic problem and international economic pressures against Iran, will not the smoke of paralyzing the government and humiliating the president and his cabinet in the face of the world got directly into the eyes of the Iranian people?" Abtahi asked, writing on his personal Internet weblog www.webnevesht.com.

Government spokesman Abodollah Ramazanzadeh confirmed that Abtahi had discussed the issue of his resignation with Khatami, but added that he did not know whether the president had accepted it or not. But at the same time, he hinted that Khatami himself intended to stay in office until the end of his second and final term, due next May.

Abtahi served with Khatami when he was placed in charge of a Shi'ite mosque in Hamburg before the start of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and has remained with him ever since, following Khatami in the now-hardline daily Kayhan, then in the Islamic Culture and Guidance ministry, in the National Library and finally in the presidency, where he held the post of the president's secretary during Khatami's first term from 1997-2001, before being made a vice president.

Analysts say Abtahi's confrontation with the majlis had reached a critical point, and even if he had not resigned, lawmakers would have forced Khatami to boot out Abtahi, one of their most hated opponents.

Though Khatami has seen other close friends and confidants, such as Hojjatoleslam Abdollah Nouri, his first Interior minister, and Ayatollah Mohajerani, in charge of Islamic Culture and Guidance, forced to leave the cabinet, the loss of Abtahi will cause Khatami to lose even more public respect, pundits predict.

According to observers, what the hardliners are doing is drying the roots of the reformism movement, and sowing in their place the seeds of neo-conservatism, a movement best embodied in Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Assembly for Discerning the Interests of the State (ADIS, or Expediency Council), and Hojjatoleslam Hassan Rohani, the powerful secretary of the Supreme Council on National Security and Iran's senior negotiator on the country's controversial atomic project.

Safa Haeri is a Paris-based Iranian journalist covering the Middle East and Central Asia."

Khatami: Iran's democratic reforms failed

2004-12-24T19:28:00.000-08:00

Khatami: Iran's democratic reforms failed: "Khatami: Iran's democratic reforms failed
(Agencies)
Updated: 2004-12-07 07:52

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, listens to Iran's national anthems as he stands under a large screen television during a ceremony to mark Student Day at Tehran university in Tehran, Iran Monday, Dec. 6, 2004. In his final months in office, Iran's embattled President Mohammad Khatami admitted Monday he failed to implement his program of democratic reforms but said he refused a head-to-head collision with his hard-line opponents to save the ruling Islamic establishment. [AP]
Iran's embattled President Mohammad Khatami conceded Monday he had failed to implement his democratic reform program, claiming he had bowed to the will of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his hard-line allies to avoid riots and preserve the ruling Islamic establishment.

"If I retreated, I retreated against the system I believed in," said Khatami to Tehran University students — some openly angry with the man they once saw as the best hope for democracy in Iran. "I considered it necessary to save the ruling establishment."

Some students chanted: "Khatami, Khatami shame on you!" Others yelled out: "Incompetent Khatami, may our vote not bless you!"

The reception was a stark change for the intellectual once so deeply admired among Iran's big population of young people. Many once carried his photograph in their purses or wallets.

Iran's Guardian Council, the conservative oversight body of Muslim clerics that can overrule parliament, banned many of Khatami's pro-reform legislators and candidates from a February election. Khatami has since been seen by many as an ineffective, lame-duck leader — but he said he chose not to boycott the elections to avoid violence.

"Either we had to hold the elections or face riots," Khatami said in the first of several farewell speeches. "I didn't consider it in the country's interests that riots erupt."

Khatami has complained repeatedly that he was powerless to stop hard-liners who blocked reform legislation, detained pro-reform activists and shut down more than 100 liberal publications.

Khatami, whose term ends in June 2005, even said he looking forward to the end of his presidency.

"Fortunately, my tenure is coming to an end," said Khatami. But the soft-spoken president did not refrain from blaming hard-liners and some of his allies for undermining his proposals.

"I have claims against some reformers who ... limited all demands of the people to certain political demands, provoking rigid hard-liners," said Khatami. "(I) have claims against rigid evil thinkers who failed to see people's demands for reform and instead of respecting (the) people's vote (they) began resisting them."

Khatami insisted that democracy in Iran would only come about if it was combined with an Islamic republic.

"The only way to save the country is to establish democracy," said Khatami. "The way toward democracy is through and within the Islamic Republic."

Khatami the optimist said he saw a relative victory in the heckling by the students.

"In Third World countries, powerful institutions stand against the people," said Khatami. "That the government is not seen as an arrogant body is enough of reforms."

Khatami said Iran's image has improved in the world after his 1997 election but anti-democracy measures by hard-liners disappointed the nation and helped prompt US President Bush to include Iran in his "axis of evil" along with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea.

Khatami was voted into office by landslide majority in 1997 and again in 2001.

The Iranian parliament approved two of his reform bills seeking to check the power of hard-liners, but the Guardian Council rejected both."

IIPF castigates attribution of student rallies to political parties

2004-12-23T12:14:00.000-08:00

IIPF castigates attribution of student rallies to political parties: "IIPF castigates attribution of student rallies to political parties

Tehran, Dec 4, IRNA -- Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) Secretary General Mohammad Reza Khatami here Wednesday referred to attribution of recent student rallies to political parties as a way of burying the actual problem by some individuals to do away with their concern about true student movements.

Mohammad Reza Khatami told IRNA, "We believe that in view of some improper approaches witnessed on the part of some officials in the course of past years, Iran is on the verge of a significant development."

According to him, such developments are known to all informed sources, who are aware that illegal measures taken by some officials, specially those from the judicial power, and blocking the community's free trend of activity is the most significant factor provoking the community.

The IIPF Secretary General added, "Given that the court ruling has been issued for one of the political activists and some movements have been made by students, attempts are underway to attribute them to non-scholar agents, while the movements are actually initiated by the students themselves."

"Now that they are faced with a complicated situation, they attempt to bury the actual problem and believe that by attributing the student rallies to a group they can do away with it. They should, meanwhile, notice that the trend was commonly practiced during the reign of Shah," said Khatami.

Khatami added that student rallies in pre-revolutionary era were also attributed either to overseas agents or some active domestic groups to suppress them.

He underlined, given that IIPF finds the activity of political parties in universities accounting for deviation from true student movements, it has never been involved in on-the-campus activities.

Khatami said, "Even the students associated with IIPF go ahead with their activities within the framework of the political and social events taking place outside the university. Besides IIPF youth and student committees are not involved in any on-the-campus activities."

Denying any connection between the recent student rallies and IIPF, he said, "We believe that student rallies should be independent, since we find on-the-campus activities of the political parties end up in their deviation from true student movements."

biography of Mohsen Mohagheghi

2004-12-23T10:27:00.000-08:00

biography of Mohsen Mohagheghi: "Mohsen Mohagheghi was born in Tehran in 1943 and brought up in a religious family. Having finished school, he went to England in order to continue his studies aiming for higher-level education and received his B.Sc. and M.S. in Electronic Control System from University of Salford.

By returning to Iran after his marriage, he was employed in the Nuclear Energy Organization as a senior specialist. After the Islamic Revolution he was promoted to the manager of Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.

In order to achieve his biggest goal in life, Improving Iran’s technological and industrial capabilities, he founded Contronic Co. affiliated to Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran, which is known as one of the pioneers in control system technology in Iran.

Mohsen Mohagheghi was also one of the founders of Abrar Iran Co. and along with his other colleagues managed to establish and install so many factories in Iran, which installing Lorestan Brick Factory, Isfahan Hygienic Systems Factory and fulfilling Polour Mineral Water Project are some of his achievements.

He was also involved in construction projects which building construction and housing the earthquake survivors in Kerman is one of them.

At present he is the managing director of Sepehram Co. He and his wife Fattaneh Bazargan have two children, Salman and Mona.

Mohsen Mohagheghi is the head of the board of executive and member of the main council in Iran Freedom Movement (IFM) and also member of Islamic Association of Engineers. He was arrested on May 8th 2001 by the Islamic Revolutionary Court."

The FMI (Freedom Movement of Iran) rejected the supremacy of jurisprudence

2004-12-23T10:15:00.000-08:00

A Report on Judiciary Cases against the Freedom Movement of Iran: "A Report on Judiciary Cases against the Freedom Movement of Iran

By: Abdolreza Tajik

“I have great respect for Ibrahim Yazdi, because he is a whole politician, and this is a rarity in our politics. He can stand by what he states.”

(Abbas Abdi in Truth or Freedom, p. 134)
Following the death of Mehdi Bazargan, the ideologue and one of the founders of the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), Ibrahim Yazdi emerged as the leader of this ideational-political organization in 1994. On October 3, 2004, Yazdi reacted to being prosecuted by a secret court, and in the absence of a jury, through not showing up at the court. That is because Yazdi and his comrades in the FMI are accused of political offenses, which ought to be prosecuted in an open court and in the presence of a jury.

However, the judiciary denies their claim and contends that since “political offense” is not yet defined, a revolutionary court is proper to prosecute them for the accusations cited in the communiqué released by the public relations bureau of the judiciary on March 18, 2001. The legal case against the FMI followed the arrest of a number of activists belonging to the school of thought called the “ideational-political or religious-nationalist,” and entailed the objection of the movement in the form of a letter to the head of the judiciary in the very next day. Yet the protest did not prevent the judiciary from arresting around 40 of FMI leaders, members and sympathizers on April 6, 2001 in Tehran, Tabriz, Mash-had, Zanjan, Isfahan and Shiraz.

At the time, Yazdi was in the United States for medical treatment. He reacted to the arrests by asserting, “There is no ambiguity or transgression in my activities or those of my comrades’.” Like other members and sympathizers of the FMI, Yazdi was accused of “acting against national security” and “propagating against the system [regime].” Upon relative recuperation, Yazdi arrived in Tehran so that he could join the rank of his friends and comrades, among them those who had been released on bail after their arrest on similar charges a year earlier.

At the reunion, Yazdi referred to their release and affirmed, “the very fact that our friends were released demonstrates that the charges against them were without merit.” Yet the arrests of April 2001 were not the first for the FMI in the past 25 years. The movement has faced at least another two prosecutions: one in 1989, and another in 2000.

The Background of Disputes
After the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan resigned, members and sympathizers of the FMI, a number of them deputies in the first post-revolutionary Majles (parliament), exited the rulership. They began to publicize their organization’s positions and analyses on the current socio-political issues facing the nation.

It was in this context that when Yazdi and his colleagues were being charged with “subversive” activities, he told the French paper, Le Monde: “For many years, the FMI has been committed to its legal path, and has never supported the overthrow of the regime, or advocated public insurgency. We want to change those in command, and such changes, either in whole or in part, are recognized by the constitution. Accordingly, no one can accuse us of being subversive, since we campaign for democratic changes within the framework of law and through peaceful means.” In spite of this pronouncement, the socio-political positions taken by the FMI incited harsh reactions on the part of its opponents, as it happens in the case of any political party or activist organization.

Founders of the FMI, who had a different interpretation of Islam from that of the “classic traditional” reading, had from the very beginning distinguished themselves as “classic neo-thinkers” from “classic traditionalists.” Yet with the rise of the 1979 revolution, the movement, while making links to similar-minded groups, including clerical, began to collaborate with “classic traditionalists.” The cooperation, however, did not last long. After the events of 1982, the course changed and the FMI emerged as one of the most contentious Iranian political parties.

This was to the extent that Asadollah Badamchian, a principal member of the Islamic Coalition Party (Hezbe Mo’talefeh Islami) whose party has always been critical of the FMI, criticized the movement’s worldview and its performance. He questioned regime’s lenience toward the movement in The Sobh, the party’s weekly publication: “Isn’t this tolerance and indulgence that the FMI-ers -- who before the victory of the revolution were never revolutionary or part of it, never accepted Imam [Khomeini]’s leadership, believed in the policy of gradual/evolutionary change within the framework of the laws of the era of the taghoot [shah], supposedly believed in parliamentarian struggle [to the extent that] Bazargan explicitly told the late Imam [Khomeini] that we should not go for revolution, but be content with gaining some points from the shah — were given the provisional government after the victory of the glorious Islamic revolution led by the Imam?

“Yet from that very beginning, they quarreled with the Imam: instead of Islamic republic, they sought democratic Islamic republic, and according to Bazargan, on every issue he thought differently from the Imam, yet the nation tolerated them. Isn’t this indulgence?”

This was against the backdrop in which the FMI, while stressing on the authenticity of the Islamic revolution, viewed itself involved in the materialization and victory of it. As a result, the final declaration of its fifth congress, held in March 1982, read: “The FMI is a compassionate supporter and a genuine defender of the Islamic system and the constitution, which was approved by the votes of the nation. The constitution is a robust declaration and a binding covenant between the rulership and the nation, which the two sides in accordance to the Koranic teaching are obliged to respect and conform with genuinely and fully. Based on this perspective, the FMI believes that disregarding the constitution by either side would ensue deprivation of rights or public unrest.

The FMI deems the path to reform is through internal, transparent and legal challenges, which are grounded in the constitution. Further, it presupposes that freedom, confined within the limits of the law, constructive criticism, and protests are neither harmful nor aggravating. Indeed, they are useful and beneficial to maintaining and prolonging the system and are founded on the Islamic tradition of amre be ma’roof and nahie az monkar, [enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong] which every [Muslim] person and society is obligated to perform. The FMI censures the notion of overthrowing the Islamic Republic, and condemns dependency on or seeking assistance from foreign powers and enemies of Islam.”

Early in 1982, the group experienced a two-week detention of Reza Sadr, a leading member and the publisher of the FMI newspaper, Mizan. Later, Abbas Radnia, another of its top members, was detained. Yet it maintained that even based on the 10-article statement with regard to banned political parties/organizations released by the revolutionary court in that year, the FMI had the right to continue its political activities.

However, Asadollah Badamchian attempted to justify some of the treatment received by the FMI in the weekly Sobh: “Obviously, a segment of the population cannot tolerate seeing so much violation, lawbreaking, and opposition to Imam [Khomeini] and the public will. Those people might resort to acts of violence, similar to which also occur in all Westerns countries and democracies. In Iran it is even more so: an old man has offered his son and son in law in the holy defense [Iraq-Iran war], and has witnessed how his comrades falling in their bloods, or that basiji [volunteer fighter] who has been present in the warfronts and suffers the pain of losing thousands of his co-fighters. When these people see that FMI-ers are disrespectful to the warfront, jihad, and defense, they become angry and sometimes resort to actions such as attacking the former headquarters of the FMI or its gatherings.”

The hostility toward the FMI among some of the groups comprising the ruling coalition, based on what they perceived as the movement’s opposition toward the revolution, led to actions taken by relevant institutions in the ruling system. The Office of the Revolutionary Prosecution [for instance] sealed for a while the FMI headquarters in 1985 and returned it for resumption of activities only after examining all the papers and documents inside the building. In spite of that, Ali Akbar Mohtashemipour, the interior minister of the time, in an interview published on January 27, 1990, stated: “Bazargan’s interview with the press is an indication of the existence of freedom in the society. A person who has been within the structure of an organization, acted so improperly during and after the [post-revolution] provisional government, and he and his organization are detested by the people conducts interviews and the press print them. This is the best reason for the existence of freedom.”

The First-Case Warning
The FMI, which had a different view of the continuation of the Iraq-Iran War from 1982-3, released a statement entitled “Warning” in April 1988. It was initially written by Bazargan and, after being reviewed and edited by the Political Office of the FMI, was signed by him. Following this action, a number of high-ranking members of the organization were detained on May 30. Yet Bazargan, Yazdi, and Yadollah Sahabi were not among them. Hashem Sabbaghian, Mohammad Tavassoli, and Khosro Mansourian were among those who were detained on charges of encouraging people to combat the Islamic Republic system, causing public disorder, and disseminating lies and hearsay. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then speaker of the Majles [parliament], told the second-in-commands in charge of security, and other directors of the Ministry of Information in a meeting: “Rest assured that we are heading toward centralization and this needs time, sufficient study and collaboration of all forces. We should harshly confront those who want to create public dissent.” He stressed that “those causing dissent anywhere should be separated from insiders in the system,” and continued: “people should not perceive that you are trying to solve their problems through repression. Oppression should be limited to elements incapable of reform. The atmosphere of fear should be for traitors and the impious.”

Finally, after around eight months of imprisonment, Sabbaghian, Tavassoli, and Mansourian were released from jail around midnight of February 10, 1989. They were subject of a pardon by the leader of the revolution [Ayatollah Khomeini], and their charges were never known. Nonetheless, after the passage of the Article Ten of the laws governing political parties, the FMI applied for a license. Its leaders modified FMI’s constitution to suit the political party laws and submitted their petition to the interior ministry. But, Rafsanjani, who was in his first year as the president, told a university students’ meeting on the occasion of Teacher’s Day: “The FMI became unlawful because of some of its positions and because it rejected the supremacy of jurisprudence. If they reform themselves and conform to the constitution, they can operate like other parties.”

Second Detention with 90 Signatures
In spring of 1990, what is called the Government of Construction, in its first year in power, received a letter with 90 signatures addressed to the president [Hashemi Rafsanjani]. A number of members of the FMI and others, who had signed this letter, were arrested and moved to Tohid Penitentiary on charges of “participating in [illegal] associations, committing offenses against the internal and external security [of the state], and participating in, signing and endorsing the letter written by a group of the so-called ‘freedom seekers,’ better known as the ‘90-Sigature Letter.’” After two years of imprisonment, those of whom the court had found guilty of “attempting to insult, accuse and spread lies against the holy system of the Islamic republic” were released with a pardon by the leader of the revolution on April 6, 1992.

Consequently, with the closure of the second case against it, the movement began a new chapter. The end of the Government of Construction and the election of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami as the president in 1997 provided fresh circumstances for the FMI. Abdollah Noori, the new minister of interior, who was also a member of Rafsanjani’s government, proposed that the FMI could be permitted to resume its political activities if it changed its name. But, the movement’s leaders rejected this. They believed that if the FMI was not granted the right to political activism, its members, as individuals, would not be permitted activism either. As a result, they preferred to work within the structure of their old organization, which had a 40-year-old history behind.

( Third Detention with Subversion Charge )

With the grow of a splinter within the ruling factions of reformists and conservatives and the emergence of fresh discourses in society, the FMI intensified its presence, which brought a third legal case of “sedition” against its leaders and ranking members. Although the court eventually dropped the charge of “subversion,” they were found guilty of “attempting against national security.” In the revolutionary court -- the first session of which was held on December 11, 2001, in the presence of many members and sympathizers -- 32 of the 34 accused attended the Branch 21 of the revolutionary court of Tehran and listened to the prosecutor’s 150 pages of indictment. It was read in three sessions. Then the court used an amendment to the criminal law (Amendment 1 to Prefix 3 of Article 188) to make the prosecution process secret. In the meantime, five leading members of the FMI -- namely, Tavassoli, Sabbaghian, Mansourian, Mahmood Na’eimpour, and Abolfazl Bazargan – were still in detention. Yazdi, who had an ongoing case against him, was summoned to the same branch of the revolutionary court for May 3, 2002. Since then and over the past two years, he has been interrogated in 52 sessions.

In the end, Branch 21, which was in charge of prosecuting a total of 45 people in the FMI case, issued its verdicts on May 16, 2002, yet they were not made available to the accused or their lawyers until July 27 of that year. Those charged in the case had always complained about the process of their imprisonment, search of their houses or places of work, interrogation, and the conditions of detention and prosecution. They even requested a special committee to be formed to examine their case, and pleaded to a higher court for reconsidering the verdicts.

Along with prosecuting the FMI case, Branch 21 of the revolutionary court had also shut down the Islamic Association of Engineers (Tehran), the Center for Disseminating Islamic Truths [Ideas] (Mashed), Mehdi Bazargan Cultural Center (Tehran), The Society for Cultural Development (Tabriz), The Association of Resisting Intellectuals and Mahak Research Office (Zanjan). The closures were in spite of the fact that the first two of the above institutions were founded before the FMI and had developed independent ideational and cultural characters.

Now, again, Yazdi is facing a new charge in Branch 6(new number for branch 21) of the revolutionary court – i.e., “attempting to convert the velaii (jurisprudence) rule into a democratic rule.” He has one condition for presenting himself to the court and responding to the charges. That
This is a translation of “Three Experiences: A Report on FMI Cases,” published in Shargh, October 5, 2004."

Karroubi: Religious, national beliefs should be respected

2004-12-23T08:01:00.000-08:00

Three editors of banned daily arrested over controversial cartoon: "Karroubi: Religious, national beliefs should be respected
Tehran, Jan 12, IRNA -- Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi said here on Sunday, that the media should respect the national and religious beliefs of the community and that their freedom should be within the framework of the nation's current laws.
Addressing a press conference, he added that in view of the high sensitivity of the community and serious competition, all media specially the newspapers should be quite careful about bringing up current issues to avoid any confusion.

"The reason I recommend the newspapers to be extra careful, is that they have to fill numerous pages everyday," he noted.

In reply to reporters question on Hayat-e-No temporary ban, he criticized the printed design and added that further survey will bring to light whether it was deliberate or not."

BBC News | Ayatollah's brother Hadi Khamenei faces court summons 9/10/2000

2004-12-23T07:58:00.000-08:00

BBC News | MIDDLE EAST | Ayatollah's brother faces court summons: "Ayatollah's brother faces court summons

Hardline conservatives back curbs on press freedom

By Iranian affairs reporter Sadeq Saba
Hadi Khamenei, the younger brother of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been summoned by a special religious court to answer charges of unspecified press offences.

The younger Mr Khamenei, who supports the reformist President Mohammad Khatami, is the publisher of a moderate newspaper in which the alleged offences were committed.

Mr Khamenei says he has not yet decided whether to appear before the tribunal.

The move is the latest in a series of measures against pro-reform publications, which have caused growing concern in pro-reform circles.

Details of the charges against Hadi Khamenei and his daily newspaper, Hayat-e No, are yet to emerge.

But Mr Khamenei said the Special Court for the Clergy has ordered him to appear before the tribunal on Monday to answer charges brought against him by the prosecutor.

Summons

The summons was sent to the Iranian parliament because Mr Khamenei is a member of the majority reformist faction in the chamber.

Hayat-e No: One of Iran's few remaining moderate newspapers

Hayat-e No is one of the few newspapers not to have been closed in the recent wave of crackdowns against pro-reform publications.

Mr Khamenei is allied with President Khatami and is opposed to his older brother, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who as supreme leader of Iran is considered closer to the conservatives.

Hadi Khamenei is a cleric himself and that's why he is summoned by the Special Court for the Clergy.

Challenge

But pro-reform clerics say that the religious court is unconstitutional and has no authority to consider press offences.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen as closer to the conservatives

A refusal by Mr Khamenei to appear before the court will be seen as a direct challenge to his brother, who appointed the court to deal with offences committed by clerics.

In the past some clerics refused to accept the authority of this court, insisting that only an ordinary tribunal with the presence of a jury was competent to hear press offences.

But this court has been very active in recent years, ordering the closure of several newspapers and sentencing clerics to long term prisons."

Grounds for barringreformist Candidates

2004-12-23T07:54:00.000-08:00

ABANDONED BY KHATAMI, REFORMISTS HAVE LOST THE ELECTORAL BATTLE: "According to a spokesman for the CG that has barred the majority of the reformist candidates on grounds of their "lack" of allegiance to Islam, the concept of velayat faqih, or the absolute rule of the leader etc. has re-instated several of the disqualified hopefuls, with only three incumbent deputies only.

"

Abbas Amir-Entezam Continues War Against the Republic From His Jail Cell

2004-12-23T07:27:00.000-08:00

IranMania News: "Feature : Abbas Amir-Entezam, Iran's Nelson Mandela?

Sunday, May 18, 2003 - ©2003 IranMania.com

By: Dr Sa'id Farzaneh
Mohandes (Engineer) Abbas Amir-Entezam, 68, the longest serving Iranian political prisoner during 23 of the past 24 years of the reign of the Islamic Republic of Iran has once again been summoned in front of the Clerical Judiciary to account for his latest call for a genuine referendum and free elections in Iran.

Amir-Entezam, the deputy prime minister to Mehdi Bazargan's first post-1979 revolution government in Iran was arrested when he returned from his diplomatic post in Sweden -after the siege of American embassy in Nov 1980 by a group of students calling themselves "followers of Imam (Khomeini)'s path" - and charged with treason on trumped-up charges of spying for the Iran's then enemy, the United States of America. [for more information about Abbas Amir-Entezam, see http://www.entezam.org].

The latest move by the Islamic judiciary, appointed by the clerical leader Khamenei (Khomeini's successor), to "interview" the 68 year old ailing Amir-Entezam is a sign of desperation by a regime deeply concerned about his call for true democracy and free elections, a call also echoed by the most radical student organisations in the country, gaining momentum and becoming ubiquitous.

Currently, within Iran's internal political landscape, there is talk of two other referendums. The reformists within the Islamic Parliament and President Khatami's government are pushing for the 'twin' legislations to strengthen Khatami's hand within the confines of the current Islamic constitution and to push back the right wing Khamenei appointed clerics of the so-called "Council of Guardians of the Islamic Republic Constitution" (CGIRC) who control every election and oppose any reform. The reformists have been threatening a referendum on the issue if CGIRC does not back down. Recently Khatami apparently stormed out of a meeting authorising the doubling of CGIRC's budget. The conservative clerics are clearly not showing any signs of backing down. They know that such a referendum (to ask if people support the twin legislations) will never happen. This is because despite three major presidential and parliamentary elections and clear mandates for reform, nothing has changed. Therefore in the recent local elections (March 2003), a large majority of Iranian people especially in the large cities, chose to express their votes by abstention. Once again they demonstrated that despite what the reformists might have thought, people value their votes. The Iranians seem to be saying to their twice elected President they believe his twin legislations are "Nooshdarooye Pas az Marge Sohrab", i.e. too little, too late!

A second referendum is being talked about by the powerful Rafsanjani (ex-President and ex-leader of Parliament and now heading the Expediency Discernment Council of the IRI) supposedly to ascertain if the people of Iran were in favour of the normalisation of relations with the USA. And all this only a few months after Abbas Abdi, a leading reformer and an ex-student follower of Imam's path (who occupied the American embassy 'nest of spies' in 1980) was jailed and "confessed" under torture to being a tool of the Americans. Abdi was leading an Iranian 'Pollster Organisation' that conducted a poll showing an overwhelming majority of Iranian people supporting the normalisation of relations with the USA! Clearly, Rafsanjani, who stated that he had always been in favour of "relations with the USA on an equal basis", has seen the writing on the wall after what has happened to the East and now West of Iran. His referendum will also never happen as to the sophisticated Iranian electorate it is merely a desperate ploy of a has-gone politician to expedite his regime's survival.

But what are the chances of a genuine referendum, under the auspices of the United Nations, that Amir-Entezam has called for? A decade ago, another long-standing political prisoner was freed by his jailors under international and domestic pressure to lead his people into his country's first genuine and democratic elections that made him a President. He was the legendary Nelson Mandela, a leader of African National Congress (ANC) and now an ex-President of the Republic of South Africa.

Such a predicament is probably far from Amir-Entezam's thoughts as he is facing his tormentors again. His standing world-wide is no where close to Mandela, he may hardly be known outside Iran. The people of Iran, however, are proud to tell the world that they have political personalities such as Amir Entezam (leading member of Pro-Mossadegh "Iranian National Front" inside Iran) that are true democrats. A quarter of a century ago, politicians such as Bazargan and Entezam were derided as "liberals" or "compromising". Now most of the ex-revolutionaries of the Iranian left and Islamic fundamentalism respect their moderation and conciliatory politics. In Today's politics of West versus Islam and George Bush versus the 'axis of evil', politicians such as Entezam stand out for Iranian patriotism and independence while also representing Iran's wish to draw a line against its Pro and then Anti West politics for good"

Mashallah Shamsolva'ezin Claimed Court had "no legal basis".

2004-12-23T07:18:00.000-08:00

Amnesty International Report 2000 - country reports: "Mashallah Shamsolva'ezin, editor of the daily newspaper Asr-e Azadegan, was tried in November on charges of "insulting Islam" in articles printed in the subsequently banned newspaper, Neshat. The Press Court judge dismissed the jury prior to the trial and sentenced Mashallah Shamsolva'ezin to three years' imprisonment. Mashallah Shamsolva'ezin questioned the absence of the jury and observed that the Court had "no legal basis". "

Abdollah Nouri claimed that the Special Court for the Clergy was "unlawful and incompetent" to try his case

2004-12-23T07:17:00.000-08:00

Amnesty International Report 2000 - country reports: "Abdollah Nouri, a former Minister of the Interior and publisher of the daily newspaper Khordad, was tried by the SCC in November on 20 charges, including insulting government officials. In his defence he reportedly upheld the constitutional rights of a variety of groups and theologians to present their views in his newspaper; he also claimed that the Special Court for the Clergy was "unlawful and incompetent" to try his case. The judge brought the proceedings to an end on
11 November when he prevented Abdollah Nouri from completing his defence and gave him 10 days to submit a written text of the defence. However, on 17 November the jury reportedly found Abdollah Nouri guilty of 15 of the 20 charges against him. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and disqualified from standing in the parliamentary elections in February 2000."

Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha got a Suspended Sentence

2004-12-23T07:15:00.000-08:00

Amnesty International Report 2000 - country reports: " Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha, publisher of Salam, was tried by the Special Court for the Clergy. The jury found him guilty of "publishing classified material" but the judge suspended a prison sentence and punishment of flogging on the grounds that Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha was a former revolutionary leader. He was banned from journalism for five years."

Seyyid Mohamed Musavi-Khoeiniha of the daily newspaper Salam Convicted (7/28/1999)

2004-12-23T07:06:00.000-08:00

Assault on Independent Press in Iran Intensifies (Human Rights Watch, July 28, 1999): "On July 25, the Special Court for the Clergy convicted Hojatoleslam Seyyid Mohamed Musavi-Khoeiniha, publisher of the daily newspaper Salam, on charges of misinforming the public. Kazem Shukri, an editor of Sobh-e Emrouz, remains in incommunicado detention since July 20 without a hearing or an opportunity to post bail. Journalists and editors in Iran have told Human Rights Watch that legal proceedings are being prepared against two other reformist newspapers, Khordad and Neshat, apparently in an effort to silence them"

Dr Seyyed Hashem Aghajari Sentenced For His Seditious Behavior

2004-12-23T06:17:00.000-08:00

History Professor Faces Threat of Execution: "Dr Seyyed Hashem Aghajari was arrested on 8 August 2002 following a speech he gave on 19 June 2002 in Hamedan, western Iran. His speech, entitled "Islamic Protestantism" reportedly called for a "religious renewal" in which Muslims should not "blindly follow religious leaders".

According to media reports on 7 November 2002, Dr Seyyed Hashem Aghajari was sentenced to 74 lashes, eight years' imprisonment - to be served in "internal exile" - and death following a closed trial in Hamedan, on 6 November 2002. He faced vaguely worded accusations consisting of defamation and insult charges, notably of religious figures and leaders. Dr Seyyed Hashem Aghajari's lawyer has indicated that he will appeal against the death penalty; he has 21 days in which to do so.

According to his family, Dr Seyyed Hashem Aghajari is in urgent need of medical attention to his right leg, amputated at the knee during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. His leg is apparently bruised and infected and he is reportedly unable to stand up, walk or use the prison's hygiene facilities."

Iran's let wing rallies to Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi 2001

2004-12-23T06:05:00.000-08:00

RFE/RL Iran Report: "...AS REGIME MOVES AGAINST ONE. The state's recent actions against Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi and his household, coming in the midst of all the recent unrest (see above) may reflect fears about the emergence of an Iranian hero. Indeed, support for Montazeri is increasingly evident. Five hundred and fifty-four clerics submitted a petition calling for an end to Montazeri's house arrest in Qom. "Nearly four years have passed since the illegitimate and illegal house arrest of [Montazeri]...unfortunately the siege has become tighter and the pressures on him have increased," the statement said, according to a late July Reuters report. Montazeri's own statements will not dispel governmental fears about him.

"If the leadership does not change its behavior radically, there is no future for the religious government," he said in response to questions faxed to him by a French communist party. Montazeri, who has frequently questioned the credentials of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and also called for changes to the constitution that empowers him, said that "the concentration of powers in the hands of a single person is not accepted and must not be accepted." Montazeri also suggested that either the post of president and spiritual leader should be combined to create a powerful elected leader or the president should be given more powers and the spiritual leader should just fill an advisory role, AFP reported on 18 July.

Tehran is continuing its efforts to silence Montazeri's followers. Special Court for the Clergy (SCC) agents arrested Montazeri's son-in-law, Mujtaba Feyz, and three other clerics on 16 July, and they confiscated computers, compact discs, and documents. Moreover, agents raided the house of Montazeri's son Ahmad a few days earlier and confiscated money, documents, and books.

Saideh, Montazeri's daughter, told RFE/RL's Persian Service that she does not recognize the SCC as a legal entity and she would not let the SCC agents enter, so they broke the windows and came in that way. Saideh was not given a reason for the arrest of her husband, and she speculated that it was in connection with his work with computers and Ayatollah Montazeri's website.

Hojatoleslam Mahmud Salavati was among those who were arrested by the SCC agents. Salavati's son told RFE/RL's Persian Service that the SCC agents had a search warrant, and they seized some of his writings, translations of Montazeri's work, and computers. The son went on to say that this is not the first time his father has been arrested.

Bertolt Brecht wrote that "unhappy the land that needs heroes," and under current circumstances, Tehran may fear that Montazeri is that hero. Montazeri's release from house arrest in the near future is extremely unlikely, Tehran journalist Nima Rashedan told RFE/RL's Persian Service, and as long as Supreme Leader Khamenei sees Montazeri as a threat, it will not matter how many clerics sign petitions. (Bill Samii)"

Hashemi-Shahrudi Reasserts Conservatives’ Hold on Nation's Courts

2004-12-23T05:56:00.000-08:00

Brief on Iran, No. 1214: "New Chief Judge Reasserts Conservatives’ Hold on Nation's Courts, Agence France Presse, August 20

TEHRAN - Iran's new top judge has reasserted conservative control over the nation's courts just days after taking office with a pledge to keep the judiciary free of political and factional disputes.

Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi-Shahrudi kept leading conservatives in their posts as prosecutor general and supreme court president, and re-shuffled other members of Iran's conservative-dominated judiciary to key deputy positions.

The appointments, announced on state radio Thursday, came amid hopes of a change in the political tenor of the judiciary as Hashemi-Shahrudi replaced Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi after 10 years in office.

But the new judiciary chief kept Yazdi's prosecutor general, Ayatollah Morteza Moqtadai, and supreme court chief, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi-Ghilani, bolstering their presence with several conservatives close to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

He shifted noted conservative Ali Razini from head of the Tehran judiciary to the number two slot on the supreme court, where he will be the liaison to Iran's hardline Special Court for Clergy.

Khatami said Wednesday he was "cheered" by the appointment of Hashemi-Shahrudi, whom he said wanted to "reform and serve judicial authority.""

Hashem Aghajari attacks Velayat-e Faqih

2004-12-23T05:54:00.000-08:00

IranExpert:Hashem Aghajari, chronology of a crisis: "17 November AFP

Hashem Aghajari, chronology of a crisis
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Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Sunday sought to bring an end to a mounting storm surrounding the sentencing to death for blasphemy of a prominent reformist academic.

Here is a chronology of the case of Hashem Aghajari, a disabled Iran-Iraq war veteran, prominent academic and political activist, and close ally of reformist President Mohammad Khatami:

- June 19: Aghajari delivers a speech to students in the western Iranian city of Hamedan, calling for a "religious renewal" of Shiite Islam. He says Muslims are not "monkeys" who should blindly follow the teachings of senior clerics -- a comment that challenges the Shiite doctrine of emulation and the very foundation of Iran's Islamic regime. He based his speech on the thoughts of the late Iranian intellectual and philospher Ali Shariati, who said Islam must be reformed like Christianity and that the clergy should be put aside as a mediator between God and mankind.

- July 13-14: Aghajari appears in court to answer questions related to his speech, and reportedly posts bail of two billion rials (250,000 dollars).

- August 8: Aghajari is arrested and imprisoned in Hamedan after his speech sparks outrage among hardliners and prominent conservatives, and even draws criticism from a number of reformers.

- November 6: A hardline judge in Hamedan sentences Aghajari to hang for "insulting the prophets" -- or blasphemy. He is also banned from teaching for 10 years, jail terms in desert cities amounting to eight years and 74 lashes. The sentencing coincides with the reformist-controlled parliament's adoption of a bill aimed at limiting the powers of a conservative-controlled watchdog body to vet candidates for public office.

- November 9: Student protests begin with up to 400 activists gathering at Tehran university.

- November 10: The reformist parliament adopts a second bill aimed at giving President Khatami more power to confront hardline judicial rulings that have targetted a number of his allies.

In an open letter, 178 deputies call on judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi-Shahrudi to overturn the verdict and allow Aghajari to go free. At Tehran University some 1,200 students hold a demonstration denouncing "the mediaeval verdict" on Aghajari and signing a petition to Shahrudi.

- November 11: Iran's judiciary stands by the verdict, hitting out at parliamentary efforts to have the ruling quashed.
Close to 2,000 university students rally in what witnesses said was the Islamic republic's largest protest gathering in three years. Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei steps into the mounting crisis, warning he might resort to "popular force" -- seen as a veiled warning to protestors -- and warns judges to "pay attention to the general behaviour of the judicial apparatus, particularly in sentencing and the running of the courts to avoid giving any pretext" to enemies of the Islamic republic.

- November 12: Student protests take on a wider political dimension, with some 3,000 activists gathering at Tehran university campus chanting slogans including "death to despotism".

- November 13: Aghajari's lawyer says the dissident is "ready to die" and has defiantly refused to appeal his sentence.

Khatami breaks his silence over the case, describing the verdict as "inappropriate", and says "the death penalty is not applicable and will not be applied".

Up to 2,500 students gather at Tehran's Amir Kabir university for a series of speeches by student activists and reformist leaders, while police and anti-riot squads keep a discreet eye on the proceedings from streets outside. The judge who handed down the verdict, Judge Ramezani, appears on state television to defend his ruling.

- November 15: Hundreds of hardline demonstrators call for the execution of Aghajari in a rally after Friday prayers.

- November 16: A grandson of Iran's revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a prominent conservative pile fresh pressure on the judiciary by rallying behind Aghajari. More student rallies in Tehran and provincial universities.

- November 17: Parliament speaker Mehdi Karubi announces that Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ordered the judiciary to back down over the verdict."

Shahrudi urges establishments to heed guidelines of supreme leader

2004-12-23T05:46:00.000-08:00

Shahrudi urges establishments to heed guidelines of supreme leader: "04/17/2000
Shahrudi urges establishments to heed guidelines of supreme leader

Tehran, April 17, IRNA -- Head of the judiciary ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi said here Monday that all establishments, particularly the judiciary, have legal and religious duty to follow up the viewpoints and policies raised by the supreme leader of Islamic revolution ayatollah Ali Khamenei in his recent speech.
Public relations department at the judiciary quoted ayatollah Shahrudi as saying that all have the duty to care for concerns of the supreme leader.

Voicing his dissatisfaction over the performance of certain segments of the media for inciting public opinion, he said the judiciary is not indebted to any group or wing, rather it is executor and protector of law and if it deems necessary it would act according to its legal duty irrespective of who the person or group might be.

He expressed displeasure over recent moves and unrest in different parts of the country. "people want security: economic security, social security, cultural security and security in information dissemination. Just as social and economic unrest is harmful both for the country and people, cultural insecurity and anarchy as well as dissemination of false information are also harmful," he added.

Enemy is making economic and social conditions insecure by by misleading public opinion because the society whose mind is disturbed would not attain solidarity and progress under any living conditions, he concluded."

Constitution Vs. Koran pits Judiciary Against Press

2004-12-23T05:43:00.000-08:00

IranMania News: "1379 witnessed the closure of numerous newspapers and other publications. The body responsible for licensing new publications was the Culture Ministry headed by Ataollah Mohajerani, the body responsible for shutting them down was the Judiciary, headed by Ayatollah Shahrudi. The Judiciary had a busier year than the Culture Ministry.
The ball was set rolling on April the 11th when the conservative dominated Parliament approved parts of a tough new press law. The bill drafted by conservative MPs was designed to combat newspapers and journalists who "violate the values and principles of the Islamic republic."

A few days later, on Sunday the 16th, an ominous statement was issued by the Revolutionary Guards and broadcast on State Radio, accusing the papers of writing articles "along the lines of foreign demands" and "attacking the values of the revolution." "When the time comes, these people will feel a blow to the head delivered by the revolution," the statement declared.

Three days later on Thursday the 20th, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had harsh words for "certain" newspapers which he said had become "enemy strongholds inside the country." He called on the government to take action against the press

On Saturday, two days after the speech, journalist Akbar Ganji, was arrested on orders of the press court.The following day, three reformist publications were ordered to stop publication. These included the two dailies Asr-e-Azadegan and Fath which had very large circulations. The next day, on Monday the 24th, ten reformist newspapers and 4 magazines were ordered shut.

Several student demonstrations were held during the week to protest against the press clampdown. Meanwhile other newsapers were shut down, including 'Mosharekat' which was the voice of the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) run by Khatami's brother.

In the face of the closures, President Khatami appealed for calm and solidarity, "Iran today, more than ever, needs calm and solidarity to achieve our aims. Today, we need tranquility, especially at the start of a new Majlis (parliament)."

The next target of the press crackdown was the Culture Minister, Ataollah Mohajerani. On Wednesday, May the 3rd, he appeared before Parliament, accused by Conservative MP Ahmad Nejabat of unfairly distributing funds to reformist papers. Mohajerani in turn, challenged the outgoing conservative parliament to impeach him so that he could defend himself. Nejabat scoffed at the request saying "You wish you could come here to explain yourself and your policies. But that's why there will be no impeachment motion." Mohajerani appearance in Parliament was only the start of a series of attacks against him.

Two days later during Friday Prayers, Ayatollah Khamenei, widely thought to be referring to Mohajerani, while supporting Khatami's government, said "I don't agree with everybody (in the government) and I think that some are not doing their job very well."

He also further criticized the reformist press, "When I criticized the press, that is what I meant -- they present a skewed and pessimistic image of the future and an unrealistic image of the present, creating an atmosphere of tension and distrust in our society."

Following the speech, the influential Tehran Times, attacked the Culture Minister further saying that Mohajerani had delivered "total support" for publishers and a "deliberate snub" to the courts, adding: "incompetent officials who are not performing their duties well should be removed from the cabinet as soon as possible."

By the 23rd of May, 19 publications had been suspended, with the latest one "Mellat" having been in circulation for just one day. The new reformist daily had hit the newsstands on Monday, only to be closed down on Tuesday. The editor said, "I was summoned by judge Gholamhossein Mohsseni-Ejie this morning and told that I may not continue to publish," he said, adding, "the judge demanded a list of my staff in order to examine their qualifications and establish their professional competence."

President Khatami finally reacted formally at the end of May. He sent a letter of protest to the head of the Judicary Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi Shahrudi. Although the letter was never published, reports suggested that the thrust of the letter was in terms of a 'Constitutional warning'. President Khatami had often used the Constitution as a means of pointing out autocratic actions by the Judicary. Apparently Ayatollah Shahrudi did not accept President Khatami's warning.

By June more editors were summoned to the courts and by the end of the month one of the few remaining daily reformist papers, 'Bayan' (Expression), was ordered shut. One staunch reformist paper which survived the closures was 'Hayate-No' (New Life), the reason for this widely believed to be because the director is Hadi Khamenei , brother of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hadi is recognized as being a staunch member of the 'reformist' camp.

The press clampdown continued throughout July with Journalist Emadoddin Baghi , and newspaper editor Hamid Reza Zohdi being jailed. Two weekly publications were also suspended.

However, the new Parliament, dominated by reformists which had come into being in late May, was determined to make its first major task that of reforming the recent harsh press law passed by the previous Parliament. On Sunday the 6th of August the Parliament convened to debate the move to liberalize the press law.

The reformist majority had looked forward to this day as the day when they would make their first big mark on Iranian politics. To their surprise however, at the beginning of the session Parliament Speaker, Mehdi Karubi , announced that he had received a special message from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The statement from Ayatollah Khamenei, formally ordered the Parliament not to hold the debate. The statement added that the liberalization of the press laws was not in the interests of regime. Karubi, citing Khamenei's constitutional powers, declared that there would therefore be no such debate.

Soon after, a fight broke out between several Reformist and Conservative MPs , while others stormed out of the Parliament to protest against the order. It was a sad day for the Parliament which had failed in its first major attempt at reform.

On the same day, another newspaper editor, Ahmad Hakimipour editor of 'Omide-Zanjan', was given a two month jail sentence for "publishing comments offensive to the head of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards and the corps itself." The following day, reformist journalist, Ahmad Zeid-Abadi of Hamshari newpaper was arrested .

Soon after Parliament's failed attempt to liberalize the press law on Sunday, hardliners gathered outside the Parliament in the evening and started to stage an anti-reformist demonstrations. "The pro-American reformists and MPs hostile to the supreme guide must be expelled from parliament," they chanted. The demonstration was to last several days.

On Tuesday, August the 8th, one of the last daily reformist newspapers, 'Bahar' (Spring) was ordered shut. During the next few weeks several reformist journalists were arrested. President Khatami again protested against the press clampdown on Monday the 21st of August, stating that "I don't agree with the methods used ... or the wholesale closure of the papers."

The pattern of arrests and paper closures carried on throughout the year, although new reformist publications were also hitting the stands. The Culture Ministry headed by Ataollah Mohajerani was allowing new publications to go to print even if they had suspicions that they would then be ordered shut after a short period.

The pressure grew on Mohajerani and at the beginning of October there were reports that he had resigned. He had apparently handed Khatami an angry 50-page letter explaining why he was stepping down. However, Khatami had asked him to 'tone the letter down' and urged him to stay on. There were many conflicting reports during the next month as to whether he had resigned or not. He was finally persuaded to stay on by Khatami but only for another two months; following more arrests and press restrictions in November, he finally resigned in December. The reformist movement had lost of one of its key players in Iranian politics.

More restrictions and arrests relating to the press continued in December. These included a ban on Hamshahri newspaper outside Tehran, the head of IRNA being summoned to court, a local Tabriz paper being suspended and Ali Afsahi a cleric in charge of a sport & cinema magazine being jailed.

January was no different with Fatemeh Farahmandpour, woman editor of the banned 'Gounagoun' weekly, receiving a 2 year work ban; Shahla Sherkat, managing editor of the women's weekly Zanan received a 4 month jail sentence and the weekly 'Hadis' published in Ghazvin was ordered shut after the editor criticized the Judiciary for the arrest and jailing of his son Ali Afshari, the student leader.

February saw the flight of two foreign journalists from Iran before their anticipated arrest. Geneive Abdo and her husband Reuters' bureau chief in Tehran, Jonathan Lyons left Iran quietly and in a hurry on Friday evening February the 2nd. Geneive Abdo had come under pressure not only from conservatives but also from reformist circles.

Her articles & interviews were deemed to be too frank and open by some and not conducive for the stability of the political balance between the conservatives and reformists. Her clandestine interview with Akbar Ganji was the last straw for those who had for a long time wanted to see her leave. She had to leave or face expulsion or prosecution. Some saw her articles as merely sensationalist and not politically mature, others saw her as delivering a message which the two major political factions were aware of but could not bear hearing.

In an article written in the Washington Post shortly after she fled Iran, disillusioned with the reform movement in Iran, she wrote, "In the end, the reformists' notions of freedom, much like those of their conservative foes, are too firmly rooted in a shared revolutionary experience."

There were more arrests of journalists in February and March, including the arrest of Fariba Davoudi-Mohadjer, a woman journalist whose arrest was to be strongly condemned in Parliament. Pro-reform MP Fatemeh Haqiqat-Joo said armed men had "used violence and force" in arresting Davoudi-Mohadjer, ripping her "chador" off her head and "squeezed her between two doors."

Unconfirmed reports said her arrest was linked to her having headed an internet website named after Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri.

By the end of the year the French-based press watchdog Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF - Reporters Without Borders), said Iran had become the world's biggest jail for journalists. Whether true or not, 1379 was a dark year for Iran's press and journalists. However, at all times throughout the year, there were always 1 or 2 reformist publications continuing to go to print and Iranians both inside and outside Iran were well informed of the political goings on.

The arrests and court sessions of those accused were also well reported. Some of those detained were also later released on bail.

Nevertheless the move towards freedom of expression in Iran took a big blow in 1379 and even as the year was coming to a close, two days before the new year, four more publications were closed down, including the relatively new daily reformist newspaper Doran-e Emrouz. Their directors will also be facing charges in court."

Leader Reinstates Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi for Another Five-Year Term

2004-12-22T19:43:00.000-08:00

Messages and Letters: "Leader Reinstates Judiciary Chief for Another Five-Year Term

2004-08-12
Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, in a letter on Thursday, August 12, reinstated Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi for another five-year term. The abridged text of the letter is as follows:

Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, in a letter on Thursday, August 12, reinstated Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi for another five-year term. The abridged text of the letter is as follows:
In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Ayatollah Hajj Sayyid Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi,
Considering that your five-year term of office as head of the Judiciary, during which you rendered valuable services, has come to an end now, based on Article 157 of the Constitution, I hereby reinstate you as head of the Judiciary for another five-year term.
I pray to the Almighty for your further success in performing your tasks.
Sayyid Ali Khamenei"

Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi Breaks Up Plot Against the Republic. West Howls

2004-12-22T19:40:00.000-08:00

Social Research: An Open Letter to Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi from Human Rights Watch - Abstract: "An Open Letter to Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi from Human Rights Watch - Abstract
Social Research, Winter, 2000
Save a personal copy of this article and quickly find it again with Furl.net. Get started now. (It's free.)NOVEMBER 2, 2000, NEW YORK--In an open letter sent to Iran's chief judicial official, Human Rights Watch called for an end to the prosecution of prominent independent and reformist figures who attended an international conference last April.

Human Rights Watch sent the open letter to the Head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroudi. At least 12 activists and writers now face charges of "engaging in propaganda against the national security of Iran." They are being tried in secret before the Revolutionary Court in Tehran, where procedures have in the past fallen far short of international standards for fair trial.

"Iran should immediately halt the prosecution of these individuals and all charges against them should be dropped," said Hanny Megally, the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Division. "Those who have remained outside of Iran since the Berlin conference for fear of prosecution should be assured they will not be subject to reprisals upon their return."

The trials began on Sunday, October 29. All the defendants received notice to appear before the court only a few days prior to the commencement of proceedings, giving them no opportunity to prepare a defense. The charges against them have not yet been fully disclosed.

A copy of the letter is attached.

November 2, 2000

BY FACSIMILE

H. E. Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroudi
Head of the Judiciary
Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran
Your Excellency:

Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned about the trials that have started behind closed doors of at least ten Iranians, apparently for attending and/or speaking at an international conference in Berlin, Germany on April 7-8, 2000. The charges against them, which have not yet been fully disclosed, include "engaging in propaganda against the national security of Iran." We are concerned that these individuals, most of whom are prominent independent and reformist figures, are being prosecuted for exercising their basic right to freedom of expression. We are also alarmed that they are being tried before an exceptional court, the Revolutionary Court, whose procedures have in the past fallen far short of international standards for fair trial. Human Rights Watch has learned that one of the defendants, Shahla Sherkat, the managing director of Women magazine, was summoned recently to appear before Revolutionary Court 3 in Tehran. When she arrived at the court on Sunday, October 29, she discovered that the trial proceedings were about to begin even before her lawyer had obtained access to the prosecution files. It appears that the remaining defendants (list appended) also received summonses to appear in court without allowing their lawyers the opportunity to have access to case files and to prepare their defense. In April, the defendants attended an international conference in Berlin on the future of Iran, which was also attended by banned and exiled political activists. This has been used by some conservative politicians to portray the defendants as persons linked to hostile foreign powers. The state-controlled Iranian media has described the event as anti-Iranian and anti-Islamic.

Hassan Youssefi Eshkevari, a religious scholar, has been held in prison since his return in August. His trial began in October before a Special Court for the Clergy. He is facing charges of apostasy, which may carry the death penalty. Mehrangiz Kar, a lawyer and women's rights activist, and Shahla Lahidji, a publisher, were detained for a few weeks in April and tried on Tuesday, October 31, behind closed doors. Veteran independent politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, now more than seventy years of age, was detained upon his return from the conference and interrogated for more than six weeks before being released on bail. Sahabi was tried publicly today before the Revolutionary Court along with Alireza Alavi-Tabar, an editor, and Monirou Ravani-Pour, a writer. Two participants in the Berlin conference, Akbar Ganji, an investigative journalist, and Khalil Rostamkhani, have been held in prison since their return in April and May respectively.

Your Excellency, the prosecution of these individuals is a violation of Iran's obligation to uphold the right to freedom of expression as provided for in Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." Furthermore, we are troubled by the manner of their summonses, which has not allowed their lawyers adequate time and access to the necessary court files.

The court before which they are appearing raises further doubts about the fairness of this process. Iranian press reports on October 31 quoted Abassali Alizadeh, the head of Tehran's Justice Department, as saying that these trials will be held in public, but some sessions have already begun in secret.

Human Rights Watch is concerned that these prosecutions are a continuation of a pattern of repression against reformist and independent figures that has gathered momentum since February's parliamentary elections. Since then virtually all independent newspapers have been closed down and leading editors, journalists, and thinkers have been imprisoned. Human Rights Watch calls on your Excellency, as head of Iran's judiciary, to halt immediately the prosecution of individuals for exercising their right to freedom of expression. All charges against these individuals should be dropped, and all of those in prison should be released. Those who attended the conference and have yet to return from abroad should be given assurances that they will not be subjected to any reprisals for their participation.

Should the trials of these individuals nevertheless continue, Human Rights Watch respectfully requests permission to send independent lawyers to observe future sessions and to assist us in assessing the fairness of the proceedings. I look forward to your early response.

Sincerely,

Hanny Megally
Executive Director,
Middle East and North Africa Division
cc: H.E. Mr. Mohammad Hadi Nejad Hosseinian, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the U.N.

Appendix

Individuals facing trial in connection with their participation in the Berlin conference:

Shahla Sherkat, managing director of a women's magazine and a pioneer in defending women's rights, was interrogated in April and released pending trial. Her lawyer resigned from the case on Monday, October 30, after being pressured by court officials. Jamileh Kadivar, a member of parliament and second-most popular candidate in the Tehran poll, is wife of Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani, a hate-figure for the conservative right. She was released pending trial after her interrogation in April.

Mehrangiz Kar, a lawyer and women's rights' activist, was detained for a month after her return from Berlin in April, and released on payment of substantial bail.

Shahla Lahidji, a publisher, was detained for a month on her return from Berlin and freed on bail.

Ali Afshari, a student leader, was detained and freed on bail after his return from Berlin in April.

Ezzatollah Sahabi, a veteran independent politician, former minister and magazine publisher, was detained on his return from Berlin and released on bail.

Ali Reza Alavai-Tabar, a journalist, was interrogated in April and freed.

Monirou Ravani-Pour, a writer.

Hamid Reza Jalaei-pour, a newspaper editor, was interrogated in April and released pending trial.

Fariborz Reiss-Dana, a professor of economics.

Mahmoud Dolatabadi, a prominent writer.

Hassan Youssefi Eshkevari, a religious scholar who delayed his return from Berlin until August, is currently in prison and facing charges of apostasy, which may carry the death penalty, before a Special Court for the Clergy.

Four other participants from Iran attended the conference, but have not yet been summoned to the court:

Akbar Ganji, an investigative journalist, in prison since his return from Berlin in April.

Khalil Rostamkhani, a translator, in prison since May.

Two writers, Pahlevan and Kardavani, have not returned to Iran since the conference."

Khatami accepted the resignation of Dorri-Najafabadi

2004-12-22T19:34:00.000-08:00

Brief on Iran, No. 1079: "Under Public Pressure Khatami Accepts The Sham Resignation of Intelligence Chief, Agence France Presse, February 9

TEHRAN - Mohammed Khatami accepted the resignation of his intelligence minister Tuesday.

The minister, Qorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, had resisted repeated calls to step down but in the face of mounting tension over the issue, Khatami put pressure on Dorri-Najafabadi to resign, sources close to the government told AFP.

Khatami thanked Dorri-Najafabadi "for your great efforts and services" and expressed appreciation for "the valuable endeavors of our colleagues at the intelligence ministry who are the defenders of the revolutionary values as well as national security and the rights of the citizens."

Khatami hinted he might find Dorri-Najafabadi another job in government. "Of course the government and the nation will certainly benefit from your knowledge and experience and capabilities elsewhere and in an appropriate manner," he said.

Dorri-Najafabadi will remain a member of the key political arbitration body, the State Expediency Council, and will be appointed an adviser to the president, the Tehran Times said.

The government newspaper Iran Daily reported that Ali Yunesi, another conservative cleric and member of a committee investigating the recent murders, was the most likely candidate to succeed him.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution Yunesi has held a number of senior positions -- he headed the powerful Tehran Revolutionary Court and helped set up the intelligence ministry with the arch-conservative cleric Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri."

More on Dorri resignation

2004-12-22T19:32:00.000-08:00

More on Dorri resignation: "TEHRAN, Feb 9 (AFP) - Moderate Iranian President Mohammed
Khatami accepted the resignation of his conservative intelligence minister Tuesday, weeks after a shock admission by the ministry that
rogue agents were involved in a string of murders of dissidents.

Qorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi's resignation follows mounting pressure from radical supporters of the reformist president for a thorough shake-up of the secretive intelligence services over the wave of murders which shocked public opinion.

The minister had resisted repeated calls to step down, with conservative supporters saying the ministry's record was distinguished and denouncing their opponents for making political capital out of the killings.

But in the face of mounting tension over the issue, the president put pressure on Dorri-Najafabadi to resign, sources close to the government told AFP.

"Now that after serving at the intelligence ministry for one and a half years ... you have decided to resign and stop your cooperation with the government at that ministry ... I accept your resignation," said a statement from the president carried by the offical news agency IRNA.

Khatami thanked Dorri-Najafabadi "for your great efforts and services" and expressed appreciation for "the valuable endeavours of our colleagues at the intelligence ministry who are the defenders of the revolutionary values as well as national security and the rights of the citizens."

In his resignation letter, the intelligence minister insisted that he had had nothing to do with the murders personally and had fought to ensure that agents respected the law and the constitution.

"Recent unfortunate events were against the wishes of the vast majority of the ministry's staff ... I was very strongly against them as I am now and was upset," said a text of his letter read on state radio.

The minister said he had finally been persuaded to resign because mounting criticism of his management of the ministry was impeding its effective operation.

He said he hoped his departure would deprive "vengeful enemies of any further opportunities" to attack the country's security apparatus and "pave the way for suitable conditions for the ministry's effective operation."

Khatami hinted he might find Dorri-Najafabadi another job in government. "Of course the government and the nation will certainly
benefit from your knowledge and experience and capabilities elsewhere and in an appropriate manner," he said.

Dorri-Najafabadi will remain a member of the key political arbitration body, the State Expediency Council, and will be appointed an adviser to the president, the Tehran Times said.

Khatami asked the minister to stay on in a caretaker capacity until "I nominate and introduce a candidate for the intelligence ministry to the parliament."

The government newspaper Iran Daily reported that Ali Yunesi, another conservative cleric and member of a committee investigating the recent murders, was the most likely candidate to succeed him.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution Yunesi has held a number of senior positions -- he headed the powerful Tehran Revolutionary Court and helped set up the intelligence ministry with the arch-conservative cleric Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri.

Two deputy ministers at the intelligence ministry will also be replaced in the shakeup, the Tehran Times said.

Last year's murders shocked public opinion -- secular dissident Dariush Foruhar and his wife Parvaneh were stabbed to death in their own apartment in November.

Soon afterwards unknown assailants killed writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouyandeh and a third writer, Majid Sharif, was found dead in mysterious circumstances.

The ministry has so far arrested a number of its agents, who will be tried by a military tribunal.

Dorri-Najafabadi's departure is the second from Khatami's government since his shock election victory in May 1997.

Last year reformist interior minister Abdullah Nuri was impeached by the conservative-dominated parliament after allowing pro-Khatami demonstrations which led to scuffles with hardliners."

Leftists Eliminate Dorri Najafabadi - February 1999

2004-12-22T19:25:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - February 1999: "Iran Security Minister Resigns

TEHRAN,(Reuters) - Iran's conservative intelligence chief, under attack for his agency's role in recent dissident murders, has resigned, the newspaper of the official Iranian news agency reported on Tuesday.
"Informed sources said...that (Intelligence) Minister Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi has presented his letter of resignation to President Mohammad Khatami," the newspaper Iran Daily said.

There was no immediate official confirmation of the report.

But the daily Tehran Times carried a similar report and quoted what it called a reliable source as saying Khatami had accepted the resignation of Dorri Najafabadi, who was widely believed to have been imposed by conservatives on the moderate Khatami when he formed his cabinet in August 1997.

Iran Daily, published by the official news agency IRNA, said: "The same sources said...Ali Yunesi will replace Dorri Najafabadi."

Moderates close to Khatami have been demanding Dorri Najafabadi's ouster since the Intelligence Ministry admitted last month that some of its "rogue agents" were involved in the murders last year of four dissidents and intellectuals.

Press reports have repeatedly mentioned Yunesi, a Shi'ite Moslem cleric who heads Iran's military tribunals, as a possible replacement for Dorri Najafabadi. Yunesi heads a presidential commission probing the murders.

Tehran Times said Yunesi had been appointed by Khatami to replace Dorri Najafabadi and was "busy preparing his future agenda as (the) country's intelligence chief."

The murders and ensuing scandal strengthened the hands of Khatami and other moderates, tempting the president to try to extend his limited authority over the security forces.

Another daily, with good sources in the intelligence apparatus, said conservative MPs were prepared to abandon the minister in order to protect the security services.

The conservatives had been resisting Dorri Najafabadi's removal, accusing their moderate rivals of trying to make political gains from the murders.

Sobh-e Emrouz, a daily run by a former intelligence official turned leading reformer, said on Monday that Yunesi enjoyed the support of all factions and was likely to be confirmed by parliament should the president nominate him."

Plot Forces Intelligence Minister Dorri-Najafabadi Our Replaced by Yunesi - February 1999

2004-12-22T19:23:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - February 1999: "Iranian Intelligence Minister Resigns

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) -- Iran's intelligence minister has resigned four weeks after his ministry admitted its agents were involved in the killing of dissidents.

President Mohammad Khatami accepted the resignation of Qorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, thanking him for his "great efforts and services," the official Tehran radio reported today.

The president asked Dorri-Najafabadi to continue in office until his replacement is approved by parliament. Khatami said the government would no doubt benefit from his "knowledge, experience and ability in a different place and in a different and more appropriate capacity," the radio reported.

The president has appointed Ali Yunesi, the chief military prosecutor, to replace Dorri-Najafabadi, according to two newspapers with ties to the government.

There have been continuing calls for Dorri-Najafabadi's resignation since the Intelligence Ministry said Jan. 5 that some of its agents had been arrested in a spate of killings of writers and dissidents.

The disclosure intensified the rivalry between hard-line and moderate factions in the Islamic government.

Both sides have tried to distance themselves from the killings. The agents behind the killings are widely believed to be supporters of the hard-liners, who control the Intelligence Ministry.

The government has said "foreign elements" masterminded the killings. It denied that senior officers approved the slayings.

Nevertheless, Khatami's moderate faction has called for a purge of the Intelligence Ministry.

In his resignation letter to Khatami, Dorri-Najafabadi, 54, said he hoped his departure would bring about a more suitable atmosphere at the ministry and would not be a pretext for "vindictive enemies and uninformed friends" to harm the ministry.

"The hard-working employees of the Intelligence Ministry did not and will not approve of the recent tragic and unfortunate incidents that would make any honorable human being unhappy," Dorri-Najafabadi said in the letter. The text of the letter was broadcast on Tehran radio.

The first of the killings occurred in November. Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh, who belonged to a minor opposition party, were found stabbed to death in their Tehran home on Nov. 22.

In the following weeks, the writers Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh and Mohammad Mokhtari disappeared and their bodies were found dumped on the outskirts of the capital. They appeared to have been strangled. Both men had tried to set up a writer's association.

A third writer, Majid Sharif, was found dead after disappearing from his home."

Some of Todays Reformists are Yesterday's Radical Leftists - February 1999

2004-12-22T19:19:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - February 1999: "U.S. Embassy Occupiers Are Iran's New ''Liberals''

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Twenty years after Iran's Islamic revolution, the militants who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran have returned to power and influence -- this time as born-again libertarians backing reformist President Mohammad Khatami.
The 444-day crisis, in which student followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini held 52 American diplomats hostage to demand the handing-over of the deposed shah, set the revolution on a radical, anti-Western course that lasted almost two decades.

The embassy occupation that began Nov. 4, 1979, toppled the liberal government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and helped hard-line Muslim clerics extend their grip on society.

Today, some of those former students are prominent in government and the media, but they are now preaching greater political liberty, pluralism and free-market economic reform.

"The freedom we are talking about nowadays is completely different from the freedom that existed in the first days of the revolution," said Abbas Abdi, a former hostage-taker who now runs a social research unit and is a key member of the editorial board of two reformist newspapers.

"At that time, there wasn't really freedom. There was chaos, anarchy," he told Reuters in an interview.

Abdi, who held a public reconciliation meeting in Paris last August with former hostage Barry Rosen, said Iran had achieved the transformation from dictatorship to an emerging democracy far faster than western countries.

"What you did in two centuries in Europe, we have done in 20 years in Iran. We have traveled the distance between Louis XVI and Francois Mitterrand in two decades," he said.

Abdi said the former students had shared a faith in the power of the state to do good at a time when socialism was the dominant ideology. Today, they believed in smaller government, privatization and putting more power in the hands of the people.

Echoing a pragmatic economic slogan of Britain's New Labor Prime Minister Tony Blair, he said: "Whatever works is good."

Masoumeh Ebtekar, Khatami's vice-president for environmental affairs, is the most senior former "student in the line of the Imam" in government. Nicknamed "Sister Mary," she was the English-speaking spokeswoman for the hostage-takers.

Like Abdi, she has no regrets about the embassy occupation, which she said was necessary to secure Iran's complete independence from foreign domination and prevent any repeat of a a U.S.-sponsored 1953 coup which restored the Shah's power.

"You have to understand the mentality of the students and the people at that time. What happened maybe was portrayed as an act of revenge, a fanatic act of violence...but actually the mentality of the students was that this was an act to restore the dignity of the Iranian nation," she told Reuters.

Ebtekar and several other former students were among the founders of a new pro-Khatami reform party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front, which was authorized in December in the latest move toward greater pluralism within the Islamic system.

"They have one point of convergence which is the programs and policies of President Khatami...and the fact that he is seriously endeavoring to implement the constitution in terms of social freedoms, freedom of expression, political parties and the local council elections," she said.

Ebtekar said Iran's revolutionary generation had produced an elite of university-educated women who were now seeking equal responsibility in society and political life.

The leader of the students who captured the embassy, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, a Shiite Muslim cleric who was close to Khomeini's son, is now the publisher of the reformist Salam newspaper, which spearheaded Khatami's surprise 1997 election victory and a member of the influential Expediency Council which arbitrates conflicts among Iran's institutions.

Another former student, Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, is a key pro-reform activist trying to run in the local council elections against the opposition of conservatives vetting candidates.

One key player on the opposite side of the hostage drama still regards it as a turning point toward authoritarian clerical rule that helped bring President Ronald Reagan to power in the United States.

"The whole hostage thing brought only misery. It led to war and cost us billions of dollars," said Ebrahim Yazdi, who was foreign minister on the day of the embassy seizure but resigned after Khomeini gave the students his blessing.

Yazdi, who now heads a small, semi-legal liberal party, the Freedom Movement of Iran, told Reuters that when he went to see Khomeini hours after the occupation, the revolutionary leader's first reaction had been: "Who are they? Go and kick them out."

But once Khomeini saw on television crowds of enthusiastic demonstrators converging on the embassy, he proclaimed that the students had launched "the second revolution, greater than the first," Yazdi said.

Today the embassy compound is a training college for the Revolutionary Guards Corps, still festooned with anti-American slogans and murals.

One of the slogans is a quotation from Khomeini that is particularly poignant at a time when Washington is seeking to reopen a dialogue with Tehran. It says: "On the day when the United States of America will praise us, we should mourn.""

Radical Cleric Montazeri Moves to Overthrow Government - December 1998

2004-12-22T19:13:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - December 1998: "Iran dissident cleric wants secret police purged

TEHRAN (Reuters) -- Iran's most prominent dissident cleric called in a statement published Monday for a thorough purge of the cou ntry's secret police after revelations of death-squads in the organization.

Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, whose statement appeared in the moderate daily Khordad, called for a "deep and complete purge of the (Intelligence Ministry) personnel."

"This purge is an immediate necessity and should not be delayed. This action will regain the people's confidence," said Montazeri , who has often complained about police pressures.

He was echoing demands by backers of moderate President Mohammad Khatami who have called for the resignation of Intelligence Minister Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi after his ministry revealed last week that some of its agents were among those arrested for a recent spate of killing of dissidents.

Montazeri, a 76-year-old senior Shi'ite Muslim cleric, has lived under house arrest since he publicly criticized Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1997.

The demands followed press reports that Khatami might take over the running of the ministry, ousting Dorri Najafabadi, a conservative minister imposed on the reformist president by powerful conservatives when he formed his cabinet in 1997.

Meanwhile a shadowy hard-line group hailed the killings and blasted the arrests, saying "brothers and dedicated friends" were targeted and vowing to take revenge.

"The Devotees of Pure Mohammedan Islam ... are determined this time to block with full force the main source of this sinister plot and extensive hypocrisy," the daily Hamshahri Sunday quoted the secret group as saying in a faxed statement.

It was not clear if the remarks were a threat against Khatami, who spearheaded the probe into the murders of a husband-and-wife team of dissidents and two secularist authors.

A third writer was found dead under mysterious circumstances and a fourth is presumed dead after going missing in August.

Little is known of the Devotees group, which has claimed an attack with sticks and iron bars in November on a busload of U.S. bus inessmen visiting Iran as tourists. No one was hurt.

The hard-line daily Kayhan Monday rejected the widely held view that hard-liners were behind the killings. It quoted Ruhollah Hosseinian, the head of a state archives center, as saying the arrested secret agents were supporters of Khatami.

Conservatives have rushed to Dorri Najafabadi's defense after Khamenei, who outranks Khatami, last week voiced support for the intelligence minister and his colleagues and said the killings were part of a foreign plot."

Former Intelligence Minister Najafabadi cleared of charges related to serial murders case Ganji Frame Fails

2004-12-22T19:04:00.000-08:00

Former minister cleared of charges related to serial murders case: "Former minister cleared of charges related to serial murders case

Tehran, Dec 9, IRNA -- Head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Niazi said on Saturday that the military court has closed the lawsuit against former Intelligence Minister Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi in connection with the serial murders case.
Niazi said in an interview with IRNA on the process of investigation into the serial murders case that the then intelligence minister was the first person to be summoned to the military court several times.

Niazi said the military court held different sessions and arrange a face-to-face meeting between Najafabadi and the other defendants involved in the case, but the legal proceedings cleared Najafabadi of the charges.

He dismissed the claim raised by Akbar Ganji during the open trial of those taking part in Berlin Conference (in April 2000) accusing Dorri Najafabadi of ordering the murders. He said that Najafabadi has been found not guilty.

Political activist Darioush Foruhar and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari and other intellectuals Jaafar Puyandeh and Mohammad Mokhtari were killed in a series of murders blamed on the rogue elements of the Intelligence Ministry."

Description of Selected News

2004-12-22T13:45:00.000-08:00

Description of Selected News: "Office for Consolidating Unity asks Karrubi to run for president

Tehran Times Political Desk
TEHRAN (MNA) -- Central council members of the Office for Consolidating Unity (OCU) invited former Majlis speaker Mahdi Karrubi to run for president in the upcoming election in a meeting on Tuesday night.

“In a meeting with Mahdi Karrubi we discussed our views with him and asked his views about the position and the current status of the reformist faction,” Mahdi Darvish, the head of the OCU public relations office, told the Mehr News Agency."

Khatami backs Government over Anarchy 8 JULY 1998

2004-12-22T13:25:00.000-08:00

"WE SHALL NEVER FORGET 18 TIR" (8 JULY) (Iran Press Service): ""WE SHALL NEVER FORGET 18 TIR" (8 JULY)
Posted Thursday, July 8, 2004

TEHRAN, 8 July. (IPS) As the Iranian government firmly stopped the students commemorating the anniversary of 8 July 1999 revolt against the Islamic Republic, stating that the event has "no meaning" to be commemorated, students warned they would take their complaints against the regime to the United Nations.

In a statement, the Office for Consolidating Unity (OCU) said “now that the voices of justice and freedom are silenced and the eye of justice is blind, we have no other choice but to take our complaint to international instances, including the United Nations”.

The date marks the fifth anniversary of the nightly attack of the Police, backed by plainclothes men from the Intelligence Ministry and security forces on the dormitories where some 300 students were demonstrating peacefully against the shutting down of a “Salam”, a popular newspaper.

Ayatollah Ali Khameneh'i, the leader of the Islamic Republic, fearing for the survival of his regime, ordered all forces of repression to crush the demonstrations “at any cost”.
The surprise raid on the student’s dormitories in Tehran and Tabriz, the capital city of the northwestern Province of Eastern Azarbaijan was terrible. Some sleepy students were thrown out of the windows, others savagely beaten. Rooms were ransacked and books and belongings burned down.

As a result, students took to the streets the days after, demanding the culprits be brought to justice. Angered by the arrogance of the regime, the demonstrations continued and as days passed, became more political.

On the sixth consecutive days of unrest, as people had started to move backing the demonstrators, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh'i, the leader of the Islamic Republic, fearing for the survival of his regime, ordered the police and all others forces of repression to crush the demonstrations “at any cost”.

On 8 of July, as the revolt had taken openly an anti-regime nature and slogans appeared against Ayatollah Khameneh'i and some other leading ayatollahs, the revolutionary guards, supported by thousands of basij forces and special units of the Intelligence Ministry attacked the students, leaving hundreds of demonstrators wounded, several dead and thousands arrested, some still in prisons.

While the students were claiming that several of theirs had been killed, the authorities agreed to only one dead, in Mr. Ezzat Ebrahim Nezjad.

But what surprised both the students and the Iranians was the fact that Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami, elected president two years earlier mostly thanks to the vote of the students and young generation, had backed Mr. Khameneh'i in sending the forces against the students.

What surprised the Iranians was the fact that Mohammad Khatami, elected president mostly thanks to the vote of the students had also confirmed the crackdowns.
The crackdown revolted the Iranians and created outrage outside. Against repeated demands by the students for identifying those responsible for the savage attack, the authorities took no decision except sending hundreds of students to prison and a mock trial for one of the police commanders, who was later freed.

“The event, a savage operation against the student’s movement, marked for ever the rupture between the students and the regime. From the outset, the students knew well that none of the real culprits would ever be tried. The wound on the students would not disappear, nor those responsible for the brutal attack would ever sleep in peace”, warned Mr. Abdollah Mo’meni, the Secretary of the Office for Consolidating Unity, the Iranian student’s largest organisation.

Explaining the reasons the students decided to keep quiet, Mr. Sa’id Razavi Faqih, a member of the OCU said considering the “enormous” pressures put on the students by the authorities, including verbal and telephone threats and warrants sent against students activists, “there was no place we could hold demonstrations and express our views, even peaceful, as we intended”.

“Dossiers against many students were reactivated, newspapers were told not to publish anything about the 18 of Tir (Iranian month), others were contacted by phone, warned to stay at home”, he told the BBC’s Persian service.

Days before the 8 July, some senior officials, including General Mohammad Tala’i, Commander of Tehran Police had called on the students to “forget the past, whoever bitter”.

To prevent any outburst, special anti riot of the Police and plainclothes men had been deployed in Tehran and other Iranian cities, claiming it was for "helping flow of the trafic jam".

As the day passed in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran with no major incident, outside, Iranians of all ideology organised well-attended demonstrations in several major cities and capitals, denouncing the ruling “Mollahrchy” for its “brutal crackdowns” on Iranian students, intellectuals, journalists and dissidents.

“8 July of 1999 was the year President Mohammad Khatami showed his true colour, abandoning both his promised reforms and the people who voted for him. What started out as a reaction to the utter brutality of the fossilized establishment by young Iranian students has turned into a freedom movement the world should acknowledge and encourage”, Iranians said in a statement.

Amnesty International and the New York-based Human Rights Watch renewed their calls to Iran's judiciary to undertake an independent and impartial judicial review of the trials of demonstrators convicted after their arrest during the 8 July 1999 demonstrations.

“The organization also calls on the authority to carry out investigations of allegations of torture made by these prisoners and ensure that anyone found responsible for the torture is brought to justice” Amnesty International said in a statement released on Thursday from London.

“Five years latter, the authorities have taken no measure against those who conducted the savage attack on students and we are certain that like in the case of the serial murders, those who ordered the raid would never be identified”, one scholar told Iran Press Service, hinting indirectly at the very person of Ayatollah Khameneh'i who actually ordered the forces to put down the revolt, the largest ever against the 25 years old Islamic Republic.

Iranian analysts said the authorities preventing peaceful manifestations by the students would further damage the already difficult relations between Tehran, now firmly controlled by the conservatives, with the rest of the world, mostly the European Union, which, in a recent statement, had strongly condemned the Islamic Republic for its handling of human rights. ENDS STUDENTS COMMEMORATION 8704"

Abdollah Nouri and Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi Spar over Karbaschi 3/4/98

2004-12-22T08:57:00.000-08:00

: "Interior Minister Harshly Attacks Top Judge for First Time, Reuter, March 4

Iran's Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri on Wednesday launched a rare attack on the country's top judge for an alleged campaign against a key political supporter of Khatami. Nouri, appointed by Khatami to his cabinet last August, said an investigation Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, head of the judiciary, was carrying out into Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi and his aides was misplaced.... Iranian analysts and journalists said that Nouri's comments were a clear warning to the judiciary to lay off Karbaschi, one of the president's closest advisers. In last Friday's prayer sermon broadcast on Tehran radio, Yazdi denounced the mayor's aides.... Nouri responded at Wednesday's news conference: "I recommend to Yazdi that when he makes speeches he should speak more cautiously...the head of judiciary must not be contradictory and bring anxiety into the system," according to an unofficial translation of his comments.... Karbaschi's top aides have been jailed and received flogging sentences for graft. A closed court last year banned the mayor himself from travelling abroad and only freed him on bail of five billion rials ($1.7 million). Nouri made it clear he backed Karbaschi and his aides.... Ever since the May election, Karbaschi has been in the firing line of conservatives who lost out at the polls but still control large parts of the Islamic justice system and many other levers of power.... "

Arrest of Karbaschi Sparks Street Protest- April 1998

2004-12-22T08:50:00.000-08:00

FarsiNet News - News related to Iran, Iranians and Persians - April 1998: "Tehran's mayor is at center of Iran's power struggle

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) -- The arrest of the mayor of Tehran earlier this month sparked the largest protests since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. His release just days ago led hundreds of thousands who lined the streets to shower him with flowers and praise.

It was partly this emotional public outpouring more than 4,000 people demonstrated when Mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi was in jail that led to the Tehran mayor's liberation. Judicial officials had warned he could be held for months until his trial on municipal corruption charges.

But the 44-year-old mayor hardly seems the subject for such hero worship. He is more technocrat than politician, known for his dour expression and a no-nonsense manner that some say verges on rudeness. Others say he is simply shy.

"I really don't know how to give my appreciation. I am only a small servant of you," Karbaschi, smiling broadly, told the crowds on Wednesday after his release.

Mayor since 1989, Karbaschi has added a splash of color to polluted, congested capital of Tehran a city of 8 million by having buses painted pink, lavender and orange, and establishing small parks throughout the city.

He also built new roads, restricted vehicle access to downtown and developed 1,300 sports facilities and more than a dozen cultural centers.

All this gained Karbaschi fans and enemies. Conservative clerics complained about the "corrupting" influence of films and music at the cultural centers. And the powerful bazaar merchants say they have been taxed heavily to pay for city improvements.

Karbaschi was a controversial figure even before the corruption scandal erupted.

The mayor, a bespectacled man who studied religion in college before turning to mathematics, has acknowledged that he upset many people, but said it was done to improve Tehran.

"Obviously, when we disrupt people's lives, we are going to face opposition," Karbaschi told The Associated Press in an interview last year.

Karbaschi is the son of a clergyman. He wore a traditional turban when he began a career in television, but soon took off the headdress.

The mayor was jailed in 1978 for opposing the Shah of Iran and wasn't freed until the revolution a year later. In 1981, he was named governor of the central city of Isfahan, where he did what he later became famous for in Tehran changing the city and taxing businesses to pay for it.

Karbaschi's arrest on April 4 touched off a major power struggle between hard-line and moderate clerics. It was widely seen as an effort by hard-liners to undermine moderate President Mohammad Khatami, who was elected in a landslide victory in May 1997.

Khatami's attempts to ease social restrictions and end Iran's international isolation have upset conservative clerics.

But many analysts say that in ordering Karbaschi's arrest in a probe of municipal corruption, hard-liners in the judiciary added to the power of the moderates by causing an outpouring of support for the mayor.

"Karbaschi's release has strengthened the position of Khatami and his supporters," said Mashallah Shamselvaezin, editor in chief of the independent Jameah newspaper.

The head of Iran's judiciary said Monday the corruption investigation would continue, the Islamic Republic News Agency reported.

"By putting the mayor in the dock, the judiciary has made itself an object of scrutiny," the English-language Iran Daily editorialized. "The impression is that far from the image of fleet-footed efficiency and future vision that attaches to the mayor, it looks decidedly like a dinosaur."
EDITOR'S NOTE: Scheherezade Faramarzi, an AP correspondent based in Cairo, Egypt, has been covering events in Iran since the 1979 revolution."

Khatami Promised Students Rule of Law But Failed to Deliver

2004-12-22T08:43:00.000-08:00

Days of Rage in Tehran: "Days of Rage in Tehran

Geneive Abdo

Ms. Abdo is the Iran-based correspondent for The Guardian newspaper and author of a book on the Islamic movement in Egypt, forthcoming in 1999 from Oxford University Press. For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.

On December 28, 1996, Mohammad Khatami gathered with university students in a courtyard in downtown Tehran to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Ali, one of the holiest figures in Shiite Islam. The meeting took place at the headquarters of the Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, a 20-year-old student organization whose founders helped take U.S. diplomats hostage in 1979. Khatami pulled out of his pocket a small copy of the Iranian constitution and promised his audience that, if elected president, he would create a society based on the “rule of law.”

It was the beginning of Khatami’s close affiliation with Iran’s youth, who comprise more than half of the population. From that day forward, student groups vowed to help elect him president. They campaigned for him in their towns and on their campuses. When Khatami won in a landslide victory five months later with 70 percent of the vote, he owed much of his victory to Iran’s students.

This relationship between Iran’s president and its youth prompted university students to demonstrate July 8-14 in support of the very policies Khatami advocates. Over the two years he has been in power, the country’s youth have embraced his reformist agenda with high expectations for social and political change. The days of unrest were sparked by the closing of the liberal newspaper Salaam, a publication that symbolized freedom of expression. But the students’ underlying motivation was in fact their own liberation from cultural and political pressures. This would require modernizing the Islamic system that now restricts their social and moral behavior. So when they shouted “Freedom or Death”at their rallies, which began on university campuses and then spilled into the streets, they were thinking of the freedom that Khatami had first promised that cold December afternoon in 1996.

By the third day of the July unrest, the protests grew more violent. As students felt the pain of the brutal and, in some cases, deadly blows of the Islamic militia, and plainclothes police and vigilantes took swipes at them on the campuses and in the streets, they became inflamed. At some rallies, there was no way to know if the armed men beating the students were police, members of the right-wing Basij militia, the secret intelligence service, or the Ansar-e Hezbollah, Iran’s most prominent militant extremists. It appeared the aggression was unauthorized at times; yet the authorities failed to stop it.

When calm had returned to the capital and major cities such as Tabriz, where clashes between students and law-enforcement agencies were reportedly bloodier than in Tehran, the question on the students’ minds was: Where was the “rule of law” Khatami had promised?

The student unrest, the worst since the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, raised the political stakes to a level unseen since the president took office in August 1997. Their courage to cross the line from peaceful protest to public rage came from a determination to chart their own destiny. If at one time they doted on Khatami’s every word, now they were willing to risk leaving him behind. The students and youth in general believe the pace of reform has been too slow. Their patience has grown shorter each time their weddings are broken up by aggressive vigilantes who are given law-enforcement powers, or they are stopped in their cars and taken into custody for being in mixed company, or when they sit, boyfriend and girlfriend, in cafes.

If modernists fail to answer this call for fast reform, they risk being done in by the very people who helped bring them to power. But how can they accelerate the pace, when President Khatami himself seems powerless at times to undo the damage his hardline rivals have inflicted on his government? Unlike the chief executive of a Western government, Khatami’s power as president is severely circumscribed. In all matters of state, he must defer to Iran’s supreme clerical leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is backed by conservatives. Khamenei and his loyalists effectively control most branches of law enforcement, which include the police, the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah) and the Basij militia. They also dominate the judiciary and have used their powers to close reformist newspapers, attempting to choke off the growing independent media that represent one of the president’s greatest achievements to date.

A few weeks after a court closed Salaam, Khatami, making a public appearance, was asked by a journalist what action he might take:

“What about Salaam?” the journalist asked.
The president grinned from a distance.
“Mr. Khatami, why are you grinning?” the journalist asked.
“What do you want me to do, cry?” Khatami replied.
“I mean, what have you done for Salaam?”
“What can I do?” the president answered.

STUDENT MOVEMENT
Intellectually, the student movement understands the limitations of Khatami’s presidency. But rather than waiting for change within the institutions beyond his control, the students have decided to apply their own pressure from outside. In pressuring their hardline rivals, they are also forcing the man they helped elect to sit on a time bomb. This volatility has made Iran a more dangerous place than it was before the riots occurred.

The students have become a powerful force on the political scene, yet they have neither the organization nor the leaders to direct their movement. With its long history of working against secularist dissent lodged at the Islamic regime shortly after the revolution, the Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, or Office to Consolidate Unity, was once the students’ guiding light. But the July demonstrations illustrated the organization’s shortcomings. Its almost exclusive focus on political affairs leaves many of today’s students cold, as does its impeccable revolutionary heritage. Its original mentors are now seasoned politicians and journalists in their 40s. And its loyalty to the Khatami government has left it struggling to keep up with the rising demands of the campuses for accelerated change.

Ideologically, the Daftar backs President Khatami’s political agenda, even if he may at times disappoint them. “Khatami is the system’s last hope for survival,” said one of the organizations’ leaders during a press conference at the height of the July mayhem. “This is why we must support him.” It is a message many students do not want to hear.

In the heat of the unrest, when fears were rampant that students might try to take over Tehran streets and get themselves killed while doing so, the Daftar called on all students to restrict their rallies to the university campuses. But the young students refused to obey. One evening, they left the gates of Tehran University and began marching in the streets. Soon they were chased back into the university by Islamic vigilantes. The students were so frightened they took refuge in the university mosque, which the vigilantes then tried to storm. The Daftar issued a statement disassociating itself from the student demonstrators. The protestors then elected the so-called Select Committee, including several members of Daftar, to act as their representatives. This split showed their ultimate difference: the Daftar as a whole had become part of the system; but the younger students were content to remain outside it if rebellion was the only avenue to rapid social freedom.

Generational change plays a large part in these differing approaches toward reform. Today’s students, too young to carry the baggage of the 1979 revolution, are less ideological than their elders who stormed the U.S. embassy and founded the Daftar. The most important change for them is to remove the prying eyes of law enforcement and intelligence agencies from the personal lives of Iranians. But the important point upon which the Daftar and the young generation agree is that Iran should remain an Islamic state. Students made it clear during their protests that they were fighting for Islamic revisionism, not for dismantling the system.

“There might be an idea that the Islamic system is bad. What we want to say is that some have tried to install a system which is not a real Islamic system. Everyone in the Islamic system should be able to express their ideas in a clear way and live freely,” one student leader said in an interview.

COMPETING RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS
The depth and scope of Tehran’s days of rage clearly caught the reformist camp off-guard. Students, after all, hold a near-sacred status in modern Iran. It was the students who did much of the heavy lifting during the Islamic Revolution. Later, they watered the homeland with their martyrs’ blood to defend Iran from Iraq. And it was the students who reveled in their new political power with the election of Khatami and then were among the first to enjoy the tentative fruits of his social and cultural reforms. Surely, no true student would seek to destabilize the existing order.

The conservative establishment suffered from no such illusions. It was not that they were any less starry-eyed over the students. Rather, they grasped at once the immediate political implications to what was essentially a release of pent-up demand for cultural and social “normalization” after 20 years of permanent revolution. If competing versions of Islam were allowed in the name of expanded freedom, then the role of the clerical hierarchy could be called into question.

To freeze the momentum created by the protests, senior religious figures ran to their pulpits to denounce Western-style personal and intellectual freedom. The right to resort to violence in defense of the existing orthodoxy was asserted from one end of the country to the other.

At a rally organized by hardliners during the July unrest, the students were denounced as mohareb, a term meaning those who declare war on God, and mofsed, or the corrupt on earth. “No doubt, those who have resorted to sabotage, destruction of public assets and violation of the state property will be tried in our relevant courts,” Deputy Speaker of Parliament Hasan Rowhani, a mid-ranking cleric, told a crowd of about 100,000 people. “They shall be punished as corrupt of the earth who waged war against God.” The most common penalty for such crimes is death.

The monopoly the conservative establishment claims to hold on Islamic interpretation collides with the thinking of the students’ guiding light, the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush. In his theory of the “contraction and expansion of religious laws,” Soroush rejects the idea that the clergy maintains the exclusive religious knowledge required to interpret Islamic texts. To adopt such a view, according to Soroush, is to deprive an individual of free thought. And such deprivation does not produce true believers. In The Theoretical Contraction of Religious Law, he wrote: “A religion that is tied to the material and political interest of a special class leaves little room for its own evolution and development. From that point on, that groups’s defense of that religion, and its struggle against invention and innovation, will become a defense of its own interests and position....With such a religion it is neither possible to attain happiness in this world and contentment among the people, nor to satisfy the Creator and achieve happiness in the hereafter.”

Soroush, who led Iran’s cultural revolution in 1980 after the overthrow of the shah, has long been on the fringes of the system. For years he was considered a dissident. He was removed from his post as a professor at Tehran University and often denied permission to leave Iran in order to give lectures in the United States and Europe. Over the last six months he has been rehabilitated to some extent. He is now allowed to give public lectures, albeit at the risk of violent disruption by the hardline Ansar-e Hezbollah, and to travel abroad. But Soroush’s new liberation is made possible only through President Khatami’s indirect support for Soroush, which is never discussed publicly.

For the clerical establishment, Soroush’s ideas are a serious threat to their legitimacy, to say nothing of their very existence. His direct challenge provides an example for the youth to act likewise. At rallies during the unrest, students booed and jeered at Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Such an act verges on heresy. Khamenei symbolizes the sacred nature of the Islamic Republic, and supporters of the “absolute” reading of clerical rule say he is answerable only to God. To insult the leader is considered a crime punishable by up to two years in prison. Insiders said Khamenei was devastated by such humiliation. When he appeared in public shortly after the unrest, he was visibly shaken.

One of the fundamental differences between thinkers such as Soroush and those of the conservative establishment lies in their interpretation of the velayat-e faqih, the concept of supreme clerical rule. The main problem of the principle of velayat, according to Soroush, is its imposition on the people of obligation to the state. In a republic, the state should be governed according to the rights of the people.

What has become the establishment political reading of the velayat was first introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini, but many senior theologians argue there is insufficient evidence in the Quran or other sacred texts to support its existence. Islamic intellectuals such as Soroush argue it is the people who give legitimacy to political rule. The conservative establishment, however, believes the state’s legitimacy rests within the divine rule of the supreme leader.

When students jeered Ayatollah Khamenei, they were in fact expressing their disapproval with the system of supreme clerical rule, which inherently gives short shrift to the desires of the people. More significantly, their dismissive attitude toward one of the greatest symbols of the Islamic revolution – the velayat – shows they have left much of the revolution behind psychologically. Many students may not be able to articulate this idea, but their vision of an ideal Islamic Republic has all the characteristics of a modern Iran that has moved on since 1979.

The conservatives, on the other hand, appear incapable of surrendering their revolutionary mentality. They interpreted as heretical the students’ anti-clerical protest. Their response to the student rebellion was to hold a staged rally. Tens of thousands of citizens traveled to Tehran from their villages and towns on state buses, in a tactical maneuver reminiscent of those used by the Communist party in the former Soviet Union. When the crowd was shown on national television, which is controlled by the conservatives, marchers carrying pictures of President Khatami were conspicuous by their absence from the nation’s television screens. Crowd shots included only those participants holding pictures of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

The debate over religious interpretation heated up in the weeks following the student unrest. In mid-September, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the leading ideologue of the right, gave a speech before Friday prayers in central Tehran and clearly articulated the conservatives’ position: “If everyone is allowed to make his own interpretation of the holy Quran, nothing would be left for Islam.What would you do if in the future someone claims that according to his reading there is no God? He would base his words on his interpretation of Islam. If you plan to be Martin Luther, invent a new religion for yourself. The religion we have inherited from the Prophet and his household is not adaptive to different readings and has no other interpretation but that of the Prophet.... If anyone tells you he has a new interpretation of Islam, slug him in the mouth,” he concluded.

KHATAMI’S STANDING
The current crisis of defining the “true Islam” certainly is not new in Iran. But the student demonstrations have pushed both the extreme left and right to new heights, regenerating a cycle of debate that has put President Khatami in a no-win situation. During the days of unrest, Khatami called upon the students to stop demonstrations in the streets. When the protests continued, he distinguished among the students, calling those who marched in central Tehran a “deviant movement.” Some of the demonstrators in the streets during the fifth and sixth days indeed included non-students. Some were workers who sympathized with the students; others were hooligans who took advantage of the chaos, burning cars and tires and breaking the windows of two banks near Tehran’s grand bazaar.

By the time the students called off their marches, they felt betrayed by a president they had worked hard to elect. They never heard the words of support and sympathy they had expected from President Khatami; some said they just wanted to see him shed a sympathetic tear or two. In his first public appearance after the unrest, in the western town of Hamadan, he referred to the police and Islamic vigilantes who had attacked students in their dormitories the first night as “supporters of violence.” But he drew a clear separation between the injustice committed that night and the following days of unrest. “The attack on the university dormitory was a crime. Why did they attack the university? Why did they beat up students? Because students and academics are dynamic and active members of society and the greatest supporters of the progress and development of this country.”

Khatami distinguished the dormitory attack from the demonstrations which followed by saying, “What (later) happened in Tehran damaged our national security. It was an effort to cause unrest among the honorable people and to destroy public opinion and private property. It was to express vengeance towards the system. It had nothing to do with the honorable nation or the university and its students.”

In declaring the students “sacred,” Khatami tried to convince Iranians that his supporters were not among those wreaking havoc on the nation. When he ran for office, his conservative rivals had warned that his presidency would spark civil unrest, and Khatami tried hard not to give credence to hardliners’ predictions that his own supporters were defying his calls for law and order. But despite his revisionist history that evening, the reality remains: Students have become the wild card in the political game being played out in the Islamic Republic.

Khatami’s loyalists – the editors of reformist newspapers, the modernist intellectuals and pundits and the Daftar leadership – are all warning the young students to slow down. But they concede they have little control over the momentum of the movement that Khatami’s landslide victory unleashed. This, of course, is the danger of any reform drive under authoritarian conditions, as illustrated most memorably in the case of the former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, in creating the political climate to reform and energize the Communist system, inadvertently laid the groundwork for his own political demise. Like Gorbachev, the Iranian president is hoping to carve a more modern and democratic reality from the existing system, in this case an Islamic Republic.

But Khatami, unlike Gorbachev, continues to enjoy broad popular support well into the reform process. And Khatami also seems fully aware that he can no longer control the pace of change, which is the reason his response to the student demonstrations has been a mixed strategy of appeasing his conservative rivals while not permanently alienating his pro-reform constituents.

THE FUTURE LIES WITH THE JUDICIARY
For now, Khatami’s strategy appears to have worked. There are no signs that his popularity plummeted as a result of the unrest. But the long-term political implications depend upon the very promise the president made to students back in December 1996. The pace of reform – and Khatami’s ultimate success – depend upon the judiciary. If Khatami’s administration can manage to force judicial reform and create a modicum of law and order, his supporters will tolerate change at a gradual pace.

In August, a new judiciary chief was appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei. Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a little-known scholarly cleric, has a record of conservative policies. But upon taking office, he vowed to remove the judicial system from factional infighting. This has encouraged the reformers. But shortly after he took office, hardliners made a point of showing their strength and underscored the difficulty Shahroudi will face in instituting any profound change.

The Revolutionary Court announced that four people were handed the death penalty for their involvement in the July demonstrations. There was no evidence a trial had taken place, and the names of the accused were not released. The announcement sparked outrage in the international community. The European Union registered a formal complaint with Iran’s foreign minister, and international human rights groups issued stinging letters of criticism. Shahroudi’s staff made it clear the new chief was unaware of the sentences ahead of the announcement. The sentences were not only a direct challenge to his authority, but handed him a most difficult predicament during his first weeks in office.

The conservatives are clearly using the judiciary as a means for settling their political scores. For example, in cases such as those involving the press, conservatives have sidestepped the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the institution with formal authority over the press, and have taken their objections directly to the judiciary. They prefer to be heard in the courts, which they dominate, rather than in the ministry, which is under Khatami’s influence.

Shahroudi has suggested he will try to remove the courts from press matters and all other issues that should be dealt with administratively, but the obstacles he faces could prove insurmountable. Conservatives generally use the Islamic texts as justification for their legal arguments. When they have taken newspaper editors to court in the last year, they have generally charged them with undermining Islamic principles as stated in the Quran, or they have charged journalists with insulting the faith by questioning Islamic practices such as retribution or blood money. Thus, as long as Iran’s judicial system remains one that is based entirely on the Sharia (Islamic law), the conservatives will likely maneuver their way into the courts.

Shahroudi’s only avenue toward substantive judicial reform is to cleanse the courts of jurists who base their decisions on ideological grounds. He has already made moves in that direction. One of his first acts was to remove several key judiciary officials, including hardliners tied to the Haqani seminary in Qom, the holy Shiite city and seat of Islamic learning.

In many ways, Shahroudi’s announced mission resembles that of President Khatami: insitutionalization of the rule of law in a system long-dominated by factional interests, ideological considerations and expediency. In a broader sense, both men are seeking to lead their respective branches of government, the executive and the judiciary, into the post-revolutionary era. Given the heated political environment of contemporary Iran, however, neither of these two learned clerics, who both trace their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammad, can say as much out loud."

Philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush opposes velayat-e faqih Ally of Khatami

2004-12-22T08:37:00.000-08:00

Days of Rage in Tehran: "The monopoly the conservative establishment claims to hold on Islamic interpretation collides with the thinking of the students’ guiding light, the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush. In his theory of the “contraction and expansion of religious laws,” Soroush rejects the idea that the clergy maintains the exclusive religious knowledge required to interpret Islamic texts. To adopt such a view, according to Soroush, is to deprive an individual of free thought. And such deprivation does not produce true believers. In The Theoretical Contraction of Religious Law, he wrote: “A religion that is tied to the material and political interest of a special class leaves little room for its own evolution and development. From that point on, that groups’s defense of that religion, and its struggle against invention and innovation, will become a defense of its own interests and position....With such a religion it is neither possible to attain happiness in this world and contentment among the people, nor to satisfy the Creator and achieve happiness in the hereafter.”

Soroush, who led Iran’s cultural revolution in 1980 after the overthrow of the shah, has long been on the fringes of the system. For years he was considered a dissident. He was removed from his post as a professor at Tehran University and often denied permission to leave Iran in order to give lectures in the United States and Europe. Over the last six months he has been rehabilitated to some extent. He is now allowed to give public lectures, albeit at the risk of violent disruption by the hardline Ansar-e Hezbollah, and to travel abroad. But Soroush’s new liberation is made possible only through President Khatami’s indirect support for Soroush, which is never discussed publicly.

For the clerical establishment, Soroush’s ideas are a serious threat to their legitimacy, to say nothing of their very existence. His direct challenge provides an example for the youth to act likewise. At rallies during the unrest, students booed and jeered at Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Such an act verges on heresy. Khamenei symbolizes the sacred nature of the Islamic Republic, and supporters of the “absolute” reading of clerical rule say he is answerable only to God. To insult the leader is considered a crime punishable by up to two years in prison. Insiders said Khamenei was devastated by such humiliation. When he appeared in public shortly after the unrest, he was visibly shaken.

One of the fundamental differences between thinkers such as Soroush and those of the conservative establishment lies in their interpretation of the velayat-e faqih, the concept of supreme clerical rule. The main problem of the principle of velayat, according to Soroush, is its imposition on the people of obligation to the state. In a republic, the state should be governed according to the rights of the people.

What has become the establishment political reading of the velayat was first introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini, but many senior theologians argue there is insufficient evidence in the Quran or other sacred texts to support its existence. Islamic intellectuals such as Soroush argue it is the people who give legitimacy to political rule. The conservative establishment, however, believes the state’s legitimacy rests within the divine rule of the supreme leader.

When students jeered Ayatollah Khamenei, they were in fact expressing their disapproval with the system of supreme clerical rule, which inherently gives short shrift to the desires of the people. More significantly, their dismissive attitude toward one of the greatest symbols of the Islamic revolution – the velayat – shows they have left much of the revolution behind psychologically. Many students may not be able to articulate this idea, but their vision of an ideal Islamic Republic has all the characteristics of a modern Iran that has moved on since 1979."

Student Radical break with Reformists and seek overthrow of the Republic July 2003

2004-12-22T08:26:00.000-08:00

EurasiaNet Human Rights - Conservatives in Iran Looking to Deliver "Knock-Out Blow" Against Reformists: "CONSERVATIVES IN IRAN LOOKING TO DELIVER "KNOCK-OUT BLOW" AGAINST REFORMISTS
Afshin Molavi: 7/22/03

Iran’s leading pro-democracy student group held a press conference July 9 to announce the cancellation of planned protests to mark the fourth anniversary of a student uprising. Leaders of the group, known as Daftar-e-Tahkim-e-Vahdat (The Office to Foster Unity), expressed concern that in Iran’s "hostile environment," organizers could not guarantee the protesters’ safety. They also predicted a stepped-up campaign by Iran’s conservative camp to quash pro-democracy forces.

They had no idea their prediction would come true so soon.

Shortly after the news conference, armed plainclothes security men, most likely from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, grabbed three of the student leaders as they emerged outside, pushing them into waiting cars and speeding away. An astonished press corps witnessed the entire episode.

One student leader described the action as "a government-sanctioned kidnapping." Meanwhile, an Iranian journalist said: "I couldn’t believe my eyes. They put guns to their heads and shoved them in a car. It was like a scene from a Mafia movie."

Later that night, roughly 5,000 people gathered around Tehran University and nearby parks, despite a government ban on commemorating the July 9 protests and the Daftar cancellation of the organized student demonstration. Met by an intimidating force of riot police, plainclothes security officers on motorbikes and helicopters circling overhead, many decided to leave the area. Those who remained were attacked by vigilantes affiliated with conservative elements of Iran’s political leadership. Street clashes left scores injured and resulted in the detention of over 100 people, according to security sources.

The July 9 incidents help underscore the broad crackdown on freedom of expression being carried out by Iranian conservatives. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Iran’s jails are swelling with dissidents, pro-democracy activists, journalists, and reformist politicians.

"We are witnessing a stepped-up campaign by the conservative camp to shut off all dissent," said a reformist parliamentarian who asked not to be named.

"They have made the calculation that they can get away with it," added the parliamentarian, who himself faces jail time on a number of charges brought up by Iran’s hard-line judiciary. "They have done this because they see the reformist camp as vulnerable due to its declining popularity."

Iranians, frustrated by the inability of reformists to deliver on promises of political liberalization in the face of conservative intransigence, have increasingly turned away from the once popular reformists. They are now seeking "third options" – neither reformist nor conservative – that have yet to form into viable movements. Indeed, the Daftar-e-Tahkim-e-Vahdat officially broke from the reform movement in an open letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. That letter sought UN assistance in the student movement’s struggle for democracy and freedom. In the letter, they described the reformists around President Mohammed Khatami as ineffective.

Conservative forces appear intent on crushing the reformists before the "third option" has a chance to coalesce, political analysts say. "The reformists are on their last legs and the conservatives seem to want to administer a knock-out blow," said Shirzad Bozorgmehr, editor of the independent Iran News English daily.

The conservatives’ confrontational methods, however, are threatening Iran’s international interests. The European Union, for example, announced July 21 that Iranian human rights abuses may force the EU to curtail economic contacts. As one Tehran-based European diplomat told EurasiaNet: "When the government rounds up students and puts them in jail and the news reaches our capitals, it makes it increasingly difficult for us to make the case that our dialogue with Iran is moderating its behavior." The EU diplomat was referring to the June street demonstrations in Tehran [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives] that resulted in the arrests of an estimated 4,000 people.

International scrutiny has intensified in the days following the death of Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A judicial investigation into the death is being led by Saeed Mortazavi, Tehran’s chief prosecutor. Mortazavi is an unabashed hard-liner who regularly calls reformist journalists "Zionist spies" and "corrupters of Islam."

Kazemi’s death has helped produce an outpouring of criticism of conservatives’ practices. For instance, the group Reporters Without Borders described Iran as "the biggest prison in the Middle East" for journalists. At the same time, the Canadian government has become more aggressive in its calls for bringing those responsible for Kazemi’s death to trial.

Daftar-e-Takhim-e-Vahdat members feel that increased international pressure on human rights issues is needed to blunt the conservative-led assault on basic freedoms. Their open letter to the UN Secretary General is seen as an attempt to implement such a strategy. The trouble is, analysts say, appeals for outside assistance are considered a taboo by many in Iranian political circles. Some observers believe the letter prompted the arrests of the three student group leaders. Still, as one member of Daftar-e-Takhim-e-Vahdat said: "Without an international spotlight, the conservatives would take even worse [action] than what they are doing right now."

Editor’s Note: Afshin Molavi, a Washington-based journalist specializing in Iranian and Caucasus affairs, recently returned from a three week reporting trip to Iran."

Student leader Ali Afshari Guilty of challenging the authority of Khamenei

2004-12-22T08:12:00.000-08:00

Islam Online- News Section: "Meanwhile, student leader Ali Afshari, political head of Iran's largest pro-reform student group, was given a five-year sentence, his lawyer told IRNA.

Afshari, who was already in prison over a fiery campus speech last month challenging the authority of Khamenei, was given four years for taking part in the conference and one year on other charges. He will also appeal."

Ganji admited to and claimed the right to rebuke Ayatollah Khomenie in a German Magazine

2004-12-22T06:55:00.000-08:00

GANJI IDENTIFIED FALLAHIAN AS THE "MASTER KEY" IN CHAIN MURDERS: "Mr. Ganji denied having insulted the Founder of the Islamic Republic in an interview with a German magazine, explaining that the fault lies with the translator and he had warned the review about this.

On the charge of insulting Ayatollah Khameneh’i, he said that opposing the Leader's views could not imply "affront". "Legally, insult means pronouncing or writing indecent words against someone and in this case the prosecutor general has failed to distinguish between insult and criticism", he observed.

He acknowledged that as far as the bundle closure of the press, the imprisonment of journalists and the treatment of political prisoners are concerned, he did not share the views of the leader. "And this is my right", he argued."

POLITICS-US: Hawks Plan 'Peaceful' Regime Change in Iran

2004-12-21T18:57:00.000-08:00

POLITICS-US: Hawks Plan 'Peaceful' Regime Change in Iran: "POLITICS-US:
Hawks Plan 'Peaceful' Regime Change in Iran

Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON, Dec 21 (IPS) - A heavy-weight group of mostly neo-conservative hawks has published a new proposal for Iran policy that relies heavily on ''peaceful'' strategies to achieve regime change, such as those used by Washington since the 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe, most recently in Serbia and Ukraine.

The group, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), targets Iran's Supreme Authority, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the theocratic apparatus that supports him in the paper titled, 'Iran -- A New Approach', and assumes, ''Iran's people ... are our allies.''

''They want to free themselves from Khamenei's oppression and they want Iran to join the community of prosperous, peaceful democracies'', it says, characterising its policy recommendations as a ''peaceful but forceful strategy to engage with the Iranian people to remove the threat and establish the strong relationship which is in both nations' and the region's interests''.

While reserving ''the right to take out or cripple (Khamenei's) nuclear capabilities'' if Tehran fails to comply with current agreements with Britain, France, Germany and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the paper strongly advocates a policy of people-to-people engagement -- particularly for young Iranians who are seen as especially alienated from the regime -- as well as greater use of television, radio and the Internet to ''communicate directly with the Iranian people''.

It also calls for re-opening the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which was closed 25 years ago after militants invaded the embassy grounds and took U.S. diplomatic personnel there hostage.

The plan does not address the possible use of covert paramilitary action against Iran's nuclear programme or the regime, despite published reports that the administration of President George W Bush has already authorised covert operations aimed at destabilising the government. The paper's main author, Mark Palmer, told IPS on Tuesday such actions should not be necessary.

Palmer, a speechwriter for former President Ronald Reagan who also served as ambassador to Hungary and has been a tireless promoter of U.S. ''democratic'' assistance abroad, said some CPD members opposed the paper initially because it smacked too much of ''engagement'' with Tehran.

Among the most prominent members of the CPD, founded last summer as a lobby group designed to rally support behind the broadest aims of the ''war on terrorism'', are former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief James Woolsey; Centre for Security Policy Director Frank Gaffney; former Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich; and a flock of other hawks from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and other groups that beat the drums for war against Iraq before the U.S. invasion in March 2003.

Until now, many CPD members have called for dealing with Iran, particularly its nuclear programme, almost exclusively with isolation and confrontation, including military action.

''There was concern that (sending an ambassador to Tehran) would strengthen or legitimise the regime as it is'', said Palmer who characterised the two-month process that led to the paper's approval as a ''vigorous discussion''.

''Our view was that was too narrow a view'', he added, noting that Washington had embassies in Soviet bloc nations in the 1980s but still supported democratic forces that led the mainly peaceful ouster of the Communist regimes there.

Palmer, whose recent book, 'Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025', has been greeted with considerable scepticism by regional specialists in academia and Washington think tanks, was strongly backed during the discussion by former Secretary of State George Shultz, who co-chairs the CPD along with Woolsey.

The fact that Shultz, seen by some analysts here as an eminence grise of the Bush administration, is backing the policy is especially significant. The taciturn diplomat, who introduced National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to Bush a year before the 2000 election and encouraged her to move to the State Department post in a second term, has also long championed one of her most influential advisors, Middle East director for the National Security Council (NSC), Elliott Abrams, as well as Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

Although Shultz's efforts to reach out to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s deeply disappointed prominent neo-conservatives, he has taken a very hard line, generally consistent with their own, in the ''war on terrorism''.

Shultz, who co-chaired the short-lived Committee to Liberate Iraq, has been especially hawkish on terrorism since Washington's ill-fated intervention in Lebanon after Israel's 1982 invasion. The paper notes, ''Iran under Khamenei'', in addition to pursuing ''regional hegemony'' in the Middle East, ''continues to be the world's foremost state supporter of terrorism''.

It asserts that the regime's policies have led to ''deep alienation'' within Iran as demonstrated by the 1997 and 2001 elections for parliament and the presidency that reformists won by large margins, as well as the regime's resort to ''hired paramilitary thugs'' to quash student demonstrations in 2002.

Specific elements of a new U.S. policy, according to the paper, would include:

- A major policy address by Bush that would pledge to ''reconnect with the Iranian people, to help the vast majority of Iranians who want democracy to achieve it ... to assure their security in return for not acquiring nuclear weapons and to help develop their economy'';

- An announcement of U.S. willingness to re-open its embassy in Tehran and the designation of a senior official devoted to the co-ordination and implementation of the policy, including lobbying U.S. allies, speaking with Iranians via various media, and engaging with senior Iranian government officials, as opposed to ''ordinary diplomats in the Foreign Ministry'';

- Making clear that Washington will not accept Iran's possession of nuclear weapons and will back that up with force, presumably unilateral, if necessary;

- Supporting Iranian democrats and dissidents ''to make clear that they are our partners in a new dialogue and that even as we meet with representatives of the Khamenei regime, we consider these to be illegitimate''. Support would include sending Iranian activists abroad for short seminars with their counterparts, ''who have been successful in organising civic campaigns in Serbia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Chile and elsewhere'';

- Developing relations with the military and various other security services in Iran in order to undermine the regime's ''pillars of support,'' and marshalling evidence for a legal case against Khamenei for indictment in an appropriate tribunal;

- Devising other ''smart'' sanctions to isolate the regime and its supporters, including the revolutionary foundations, or ”bunyads”, by publicly identifying companies and bank accounts controlled by them to highlight alleged corruption and prepare legal cases for economic crimes; and

- Attempting to launch a ''dialogue with Khamenei and the clerics around him about how to arrange ''a way to exit peacefully from political power, combined with indications of the alternatives (jail or hanging)''.

''For too long an academic debate over engagement versus containment, dialogue versus regime change has dominated and weakened America's approach to Iran'', according to the report.

''The (CPD) believes that we need a new approach, one based on a sober recognition of the threat Khamenei presents, but also an appreciation of our new strengths and the opportunity before us.''

One Iran specialist, William Beeman of Brown University, said he was ''appalled'' by the six-page paper.

''They have no idea about Iranian politics or governmental structure. They have decided for some bizarre reason to present Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as if he were some kind of Saddam-like dictator. I suppose this helps their audience fit the current Iranian governmental structure into a ready-made pigeonhole''. (END/2004)"

RIGHTS-IRAN: Suspension of Death by Stoning a Boost for Reformists

2004-12-21T17:51:00.000-08:00

RIGHTS-IRAN: Suspension of Death by Stoning a Boost for Reformists: "Suspension of Death by Stoning a Boost for Reformists

N Janardhan

Iran's decision to suspend the punishment of death by stoning for adultery, made in response to the ''demands of modern age'' and mounting protests inside and outside the country, signal a victory for reformists.

DUBAI, Jan 11 (IPS) - Iran's decision to suspend the punishment of death by stoning for adultery, made in response to the ''demands of modern age'' and mounting protests inside and outside the country, signal a victory for reformists.

Last week's suspension of the use of this sentence under Islamic law has been done through official instructions of the judiciary, which appears to have taken its cue from the government.

The 'Majlis' or parliament has not yet abolished it by changing the penal code, but an eventual decision by parliament and the Iranian government is being closely watched by many.

The reformists, who control the parliament under the leadership of President Mohammad Khatami, have been pushing a change in the execution law. Accordingly, 11 women members of parliament submitted a bill in early December to the 290-seat legislature to abolish the practice of death by stoning to punish adultery.

According to Naseeb Al Saleh, professor of political science at Ajman University in the United Arab.Emirates: ''The move to halt the practice is a victory for reformist MPs who have been looking to end discrimination against women.''

The move comes after pressure from the European Union, which is engaged in human rights talks linked to trade negotiations.

The EU-Iran negotiations, which began in December, are the most serious Western attempt to engage Iran since 1979, but the EU has been insisting that Iran take steps to improve its human rights record.

But member of parliament Jamileh Kadivar denied that the suspension of death by stoning was related to talks with the EU, saying ''the head of the judiciary has sent a ruling to judges telling them not to order execution by stoning''.

The judges had been told to issue alternative punishments and the decision would be upheld pending a permanent change in the law, she added.

It is unclear if judges are still allowed to order other forms of execution such as hanging, which is frequently carried out in public for crimes such as murder, armed robbery and rape. The EU has been demanding that Iran end public executions as well.

''Stoning has been provisionally suspended due to its negative effects, but this suspension is provisional,'' said Hojatoleslam Mohsen Gharavian, a conservative cleric based in the theological base of Qom, according to the state news agency IRNA.

Still, this top conservative cleric acknowledged that the practice had been widely criticised and had hurt the Islamic republic's image abroad.

In line with the country's political system, he said, it is now up to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to take a final decision on whether the punishment used against adultery should be completely stopped.

''If it is in the interests of Muslims and Islam, it can be suspended for a determined period by the supreme guide,'' he was quoted as saying.

In Iran's political system, Khamenei is the final authority on all matters and his endorsement of all laws passed by the parliament, including one against stoning, would give it the final stamp of legality before it is implemented.

Under Iran's strict Islamic law, in place since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, men and women convicted of adultery are normally sentenced to death by stoning. Men are buried up to their waists in a pit and women up to their shoulders. Onlookers are then invited to pelt them with stones until death.

According to the law, the stones must be big enough to injure but not kill with just a few blows, which Amnesty International has described as a ''method specifically designed to increase the victim's suffering''. The victim is acquitted if he or she manages to get out of the pit.

The 'shariah' (Islamic law) ruling on adultery was incorporated in the 1995 Islamic Penal Code of Iran.

Iranian officials refuse to reveal how often stonings are carried out. But an Amnesty International 2002 report said at least 139 people, including one minor, were executed in Iran in 2001, at least two by stoning and one by beheading.

EU diplomats say there was at least one unconfirmed case in 2002, in which an accused woman survived by escaping from the pit.

The law is particularly harsh on women. In accordance with 'shariah' law, an act of ''adultery'' witnessed by at least four people is punishable by stoning to death. But women do not have the same right when dealing with ''unfaithful'' husbands. Unofficial figures put at about 70 the number of women accused of adultery have been stoned to death so far.

These figures place Iran second on the list of execution capitals of the world, although it remains far behind China. It is also only one of the seven countries, including the United States, that allows the execution of people under 18.

But phasing out death by stoning is unlikely to be easy.

''The fact that two prominent clerics -- Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi and Ayatollah Musavi Tabrizi -- have spoken out against stoning could facilitate the passage of the anti-stoning legislation,'' said Naseeb Al Saleh, the professor at Ajman University. ''But the Guardians Council has always adopted a confrontationist attitude toward the reformists.''

Indeed, Ayatollah Gholamreza Rezvani, a member of the Guardians Council, said that there was no substitute for the stoning of adulterers. According to Farsi daily 'Hayat-i No', Rezvani said that Islamic rulings do not depend on societal tastes. ''Stoning is a sanction for ethical problems such as adultery and there is no other sanction for having intercourse with a married person.''

But Mohammed Reza Khatami, deputy head of parliament and brother of Iran's president, told the 'Women in Iran' magazine that the Koran allows for stoning to be replaced by other forms of punishment. (END)"

Khamenei: Enemies of Velayat-e-faqih are "enemy agents"

2004-12-21T09:46:00.000-08:00

Ecstasy In Iran, Agony For Its Clerics, The Christian Science Monitor, December 5

QOM, IRAN -- ... unprecedented questions are being raised about the nature of Velayat-e-faqih, a post whose sacred primacy has been a pillar of Iran's revolutionary Islamic regime. It is a debate that has begun to expose a complex power struggle... among Iran's clerical hierarchy. The outcome is likely to directly shape Iran's future.

The words of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri drew the most violent reaction. The Veli-e-faqih's duty, he said, was to "supervise" only and "should not interfere in all affairs."

Ayatollah Montazeri's criticism is particularly cutting, because by rank the cleric should have been supreme leader himself, diplomats and analysts say, to follow in the footsteps of the charismatic leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini...

"I established Velayat-e-faqih myself, and now they call me anti-Veli-e-faqih," Montazeri said in a controversial Nov. 20 speech.

Ruling clerics have responded noisily at this unprecedented public attack. Khamenei declared that dissidents who questioned his authority "were enemy agents, even though they might not be conscious of it."

"All state officials are moving in the same direction," he said, and called upon them to "carry out their duty against" dissidents who practice such "treason against the people.... You should get to know who the real enemy is. World arrogance is the enemy, America is the enemy, the Zionists are the enemy."...

The divisions push to the heart of Iran's Islamic regime, and indicate how much conservative forces have emerged since the death of Khomeini...

Officially, the current tension is blamed on "hands from outside," though top clerics admit that "factions inside" may be active. "The best way to undermine the position of Velayat-e-faqih is to have someone revolutionary ... do it," says Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, stroking his white beard.

Attacks On Rafsanjani left Ayatollah Khamenei Exposed - August 2000

2004-12-21T09:41:00.000-08:00

Middle East Institute Policy Brief: "Internal Developments in Iran: An Update

On August 11, Farideh Farhi, MEI Adjunct Scholar-in-Residence, briefed an MEI audience on recent developments in Iran, including recent government arrests and closings of newspapers. Farhi's talk placed these events in the context of a more sweeping analysis of trends and dynamics, focusing on the conflict between conservatives and reformers and the fate of a revolutionary system ruled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

According to Farhi, the latest political offensive on the part of the conservatives against the press and the Majlis, Iran's parliament, appears part of what many in Iran view as former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's strategy of sustaining support for the regime by easing social controls while tightening political controls. The strategy, Farhi argued, is intended to characterize the reformers as so ineffective that the population becomes de-politicized, and satisfies itself with the easing of social controls that has been underway in the past few years. However, Farhi cautioned, it is far too late to put the genie of political reform back into its bottle. She emphasized four aspects of the current situation that are relevant for the future of the reform movement in Iran and for political mobilization among the public.

Public Highly Pessimistic

First, Farhi noted, the public mood is decidedly pessimistic. After the mania of parliamentary election politics, she said, the population is now in the doldrums of early parliamentary politics, highlighted by intense disappointment in the wake of Mehdi Karrubi's election as speaker of the Majlis. According to Farhi, Karrubi's success has led many Iranians to question the wisdom of their own excitement at the parliamentary election. One cab driver, she related, ruminating on his economic woes and his children's demands for an as-yet-unplanned summer vacation, complained that if he had known that Karrubi was going to be the parliament speaker, he would have voted for Rafsanjani. The latter's corruption, if not wit and fox-like wisdom, is deemed matched by Karrubi, Farhi noted. But she cautioned that this depressed public mood should not be seen as a sign of Iranian reformist politics gone sour. On the contrary, she said, reformist politicians are vibrantly enthusiastic.

A Truly Independent Parliament

Farhi noted that the current Majlis session represents the first truly independent parliament in post-revolutionary Iran. While the candidates that cleared the vetting process may not have been the first-rate among the reformist front, she said, they are not short on independence or unpredictability. They include, she noted, women who refuse to wear the chador as well as characters like a well-known filmmaker who entered the chamber wearing jeans and a red shirt. In a country in which symbolic politics at times seems to be the only kind of politics, Farhi argued, these kinds of symbolism are of no petty consequence. While this parliament's future may be marred by hyper-factionalism, she said, it will not be hen-pecked. As an example, Farhi noted that, just after the "heart-breaking" compromise that elected Karrubi speaker, the parliament rejected Khamenei's hand-picked candidate for one of the deputy speaker posts, Majid Ansari. While the reformist-dominated parliament was unable to retract the draconian press law that was passed in the last hours of the Fifth Majlis, the resolve to press for reform in two fundamental areas, press laws and laws related to the formation of political groups and parties, remains. Indeed, Farhi argued, the closure of many newspapers has, to a degree, shifted the stage for political action to the parliament.

The Supreme Leader's Descent into Politics

The third important development Farhi noted is Khamenei's descent into the political fray. Farhi saw this development as part of the critical wounding of Rafsanjani last year. The bottom line, Farhi asserted, is that if Iran has had a velayat-e faqih (rule by the Supreme Leader) after Khomeini's death, Rafsanjani rather than Khamenei has been considered the real leader, the wise man who could make decisions in the political arena. Rafsanjani was also a buffer for Khamenei, absorbing the waves of public criticism that were directed at the system of velayat-e faqih. With Rafsanjani gone as a public actor, Farhi argued, Khamenei has become directly exposed. He has been forced to jump openly into the political fray as a player rather than as a mediator or a referee. This move has opened him to direct challenge.

Quashing the Press Law: Opening a Political Pandora's Box

Farhi noted that the confrontation over the press law this summer was latest example of this phenomenon. Khamenei, having failed at the use of hidden pressure, was forced publicly to call for the tabling of the new bill using a clearly unconstitutional mechanism only used before by Khomeini. By reading Khamenei's letter into the parliamentary record, the deputies made his interference evident to all, and openly criticized his action as illegal. In Farhi's view, Khamenei may have won this particular battle of wills, but he has opened a Pandora's box that probably can never be closed. She noted that he had alternative means at his disposal, notably the Guardian Council, to void the legislation, making his intervention even more pointed by its lack of necessity. He has put the clerical establishment in the difficult, if not impossible, position of ideologically defending a state decree to stunt a democratic process in the name of Islam, she said.

The impression left by Khamenei's intervention on the press law debate, Farhi said, is that individualistic authoritarianism, or what has come to be known in Iran as a monarchist interpretation of velayat-e faqih, has become blatant and increasingly difficult to defend ideologically. An early example of the costs of this move, she said, was the resignation of Ahmad Pournejati, a conservative turned reformer and a respected figure among all factions, as the head of the Majlis' Cultural Commission (which formulated the new press law). His public resignation, although not accepted by the Cultural Commission, suggested to Farhi an increased polarization of the Iranian political system that will not necessarily benefit the conservatives.

Reformists Confident

Farhi's final point was that the challenges faced by the reformists over the past few years, including the student riots and threats of creeping coup after the parliamentary election, have left them more confident about their control of the political process at least for the next five years. They are not only confident that the conservatives will not be able to field a viable candidate for president, she said, they are also more assured that the kind of chaos politics pursued by some factions of the conservative movement will not succeed. Farhi said her sources see strength in the reformist movement's high degree of organization, with a "hidden" leadership that can keep things from going out of control. For the reformist front, she said, the issue is how to respond to the popular demands generated out of electoral politics in such a way that not too many people feel disenfranchised and Khatami will garner a respectable showing in next spring's presidential election. For the most part, she said, they feel secure due to the lack of alternatives the Iranian people have and to the indecisive and reactive politics of the conservatives.

Conservatives Work To Rebuild Support

Meanwhile, Farhi noted, the saner souls among the conservatives also seem to have given up the idea of regaining control of the presidency and parliament for the next five years and are already thinking about how to resurrect themselves as a more acceptable force in Iranian politics in the long term. The dilemma facing the conservatives is quite serious, Farhi said. They have levers of power that they can and have used with a vengeance, she noted, but they have also been forced to accept electoral politics, imperfect as it is, as some sort of adjudicator in elite competition. As such, she argued, they cannot reject offhand the importance of public opinion and voting preferences. Their dilemma is that every move they make to attack the reformists undermines their public standing and lowers their chances of making a comeback. Many of them are aware of the political boost, in terms of electoral competition, the reformist front is getting through the arrest of famous journalists and activists as well as closures of newspapers. Even prison time, Farhi asserted, has become part and parcel of established electoral politics for the reformists.

Farhi cautioned that the possibility still exists that a faction of conservatives has finally convinced government rulers that the only way to go is direct and unabashed authoritarian rule. But at bottom, she argued, the Iranian post-revolutionary political system has never been a system based on direct and forceful rule by a close-knit clique of people. Instead, she said, it has always been a system of complicated compromise and negotiation among a relatively small number of elite factions that had ties to broader constituencies in the larger society. Farhi asserted that all the main political players realize that an exclusionary clique rule cannot be sustained or even attempted. Thus, she concluded, they are likely trying to figure out how to head off this latest crisis, which in her view was mainly intended to constrain the way the new parliament will work over the next five years.

The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect those of the Middle East Institute, which does not take a position on Middle East issues."

Tajzadeh Convictedof RiggingTehran elections

2004-12-21T08:25:00.000-08:00

Tajzadeh rejects charges that Tehran elections were rigged: "Court proceedings in Tajzadeh's case politicized -- MP says
Shiraz, Fars Prov., March 4, IRNA -- An MP said here Sunday that there are proofs which show that court proceedings against Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh was politicized with an aim to remove him from his post as head of the elections headquarters.
Deputy Head of the Majlis Judicial and Legal Commission Ebrahim Amini said the way the case was handled at the court was a new model of proceeding invented by the Judiciary.

He said the practice shows the judiciary system's neglect of public opinion. People will certainly will give a crushing response to such acts through their participation in the next year elections, he added.

He added that in case of any violation at certain polling booths, all those involved in the process should be answerable.

The judiciary's initiative rules that in case of any violation the highest authority in an executive organ should be punished, he said, adding, ``This is neither in conformity with legal principles and rules nor is fair and just.''

An administrative court in Tehran sentenced Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh to one year in jail and barred him from supervising the elections process for six years and holding governmental posts for 39 months as well as paying 400,000 rials in cash fine, sources said Sunday.

The ruling was issued after he was found guilty of vote-rigging in last year's parliamentary elections.

Tajzadeh can appeal the verdict.

Bench 1403 of Tehran's Administrative Court, presided over by Judge Nasser Daqiqi, held eight hearings for the deputy minister.

Tajzadeh, a close confidant of President Mohammad Khatami was initially tried on charges of `electoral fraud' committed during last year's parliamentary elections which gave reformers a sweeping majority in the Majlis.

Following the parliamentary vote, the oversight Guardian Council accused the Interior Ministry of tampering with the votes. The 12-member GC and the interior ministry were in charge of the elections.

But, Tajzadeh has described the February 2000 parliamentary elections as the `cleanest' in the country so far and dismissed accusations to the contrary.

Tajzadeh has also been under fire for his November appointment as supervisor to the presidential elections scheduled for June. Critics predict and claim that he is very much likely to tamper with the ballots at the upcoming presidential elections, as they allege he had done in the previous parliamentary elections."

Mostafa Tadjzadeh is a member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front's (IIPF) leadership

2004-12-21T08:12:00.000-08:00

IranMania News: "Reformist party to defend accused opinion pollster

Sunday, January 05, 2003 - 2002 IranMania.com
TEHRAN, Jan 4 (AFP) - Iran's main reformist party announced Saturday it would rally to the defense of Abbas Abdi, a member of its leadership accused of spying after his polling institute showed most Iranians favor resuming dialog with Washington.

"We have decided to defend every member of our party that will be brought to justice for his opinions," said Mostafa Tadjzadeh, a member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front's (IIPF) leadership.

Abdi and Hossein Ghazian, both directors of the Ayandeh polling institute, and Behrouz Gheranpayeh, the head of the National Society of Public Opinion Studies, have spent more than two months in solitary confinement over the controversial poll on Iranian-US relations.

All three men have admitted in court to committing mistakes through negligence and have asked for the chance to fix their errors.

The two institutes released a survey showing that some 74 percent of Iranians favored resuming dialogue with arch-enemy the United States, traditionally branded the "Great Satan" by conservatives here.

Tadjzadeh denounced the jailing conditions of Abdi and other party members, saying confessions they have made could not be accepted because of the pressures they had been subjected to in prison.

Tadjzadeh said the trials of the three opinion pollsters were actually aimed at undermining the IIPF and the second main pro-reform party, the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution.

Reformists have hit out at the hardline judiciary for its alleged targeting of supporters of embattled moderate President Mohammad Khatami.

The IIPF renewed its threat Thursday to stage a mass-walk out from the government saying ultra-conservative actions, including what it said were politically-motivated trials, had caused the Islamic republic's reform camp to lose its legitimacy.

It also said the three pollsters, who are facing a raft of charges including seeking to pass on secret information to foreign governments, were being denied access to legal help."

Montazeri Openly Backs Yusefi-Eshkevari, Baqi, Ganji, and Nuri

2004-12-21T07:44:00.000-08:00

YUSEFI-ESHKVERAI FACES DEATH: "YUSEFI-ESHKVERAI FACES DEATH

TEHRAN 16TH OCT. (IPS) The Clergymen’s Special Tribunal CST) has found dissident cleric Hojjatoleslam Hasan Yousefi-Eshkevari guilty of allegations on five specific charges and a verdict will be issued against him after certain pending investigations are concluded, the official news agency IRNA reported Monday.

Quoting the unidentified source that, according to IRNA, had asked not to be named, the "specific charges" brought against Mr. Eshkevari are "apostasy, moharebeh, or waging war against God, questioning basic fundaments of Islamic laws, statements and acts constituting threats to national security made while attending the "anti-Islamic Berlin conference," propaganda against the Islamic system, confusing public opinion, insulting the late founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini and defamation against the clergy".

Asked by Iran Press Service, family and friends sources said they ignored what the sentence might be, but expressed the fear that he could face death is the charges are confirmed, as some of the charges like apostasy or moharebeh bears death penalty, in accordance with the Islam based rules in the Islamic Republic.

A prominent religious reformist cleric identified withy the Nationalist-religious current, Mr. Yusefi-Eshkevari was arrested on 5th August upon his return to Tehran from Paris, where he was treated by specialists for acute diabetes and taken to the notorious Evin prison.

The controversial CST tried Mr. Eshkevari behind closed doors suddenly, without the accused prior knowledge, refusing him his defence, providing him an appointed lawyer of its own.

Mr. Eshkevari’s elder son, Ruhollah, told the press outside Iran that his father was both "shocked and surprised" when he heard about his trial, particularly when he learned that above earlier charges, he was also accused of apostasy, war against God and corruption on earth.

Iranian jurists and experts pronounced his imprisonment and charges brought against him as "totally illegal and baseless", noting that the very tribunal that is judging him is both "illegal and unconstitutional".

Iranian and international human rights organisations, including the New York-based Human Rights Watch, the London-based Amnesty International and the Paris-based Federation of Human Rights Leagues that includes the Iranian League of Human Rights have all condemned the trial and urged the Iranian clerical-led authorities to free.

Dissident Grand Ayatollah Hoseinali Montazeri ruled Monday that nothing Hojjatoleslam Eshkevari has said or written could be considered as un-Islamic nor endangering the security of the nation.

In a statement from his residence, the Grand Ayatollah, himself under house arrest condition despite the fact that he is considered as the highest religious authority for the 200 millions Muslim Shi’a world-wide, expressed "astonishment and surprise" at the CST’s sentence.

"Religious-based accusations brought against (people) like (Hasan) Yusefi-Eshkevari, (Emameddin) Baqi, (Akbar) Ganji, and (Abdollah) Nuri by the authorities have nothing to do with Islam, but are political pretext to silence dissidents", Mr. Montazeri observed in a statement released from his residence in the city of Qom, 150 kilometres south of the Capital Tehran.

Mr. Baqi and Mr. Ganji are both famous investigative journalists and researchers noted for their articles denouncing the role high officials in the Iranian intelligence services played in the assassination of Iranian dissidents, going as far as accusing former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his Intelligence Minister Hojjatoleslam Ali Fallahian.

For his part, Hojjatoleslam Abdollah Nuri, a former Interior Minister and close friend of President Mohammad Khatami was impeached by the last conservative-dominated Majles before being tried and sentenced to five years imprisonment by the same CST he would denounced as "illegal".

One of the 17 Iranian reformists and dissidents who took part in a conference organised last April in Berlin by a cultural institute close to the Germany’s Green Party, Mr. Eshkevari had, in his address to the meeting, repeated that hejab, or the ugly dress the Iranian clerics are imposing on women is not mandatory by Islamic canons simply because it concerns individuals way of behaving ha ving nothing with religion.

However, looking for pretext to unleash a merciless war against reformists, particularly the independent press, the conservatives, led by Ayatollah Ali Khameneh'i, ordered the arrest of all the participants at the Berlin meeting and shut down 25 reformist publications.

"Not only nothing Hojjatoleslam Eshkevari has stated or written are illegal, let alone against Islam, conductive of his being put in prison, but even expressing one’s view against Islam is not sufficient for imprisonment", Mr. Montazeri pointed out in his statement.

Noting that there are more and more voices among young clerics urging reforms in Islam, observers said the Iranian orthodox clergy is bound the reserve the harshest possible of treatments to Mr. Eshkevari in order to "call to order" other religious reformers. ENDS ESHKEVARI SENTENCE 171000"

BBC: Karbaschi's Trial Tied to Abdollah Nuri's Impreachment

2004-12-21T07:40:00.000-08:00

BBC News | Monitoring | Tehran mayor's trial attracts media spotlight: "Tehran mayor's trial attracts media spotlight

Mayor Karbaschi in the dock: Iranian TV has broadcast the proceedings

The trial of the suspended Mayor of Tehran, Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, has become compulsive viewing for millions of Iranians.
It has also divided media opinion between those backing the reformist mayor and those who defend the conservative-dominated judiciary.

Mayor Karbaschi and the judge argue over Iranian law (in Persian)
The trial has become a test of President Mohammad Khatami's authority, highlighting conservative opposition to the reformist platform on which he was elected last August.

Mr Karbaschi, one of President Khatami's most prominent supporters, put up a vigorous defence during his last court appearance, angrily denying the corruption charges levelled against him.

Arrested in April, he faces charges of embezzlement, fraud and mismanagement of public funds.

Audience of millions

Mayor Karbaschi's sparring with the judge is watched by millions
Mr Karbaschi has been in the media spotlight, with state radio and television broadcasting the proceedings live, and millions of Iranians following each twist and turn in the drama.

His fourth court appearance was originally scheduled for June 21, but it was postponed because of intense interest in Iran's World Cup football match against the United States, which Iran won 2-1.

Iranian media have linked the trial with another high profile political controversy - President Khatami's backing for the Interior Minister Abdollah Nuri, who was impeached last week by the conservative-dominated parliament, or Majlis.

On Monday Mr Nuri told his former colleagues at the Interior Ministry that his impeachment had highlighted a split between those believing in "political development and the defence of people's rights and freedom" and those who "sought to censure these notions."

Meanwhile, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, also stepped into the fray, defending the conservative head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, as one of the country's bravest and most trustworthy theologians.

Press warning

The English-language Tehran Times, which has avoided taking sides in the ideological struggle, warned that Iranian officials were in danger of giving a misleading impression to foreign observers by contradicting each other.

The paper said Iranian officials should "always think twice before talking and not spare room for misinterpretation by the foreign media, when referring to colleagues in other branches of the government".

The daily stressed that Iran was "passing through a very crucial period of history", and that its "economy, as President Khatami himself admitted, is sick".

`Act of revenge'
Mayor Karbaschi's first hearing (in Persian)
'Salam' and another reformist daily, 'Hamshahri,' argued that the Karbaschi trial was politically motivated and was an act of revenge for the conservatives' failure at the last elections. 'Salam' said the trial was "an assault against the people' s vote" - a reference to Mr Khatami's landmark election victory .

Meanwhile, conservative dailies, including 'Resalat' and 'Jomhuri-ye Eslami,' said it was the judiciary's prerogative to investigate mismanagement of public funds. 'Resalat' recently published an attack on the Iranian news agency IRNA, which has avoided bias in its reports on the court battle.

In the article, a Tehran deputy, Ali Movahhedi-Savoji, argued that IRNA "is not impartial and I believe that there are elements within the agency who are acting irresponsibly by filing inaccurate reports".

Another conservative daily, 'Kayhan' accused IRNA of "untimely dissemination of information" on the trial.

The radio and television meanwhile, though reporting on the trial extensively, have so far refrained from comment.

BBC Monitoring (http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk), based in Caversham in southern England, selects and translates information from radio, television, press, news agencies and the Internet from 150 countries in more than 70 languages.
"

Abdollah Nuri rejects Islam as standard for Societal Conduct in Iran

2004-12-21T07:36:00.000-08:00

� l i t e r a t u r e �# 5: "Women and the Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran - The challenges facing women politicians and their endeavours in improving women's rights under the Islamic Republic of Iran.

By Dr Ziba Mir-Hosseini

The struggle for women's rights in Iran dates back to the 19th century. Women were prominent in the political events leading to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, but they were then forgotten as men monopolised power and power struggles, as so often happens in the aftermath of revolutions. Although the Pahlavi era (1925-79) saw major advances in women¹s rights, these were largely imposed from above and in the teeth of clerical opposition. Not surprisingly, then, the clerical victory in the 1979 Islamic Revolution saw a resumption of various ŒIslamic¹ restrictions on women: much publicised, as marks of women¹s renewed Œoppression¹, were the imposition of hejab (ŒIslamic covering¹) and the dismantling of the Family Protection Law that had curbed men¹s rights to divorce and polygamy.

But the Revolution led to many positive changes that neither the religious nor the secular opponents of the Shah had intended or predicted. Not least was a new critique of the gender biases in Islamic Law and a general raising of the nation¹s Œgender consciousness¹.

Since the revolution, matters concerning women, from their most private to their most public activities, have been openly debated and disputed by different factions, often in highly charged and emotional language. Consciously or not, everyone has been drawn into these debates, and forced to take a position. A range of positions regarding family law and other facets of women¹s rights were tolerated.

Eventually, by the early 1990s, new laws made it difficult for men to exercise their right to divorce, and the issue of enforced hejab came increasingly under question. Meanwhile, Iranian society has been changing radically.

Over 70 % of the population now live in urban areas, 60 % are under 25 years old, and 33 % are in education. Eighty percent of women are now literate; in 1998, 51%, and in 1999 57 % of University entrants were females.

The large majority of the population has no memory of the Revolution.

Elections are occasions when tensions come to the surface, positions are declared, and debates move on. The February 2000 elections for the Sixth Majles (Parliament) are taking place in a changed context and have a different dynamic from earlier ones.

The battle lines are more or less the same, but the rules have been changed by the unexpected victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential election, which has brought about a reformist movement and a free press and paved the way for Œdemocracy Iranian style¹, but against opposition from part of the clerical establishment.

The outcome of the February 2000 elections will have a decisive impact on Iran¹s crucial transition from theocracy to democracy, and just as women¹s votes were decisive in electing Khatami in 1997, so women are major players in this year¹s elections.

Politics and women¹s place in the Islamic Republic might now be radically different from what they were before the 1979 Revolution.

But one fundamental fact is unchanged: politics is still the man¹s domain, and the only women who enter the field are related, by blood or by marriage, to prominent men. As such, most women politicians are hostages, vulnerable to the political fortunes of these men, and only a few have managed to break free.

This vulnerability, and the painful challenges and contradictions of this time of transition, are nowhere more evident than in the cases of Faezeh Hashemi and Jamileh Kadivar. Both women come from political families, and entered politics in the Fifth Majles elections (1996). Hashemi, younger daughter of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the only woman in the Servants of Construction group, stood in Tehran. Kadivar, wife of Ataollah Mohajerani, one of the founding members of the same group, ran in Shiraz. The Servants of Construction broke away from the dominant Conservative faction and followed Rafsanjani¹s lead to run on a platform of ŒConstruction¹, hoping to break the Conservatives¹ control of the Majles. Both women advocated greater rights for women and identified themselves squarely as modernists in the battle with traditionalism.

In one of her pre-election speeches, Kadivar said that Article 1133 of the Iranian Civil Code, which gives men the absolute right to divorce, Œshould be changed under the guidance of the ulema and according to the requirements of the time.¹ This remark caused uproar. She was accused of Œwanting to take away men¹s right to divorce¹ and of Œinsulting the Quran¹. She was denounced by the Shiraz Friday Prayer Leader, and there were rumours she would be charged with heresy. Kadivar did not get into the Fifth Majles, even though she won the third highest vote in the first round of elections.

In Tehran, Faezeh Hashemi kept quiet on divorce, but broke other taboos. She promoted women¹s sports, and cycling in public. She was the first woman politician in the Islamic Republic who dared to wear jeans, clearly visible under her chador.

All these made her a target for those now termed ŒConservatives¹, who compared her to Ayesha, the Prophet¹s wife who led the Battle of the Camel against Ali, first ShiŒa Imam; but she became the darling of those who, after Khatami¹s unexpected victory in May 1997, became known as ŒReformists¹. The public welcomed her: in the Majles elections she won the second highest vote in Tehran. It was rumoured she was top of the poll, but the Conservative candidate (Nateq-Nuri) was declared the winner. A woman beating a cleric in the capital would have been a quite intolerable blow for the Iranian political system and its deeply rooted patriarchy.

It was within this patriarchal system that women deputies like Hashemi had to defend women¹s rights during the Fifth Majles.

Despite the highest number of women ever (fourteen), this parliament has the worst record on women¹s rights. It has ratified two infamous bills: one forcing medical services to adapt to religious law, and the other banning the Œexploitation of women¹s images¹ and Œthe creation of conflicts between men and women by propagating women¹s rights outside the legal and Islamic framework¹.

The first means that doctors can only treat patients of the same sex; the second prevents the press printing features on women, and terminates the lively debate on women¹s rights.

Both bills were part of a concerted effort by the Conservatives to frustrate the reforms promised by Khatami, by using his own slogan ŒThe rule of law¹. Ironically, both were drafted by the newly created Women¹s Commission of the Fifth Majles, and were proposed in the name of the defence of women¹s rights. Hashemi - and other Reformists in the Majles - opposed both bills, but to no avail. The two laws were, however, so far from the reality of Iranian society that it was impossible to implement them.

Meanwhile, Hashemi¹s own newspaper Zan (Woman) was another victim of the struggle between Reformists and Conservatives. In April 1999 the Revolutionary Court ordered it to close down; her father would not or could not come to her help.

The different press and public reactions to these two women now, compared with the run-up to the previous elections, can tell us something about how different this election is, and how far Iranian society has moved. Hashemi is no longer the icon of students and the youth. This has less to do with her actions during her term in parliament, than with her failure to distance herself from her father¹s decision at the end of 1999 to enter the election race.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani was nominated by the Conservatives, after all their attempts to curb and silence the Reformists and the press had failed.

He is seen as their last chance; despite their differences with him, they are prepared to stand behind him as a desperate tactic to avoid losing control of the Sixth Majles. Faezeh Hashemi has stood with her father, defending his record during the two terms of his Presidency (1989-97), and thus has lost the support of many Reformists.

Her place has been taken by women such as Jamileh Kadivar, who has consolidated her links with the Reformists. In February 1999, she nominated herself for the City Council in Tehran, and was elected. Meanwhile, her husband Ataollah Mohajerani, Khatami¹s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, has been responsible for nurturing a press that is now freer than at any time in Iranian history, for which he was unsuccessfully impeached in the Majles in spring 1999.

Kadivar has become a household name; her brother Mohsen, a Reformist cleric, was convicted of 'insulting the Islamic Republic¹ following a much-publicized trial in the Special Clerical Court.

Another victim of this Special Clerical Court was Khatami¹s former Interior Minister, Abdollah Nuri, one of the boldest Reformers. The Conservatives successfully impeached him in June 1998, and then had him tried in late 1999 to rule him out of the 2000 elections. This proved an unwise move, as in his defence Nuri effectively indicted some of the Islamic Republic¹s harshly imposed rules, including compulsory hejab. As a former Minister and a man with impeccable religious and revolutionary credentials, what he said is particularly significant. While defending hejab as a religious rule, he advocated tolerance and recognition of reality.

'Hejab is among our religious obligations¹, he said, Œbut the fact is that this religious rule is not followed by some in society (including some Muslims), and government's effort to force these people to observe the rule of hejab has not been successful.¹

What to do with this reality, this fact?

The Islamic Republic¹s official answer so far has been to deny reality, or to force it into a straightjacket of legal rules, and to punish those who do not conform. But Nuri, reflecting the Reformist agenda, had a different proposal: to distinguish social reality from religious ideals and rules, to give people the choice whether or not to follow the mandates of their faith, which can never be enforced successfully, as the failure of the Islamic Republic¹s hejab policy has shown.

The solution is to accept reality and respect the social rights of those who do not conform to religious rules, however much we disapprove. In his words, Œan examination of the situation of contemporary society, and a glance at the past situation of Islamic societies, shows that these lifestyles (which in some respects are not compatible with religious rules) have been accepted as reality.¹

Such a radical departure from the old slogans led to a predictable reaction from the Special Clerical Court. Nuri is in jail, absent from the elections, but he has raised the stakes by making explicit what the Reformists have not dared to say during their campaign.

How will the voters react? They will, in effect, be voting for or against what Nuri said during his trial. His defence, published immediately after his conviction, is a best-selling book which has become the unofficial manifesto of the Reformists. Both Faezeh Hashemi and Jamileh Kadivar are now running in Tehran, but have taken different positions as regards Nuri. How will the voters receive them this time? ENDS ELECTIONS MIR HOSSEINI

* Dr Ziba Mir Hosseini, a London-based Academic and women's activist, she made the much acclaimed documentary "Iranian Divorce" that was shown on most world's televisions. * * This article was written for IRANMANIA, one of the Iranians best and successful sites. *"

Abdollah Nouri urges Iranian leader to restrain anti-Khatami hardliners

2004-12-21T07:28:00.000-08:00

Abdollah Nouri urges Iranian leader to restrain anti-Khatami hardliners: "Abdollah Nouri urges Iranian leader to restrain anti-Khatami hardliners

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To: iran-news@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Abdollah Nouri urges Iranian leader to restrain anti-Khatami hardliners
From: Payman Arabshahi
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1998 20:03:39 -0800 (PST)
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TEHRAN, Dec 10 (AFP) - Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wasurged on Thursday to help rein in Islamic hardliners who have waged a campaignto counter President Mohammad Khatami's reform program.

"How could a minority of pressure groups prevent a president with a solidpopular backing from carrying out his program?" asked former interior ministerAbdollah Nuri in an editorial in Khordad newspaper.

"Who in the world with such strong popular backing lacks the levers to exercise his power and faces various problems in pushing through his agenda?" he asked.

Nuri, a liberal cleric who directs Khordad, lamented that the president, who was elected in a landslide in May 1997, does not control the security forces to back up his reform program.

He said Khatami does not enjoy "appropriate powers to meet popular expectations of establishing security and guaranteeing constitutional rights and freedom."

"Khatami says he will not let people's rights and freedom to be violated, says he wants to enforce the rule of law. But how is this possible? Does he control the security and intelligence forces. Does the judiciary act in harmony with him?," he asked.

Nuri, who was impeached by parliament in June for his liberal policies, urged the leader "as the captain of the ship to think up a solution to end the regrettable and dangerous (political) dispute" in Iran "which has caused serious worries."

Khatami on Monday accused "conservative and traditionalist forces" on Monday of blocking reforms in the Islamic Republic.

"We are facing the three currents of counterrevolution, traditionalists hostile to progressive religion and revisionists," he said, vowing that his government was determined to "re-establish respect for the law" and defend public liberties.

Iran's conservative hardliners have sought to counter Khatami's reform agenda, fearing that it paves the way for Western cultural influences and undermines traditional values.

Islamic militants have waged a violent campaign against pro-Khatami students, intellectuals and newspapers, whom they call "anti-Islamic liberals.""

Street Demonstrations call for Interior Minister Noori's Impeachment

2004-12-21T07:24:00.000-08:00

Brief on Iran, No. 854: "Khamenei's Faction Prepares to Oust Khatami's Interior Minister, Iran Zamin News Agency, March 10

The power struggle between the regime's rival factions further escalated with the demonstration yesterday of Khamenei's supporters in Tehran. The demonstrators called for the impeachment of Khatami's Interior Minister, Abdollah Noori. They accused Noori of "politically motivated appointments" and dismissal of governors affiliated with the rival factions.

Reports from within the regime indicate that governors ousted by Noori hold meetings to gather every available document and prepare for summoning the Interior Minister to Majlis. This faction has assigned a three-man team of its members in Majlis to prepare for the Impeachment."

Rafsanjani maneuvers against Anti-Velayat i-faqih reformists March1998

2004-12-21T07:21:00.000-08:00

http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/boi/08540311_98.html
Brief on Iran, No. 854 "Rafsanjani Plays "Wait and See" Game, Reuter, March 10
DUBAI - More than six months after stepping down as Iran's president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remains a potent political force, analysts say.

"Rafsanjani still retains a great deal of power. He is certainly one of the top three powerful figures in government," said a Tehran-based analyst.

He now heads the Expediency Council, an influential advisory body that reports directly to Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

A conflict between Iran's contentious factions may thrust Rafsanjani, seen as well-connected in both camps, into a mediating role.

So far, the battle lines have been drawn in competing newspapers, sermons of religious leaders, and various power centers in Iran's political structure.

Occasionally, the conflict turns to violence. Last week, a group of conservative students affiliated with the hardline Ansar-e-Hezbollah clashed with students rallying in support of Khatami.

Particularly critical will be Rafsanjani's role in the current debate on the role of the spiritual leader in Iran's political system.

A growing number of voices have expressed opposition to the power vested in Khamenei, who is given absolute authority in Iran's government system.

Rafsanjani stepped into the debate for the first time on February 3.

"He realized how dangerous the continuation of these political disputes would be for the Islamic regime so he stepped in to mediate," said Amirali Nourbaksh, a Tehran-based political and economic consultant."

BBC News Abdollah Nouri - Pro-Montazeri former vice president and interior minister

2004-12-21T07:00:00.000-08:00

BBC News | MIDDLE EAST | Profile of Abdollah Nouri: "Profile of Abdollah Nouri
Abdollah Nouri: Impeccable Islamic and revolutionary credentials

By BBC Iranian affairs analyst Sadeq Saba

One of the leading reformists in Iran, Abdollah Nouri, has been sentenced to five years in prison for political and religious dissent.

A Special Clerical Court found him guilty of publishing sacrilegious articles and opposing the teachings of the founder of the Islamic Republic, the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

Mr Nouri is one of the closest associates of the Iranian President, Mohammad Khatami, and a former vice president and interior minister.

Khomeini's protege

Abdollah Nouri is the most senior Islamic politician to be sentenced to prison since the Iranian revolution 20 years ago.

As a mid-ranking cleric, he has impeccable Islamic and revolutionary credentials and a long history of service to the Islamic Republic.

The leader of the Iranian revolution, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, appointed him as his representative to many important organisations, including the Revolutionary Guards.

The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has also appointed him as a member of a powerful council which advises him on major policies.

Oustpoken reformer

Mr Nouri served as interior minister under the former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and he was a member of parliament when President Khatami won his stunning election victory two years ago. Mr Khatami gave him his old portfolio back despite fierce resistance from conservatives.

Mr Nouri was generally seen as the most outspoken reformist in the cabinet. He was also one of the most important officials to support the leading dissident cleric, Ayatollah Hussain-Ali Montazeri, who has been under house arrest for the last two years for questioning the authority of Ayatollah Khamenei.

Mr Nouri was sacked from his post of interior minister last year by the conservative-controlled parliament for his defence of political and social freedoms. But Mr Khatami immediately brought him back to his cabinet as a vice-president.

He stood down from this post to take part in the municipal elections in February and was elected as the leader of Tehran's city council. But he recently resigned this post as well to stand for next February's crucial general elections.

Newspaper his downfall

Mr Nouri established a daily paper, Khordad, last year, with the intention of supporting Mr Khatami's reformist policy. The paper has been advocating freedom of expression, human rights and a modern and democratic Islam.

It was the content of this newspaper which eventually provided his opponents with an opportunity to indict him.

Mr Nouri sees himself as loyal to the Islamic Republic and during his trial insisted that his activities were only for ensuring its survival. He believes that if people fail to achieve their demands through peaceful means, violence and revolution become inevitable.

Nonetheless, he is the "bete noire" of conservatives and it is believed that the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, dislikes him. This is because he has been calling for limitations of his vast powers in the past few years.

Mr Nouri is well respected and he is seen as a man of high principles. His outspoken and aggressive defence during his trial has enhanced his popularity.

In the short term, his conviction is a severe blow to reformists. But in the long term, such actions may backfire."

Special Dispatch 9. February 2004 Grand Ayatollah Montazeri Interview

2004-12-21T06:19:00.000-08:00

"Special Dispatch9. Februar 2004Grand Ayatollah Montazeri Interview: 'The Guardian Council Manipulates the Laws; It is a Betrayal of the Revolution'Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri , the highest ranking Iranian cleric, who led the Islamic Revolution along with Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini 25 years ago, gave a recent interview to the Italian daily Il Corriere della Sera . In the interview, he expressed his views on the conflict between reformists and conservatives in Iran, between the Majlis (Iranian parliament) and the Guardian Council , which recently rejected 3,600 of the 8,157 candidates for the coming election on February 20th. Ayatollah Montazeri, a founding father of the first Constitution of Iran after the revolution, was designated by Khomeini as his successor. But he was marginalized and held under house arrest from 1997 to 2003, accused of having criticized the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei . He is now free and lives in the holy Shi'ite city of Qum . "Outside his gate," writes Paolo Conti , the interviewer, "many worshipers line up to obtain Qur'anic interpretations from him. But many of his aids warn foreign visitors: 'Montazeri free? To tell you the truth, around here many apartments are occupied by people from the secret services that follow his every move.'" The following are excerpts from the interview: [1] Question: " What do you think of the current conflict between the political and religious institutions in Iran?" Ayatollah Montazeri: "At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, we said regarding the elections: the Minister of the Interior and the Shah used to pick candidates to be voted, [but] now the election must be really free. We thought of a Council of Guardians to oversee the Ministry of the Interior, to make sure it did its work correctly, not to select the candidates… Then there was a revision of the Constitution, and I opposed it. They have manipulated it and put things upside down … all against our original intentions. Thus today, instead of free elections, we have a selection made by one faction of the electoral contest. All of this is illegal and anti-constitutional." Question: " So the spirit of the Islamic Revolution has been betrayed?" Montazeri: "[Acting] this way wounds the image of Iran, creating international qualms - and all this as a result of the illegal actions of a few. It is local experts from the cities that should evaluate the candidates; they are better informed of personalities and situations." Question: " You have contested the various special tribunals that proliferate and suffocate the Iranian justice system."
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2Montazeri: "They do not exist in the Constitution, which delegates judicial affairs to the Ministry of Justice. All of this disappoints the people, who become disgusted with the system. Khomeini wanted the special tribunals for a short time. They were supposed to disappear. After his death, they were re-instituted. The sentences of these tribunals are illegal. Such abuses happened before the Revolution, which in fact took place in order to prevent their occurrence. Instead, the same things are going on. And the people are not free." Question: " What do you think of the constant closure of reformist newspapers?" Montazeri: "Today in Iran, there is no freedom of the press. They have closed more than a hundred publications; honest and knowledgeable people have been deprived of their jobs. They have reduced newspapers to self-censorship. For instance, they are forbidden to write about me. If they do, they [the editors] are immediately summoned. There is repression, as before the Revolution…" Question: " You said: If this leadership does not change, the Islamic state itself is in danger. Do you think that the system may fall apart?" Montazeri: "The peoples' consensus is the basis for everything. The Islamic Republic means popular government. If the people are disappointed, they will stop believing in the Revolution or in Islam. There is a lot of aggressiveness from the system. Yet, the Qur'an speaks continuously of a God of love, clemency, and mercy. If there is rage and violence there will be rejection…" Question: "You do not have a good opinion of Khatami. Why?" Montazeri: "He talks a lot, but in practice he does little. Let's take [for example] the sit-in of the MP's to protest against the Guardian Council members' rejection of candidacies. Khatami should already have organized it three years ago, when the Guardians themselves rejected the electoral law. Khatami has adopted a tactic of quietism; he has avoided angering 'others.' But in fact what were these reforms? They were the implementation of the promises made at the beginning of the Revolution. Nothing special." Question: "You have also questioned Ali Khamenei's role…" Montazeri: "The [Supreme] Leader [Khamenei] should only give directions; basically guide. Instead, he puts himself above the law that is no longer in the hands of the Majlis. The new Article 110 of the Constitution gives him all the power, which is followed by the word 'absolute,' including control over the police and army, without being accountable to anyone. I opposed it… This is also why they ousted me. On the other hand, the President has all of the responsibilities but no power. That is the problem." Question: "How do you judge the repression of the student protests?" Montazeri: "They attacked these youths. They threw them to the ground and beat them… They should not have done it! Regarding young people our religion tells us: 'We must be like fathers, good [and] merciful.' In prayer we say: 'Oh, Prophet, you are sweet and good to everyone, if you were cruel and aggressive everyone would abandon you.' It is a lesson for those who govern. However … the Guardians have rejected three times a Majlis law to abolish censorship. If they have rejected it, this means they prefer torture." Question: " Recently you have also spoken against forbidding men and women to shake hands." Montazeri: "It is not forbidden [by Islam]. I have written everything in an opinion paper requested by Muslims living in Europe. Islam insists on respecting the interlocutor. If the woman does not find the gesture contrary to her self-respect, then it is allowed. It should be done mainly with non-Muslim women
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3that would interpret the lack of this gesture as impolite. As for Muslim [women], if it implies misconduct, then no, it is not allowed." [1] Il

Corriere della Sera (Italy), January 30, 2004. THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (MEMRI)Linienstr. 115, 10115 BerlinTel.: +49-30-97893872/-3968, Fax: +49 (030) 97893975eMail: memri@memri.de, URL: www.memri.de© Copyright 2002 by The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) - memri.de. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.Weiternutzung der Inhalte nur bei vollständiger Nennung der korrekten Quelle."